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The Marine Corps expends much effort and money annually in recruiting 
qualified applicants to fill its ranks; however, an average of one out of every five 
enlistees leaves the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) even before attending boot camp.  
This thesis uses binary probit models to analyze four years of enlistment data obtained 
through the Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) from five of the six Marine Corps 
Districts (MCDs).  The study first investigates whether the discharge probability of new 
recruits varies by the day of the month in which the recruit signs an enlistment contract.  
Building on this relationship, the thesis then analyzes attrition prediction variables to 
differentiate enlistees who exhibit a disproportionately high attrition risk from those who 
do not.  Results show that a recruit’s attrition risk does increase dramatically with the 
approach of the monthly deadline.  Additionally, recruits who exhibit a high attrition risk 
can be identified using current enlistment criteria.  If high-risk enlistees can be identified, 
proactive measures can be taken to reduce their discharge probability.  With the 
information provided by this thesis, the Marine Corps can target high-risk enlistees and 
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The Marine Corps spends large amounts of money recruiting qualified applicants 
to fill its ranks; however, an average of one out of every five enlistees never even ships to 
boot camp.  To understand one important aspect of DEP attrition, this study investigates 
whether the discharge probability varies by the day of the month of enlistment.  This 
particular relationship is explored because recruiters are evaluated based on a monthly 
goal and the attrition risk of accessions may be higher near the end of the month, when 
recruiters are often scrambling to meet that goal. 
Building on the relationship between recruiting day-of-month and discharge 
probability established in the first part of the thesis, the analysis then identifies attrition 
prediction variables that differentiate enlistees who exhibit a disproportionately high 
attrition risk from those who do not.  The ultimate goal of the study is to design a policy 
that produces an immediate and long-term net gain in shipments to recruit training.  The 




Recruiting activity centers around two main aspects:  contracting and shipping.  
Contracting, also known as production, involves all activities to enlist an applicant into a 
DEP.  Shipping involves the enlistee’s actual shipment from the DEP to recruit training. 
The DEP for all military services was instituted to assist the All-Volunteer Force 
during the 1970s.  In this program, enlistees may be scheduled for shipment to a recruit 
depot up to 365 days in advance, hence leaving them in civilian life for up to a year 
before their active duty commitment begins.  During this period enlistees are called 
“poolees” because of their presence in a recruiter’s pool of applicants awaiting shipment 
to training.  In the Marine Corps, as in all the other services, the DEP’s primary purpose 
is to allow the recruit depots to properly plan and fill their platoons.  While the program  
 
2is also designed to prepare enlistees for recruit training, poolees are not legally bound to 
honor any commitment to the Marine Corps.  Discharge from the DEP is therefore 
relatively easy.   
One could argue that it would be better to discharge an enlistee from the DEP 
than to spend any additional money on what is likely to be a substandard Marine.  While 
this is undoubtedly true, it is not relevant to the attrition issue treated in this study.  Given 
the severe consequences of missing their targets, Marine recruiters go to great lengths to 
accomplish their recruiting goals each month. This includes interviewing and enlisting 
various types of applicants who are not fully sold on being a Marine, applicants who will 
probably test positive for drug use on urinalysis, and applicants who have a variety of 
undisclosed moral and medical problems.  The issue, then, is not that enlistees are 
discharged while in the DEP, but that recruiters waste valuable time and effort 
processing, enlisting, and dealing with substandard applicants who then ultimately attrite.  
 
2. Cost 
While the actual time and monetary cost of a discharge is difficult to estimate, 
there can be no denying that pool discharges are bad business.  From the time a recruiter 
wastes on an enlistee who never ships to training, to the time spent searching to enlist 
someone to fill a discharged enlistee’s place, many costs must be considered to fully 
understand and evaluate the impact of this problem.  An estimate of the cost of a pool 
discharge is presented later in the thesis.     
 
3. Research Questions 
Primary research questions focus on reasons for DEP discharge that can be 
affected by policy change.  Secondary research questions focus on identifying and 
isolating subgroups that demonstrate a disproportionately high attrition risk.     
• Primary 
• How does the attrition rate of all enlistees vary over the course of a 
month?  Is there a greater attrition rate at the end of the month? 




• Are there subgroups that exhibit exceptionally high discharge 
probabilities at all times of the month? 
• Are there subgroups that exhibit exceptionally high discharge 
probabilities only at the end of the month? 
• Do the identified subgroups exhibit the same characteristics in an 
independent holdout sample? 
• What would be the immediate and long-term impact on production 
of a proposed policy change? 
 
B. SCOPE AND METHADOLOGY 
While the problem of DEP attrition will never be completely solved, it is assumed 
that a significant proportion of discharges occur because of factors that are associated 
with recruiter performance.  While recruiters cannot possibly foresee all discharges, they 
do gamble and enlist a considerable percentage of high-risk individuals who then 
eventually do attrite.  It is these applicants that must be identified as early in the 
recruiting process as possible.  If this can be accomplished, a policy can be developed to 
increase the efficiency of the Marine recruiter, decrease attrition from the DEP, and, 
ultimately improve contracting. 
The majority of enlistees into the DEP ship to recruit training.  Of those who do 
not, a small percentage are discharged for reasons that cannot be foreseen (death, 
pregnancy, pursuit of higher education, etc.).  Most discharges, however, are given for 
reasons that probably can be anticipated.  A significant percentage of these high-risk 
enlistees can possibly be identified through the use of current enlistment criteria and a 
policy can be developed to proactively lower their attrition risk.   
Figure 1 illustrates the pool of enlistees of the Marine Corps DEP to include good 
contracts and discharges.  It graphically depicts the hypothesis of the thesis:  that a large 















Figure 1.   Hypothesis Overview 
 
To investigate the hypothesis that discharge probability increases for enlistees 
who are recruited at the end of the month, two years of recruiting data (FY00/01) from 
five of the six MCDs were collected.  These data were drawn from TFDW and analyzed 
using probit linear regression models.  The testing of two different years of enlistment 
data (FY03/04) from the same commands cross-validated findings from the initial 
analysis.   
 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The remainder of this thesis discusses methodology, results, recommendations, 
and conclusions.  The next chapter examines previous analyses on attrition from the DEP 
and reviews current literature in order to establish the foundation for the direction and 
methods used in this study.  Chapter III outlines the methodology used to create variables 
and ensure accuracy of the data.  It explains in detail the difficulties encountered 
throughout the study and the solutions that were applied.  Finally, it clarifies the 
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5Chapter IV discusses the base regression models used to test the study’s 
hypothesis regarding end-of-month enlistees.  Chapter V examines regressions used to 
isolate different groups of enlistee.  Chapter VI outlines in detail the process of separating 
each data set into groups.   Chapter VII summarizes the findings of the thesis and 
presents conclusions and recommendations. 
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7II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. PREVIOUS WORK IN RECRUITING AND ATTRITION 
Although previous research has examined DEP attrition, to the author’s 
knowledge, no study has investigated the relationship between enlistment time (in 
relation to monthly goals) and an individual’s discharge probability.  Additionally, once 
factors predicting discharge have been discovered in prior studies, few prescriptions have 
been offered to reduce discharge rate.  The following discussion outlines previous studies 
that most closely relate to the methodology and subject of the thesis. 
 
1. Ogren (1999) 
In an NPS Master’s thesis, Margery Ogren (1999) looked at the effects of 
personal background characteristics and local area economic conditions on an 
individual’s probability of discharge from the DEP.  Her thesis was based on binary 
logistic models, regressing DEP attrition on the explanatory variables gender, educational 
level, dependent status, Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score, race, ethnicity, 
moral waiver status, and county-level unemployment rates.  Ogren’s (1999) sample 
consisted of all individuals joining the DEP for all services, from October 1989 through 
June 1996.  This dataset, from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), was merged 
with county-level unemployment data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  
Her total population consisted of over 1.1 million individuals who entered the DEP of all 
services during this time.  Of these, 167,134, or 15 percent, never entered basic training. 
Ogren’s (1999) results indicated that gender and educational level had a strong 
effect on the attrition behavior of individuals in the DEP.  In particular, females and high 
school seniors had much higher DEP attrition rates than did males and individuals who 
enlisted after high school directly from the work force.  Additionally, individuals with a 
moral waiver were found less likely to leave the DEP.   
Ogren (1999) determined that the Marine Corps experienced the highest attrition 
rate of all the services and that the longer a person spent in the DEP, the higher the 
probability of discharge.  Across all services, blacks and Hispanics were less likely to 
8attrite.  Higher county-level unemployment rates indicated only a small, negative effect 
on an enlistee’s probability of discharge. 
Although it is a good beginning to understanding DEP attrition, Ogren’s (1999) 
study produces only marginally usable data to actually solve the discharge problem.  
Women constitute such a small percentage of total enlistments that any policy change 
involving female recruitment would not have a significant practical impact on overall 
enlistment.  Further, any limitation or restriction on the enlistment of women would 
likely have negative consequences for service diversity goals that far outweigh the 
benefits.  Similarly, the implications of findings about blacks and Hispanics do not form a 
useful basis for any proposals to reduce attrition.   
Time in DEP increases the probability of discharge, which is probably intuitive 
and also not amenable to policy change.  If an individual is a high school graduate and 
spends no time in the DEP simply because he is out of a job and wants to ship to recruit 
training, he will have no probability of discharge.  Conversely, if an individual is enlisted 
immediately on becoming a high school senior and is scheduled to ship 360 days later 
(out of necessity), then it is obvious that he or she will have a much greater probability of 
discharge.  The only way to accurately evaluate the time spent in the DEP would be to 
analyze its relationship with a combination of DEP attrition and Marine Corps Recruit 
Depot (MCRD) attrition.   
The information that Ogren (1999) presents concerning the higher discharge rates 
of seniors guided the treatment of those applicant pools in the current research, and 
supports the idea that seniors and high school graduates should be analyzed in separate 
data sets.  The average time in DEP for a senior is simply so much greater than the time 
in DEP spent by a graduate that evaluating both groups together would lead to inaccurate 
conclusions.   
Even though Ogren’s (1999) findings that moral waivers decrease the probability 
of discharge are not useful to the search for factors that impact this problem, this 
discovery does provide insight toward a possible policy to reduce attrition.  While 
enlisting only those applicants who require a moral waiver is clearly not a feasible 
solution to solve the attrition problem, this finding does indicate that recruiters, who 
9interview applicants with moral problems, do evaluate the whole applicant before they 
make the decision to spend inordinate amounts of time gathering the necessary 
documentation to submit a waiver.  If the applicant does not indicate a strong desire to be 
a Marine and has moral issues that will require a waiver, the average recruiter will 
probably not spend time submitting tedious paperwork.  Therefore, if the recruiter 
submits a moral waiver and the applicant enlists, his or her probability for discharge is 
likely to be very low.   
The finding that moral waivers decrease DEP attrition is useful information since 
this same thought process could be applied to a group of enlistees who demonstrate an 
unusually high probability of discharge.  Requiring submission of tedious and time-
consuming documentation for a relatively small segment of enlistees who exhibit a 
disproportionately high attrition probability could make recruiters evaluate these 
applicants in a different light.  If an individual who fits a certain high discharge profile 
does not demonstrate a strong desire to be a Marine, and a recruiter must submit a waiver, 
the recruiter will probably not process this applicant for enlistment.                    
 
2. Quester and Murray (1986) 
Quester and Murray (1986) studied Navy DEP attrition of recruits who entered 
this service in FY 1983-84, also through the construction of a logit model.  Additionally, 
they analyzed actual Navy recruit cohorts from FY 1983-1984.  The analysis regressed 
DEP attrition on the explanatory variables of gender, educational level, dependent status, 
age, AFQT score, program enlistment, recruiting area, and numbers of months in the 
DEP.  The data were collected from the Navy’s Personalized Recruiting for Immediate 
and Delayed Entry System (PRIDE).  The study’s total population consisted of 171,328 
enlistees.  Of these, 147,521 entered the DEP, while 20,743 were “Direct Ships” (entered 
active duty the same month as enlisted) and therefore had little chance of discharging 
from the DEP. 
Quester and Murray (1986) determined that a ten-percent increase in the time 
spent in the DEP increased a person’s attrition probability by 12 percent.  Further, the 
authors found that women and older recruits were more likely to be discharged than were 
10
male and younger recruits.  Finally, they concluded that the effects of AFQT were 
inconclusive in predicting DEP attrition.  
In addition to the above, this analysis determined that individuals with a ship date 
in May were more likely to attrite than those scheduled in other months.  Conversely, a 
ship date in October was found to have the lowest probability of discharge.  Although 
interesting, it would be difficult to use these findings as the basis for discovering 
variables that identify enlistees with a high attrition risk.  Even if some month’s enlistees 
had a high probability of attrition, it would be difficult to implement any type of policy 
limiting enlistment during these times.  The Quester and Murray (1986) discovery, that 
time of year affects discharge probability, however, does guide the approach of the 
current research in treating seasonality as a control variable. 
Finally, corresponding to intuitive reasoning, Quester and Murray (1986) 
determined that, as the ratio of recruits in the DEP per recruiter increased, so did DEP 
attrition.  It was suggested that this was caused by less time for the recruiter to prepare 
each recruit for boot camp. 
Although the population of Quester and Murray’s (1986) analysis is smaller than 
the previous reference and it analyzes only the Navy, many of its findings were 
statistically significant.  The findings with respect to discharge for female and older 
recruits seem to be supported by other later studies, as does the finding of increased 
attrition as the ratio of recruits per recruiter increases.  Many of the findings of this 
analysis have been considered in the formulation of the model in this thesis. 
 
3. Zeelenburg (1999) 
Although time in DEP is a variable that is unsuitable for policy change, it is 
probably the phenomenon most closely related to personnel attrition as studied within the 
field of Organizational Behavior.  According to Simonson (1992), “When looking back at 
purchase decisions, consumers often regret the choices they have made”.  Widely studied 
and analyzed, a number of theories have been put forward about why and when 
employees separate from their employers.  DEP attrition is notably different, however, in 
that recruits decide to leave the program after they have made a commitment to join, but 
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before they have had any real experience of the organization.  Therefore, theories that 
involve characteristics of the workplace and feelings of regret that result from comparing 
current outcomes to what might have been, would not be applicable to analyzing DEP 
attrition.  “Regret and rejoicing stem from comparisons of obtained decision outcomes 
with forgone decision outcomes” (Zeelenburg 1999).  When an enlistee chooses not to 
honor a commitment, the psychological factors involved more closely resemble buyer's 
remorse:  the well-known cognitions of regret that often occur immediately after a major 
purchase, or other commitment.  “Regret is a negative, cognitively based emotion that we 
experience when realizing or imagining that our present situation would have been better, 
had we decided differently” (Zeelenburg, 1999).   
While related to DEP attrition, both the turnover literature and the literature on 
buyer's remorse at best provide explanatory theories of recruit behavior, and as such they 
cannot directly inform the current research. This thesis is primarily focused on 
establishing the existence of a certain kind behavior among recruiters (the “hockey-stick” 
phenomenon, described below) and prescribing policies to remedy that behavior.  
 
4. Kearl and Nelson (1992) 
Kearl and Nelson (1992) studied Army DEP attrition, validating and adding to the 
findings of previous literature.  These authors also used a logit model and based their 
results on two years of Amy enlistments from FY1986 through FY1987.  Their data set 
consisted of 241,420 observations and excluded prior service and reserve enlistments.   
Kearl and Nelson (1992) estimated the effects of personal characteristics, 
economic conditions, and recruiting incentives on DEP attrition.  Because of the unique 
behavior of high school seniors and non-high school graduates, the authors chose to 
analyze these individuals in separate data sets.  Kearl and Nelson (1992) also realized that 
DEP length affected enlistee behavior.  Because of this, they divided their observations 
based on this characteristic.  Data sets were not only separated on the basis of education 
but also with the belief that entrants who remained in the DEP for more than four months 
behaved differently than those who did not.  The resulting study evaluated five different 
groups of enlistees: high school seniors with a short DEP length; high school seniors with 
12
a long DEP length; high school graduates with a short DEP length; high school graduates 
with a long DEP length; and non-high school graduates. 
Kearl and Nelson (1992) determined that individuals with dependents had the 
lowest attrition risk of any enlistee, while an increase in age also increased discharge 
probability.  As in other studies, the authors found that high school graduates and men 
had a much lower attrition risk than did seniors. 
Recruiting incentives also affected DEP loss.  An increase of one month of DEP 
time increased the probability of discharge by 3.5 percentage points.  Kearl and Nelson 
(1992) determined that enlistment bonuses decreased the probability of discharge, while 
two-year terms of enlistment significantly increased attrition rates.  High AFQT scores 
had a small effect on attrition.  The higher the AFQT score, the lower the attrition risk.  
The authors found that AFQT was not statistically significant.   
 
B. THE “HOCKEY-STICK” PHENOMENON AND GOAL SETTING 
1. The Hockey-stick Phenomenon 
Although no previous studies have investigated the increase in DEP attrition for 
enlistees signed at the end of the month, ample evidence exists to support this 
phenomenon.  The “hockey-stick” effect is an explanation for behavior that occurs in the 
presence of a deadline-sensitive goal.  Often called the “end of the month rush,” this 
event is cited frequently in business literature.  As Lee (1997) states:   
The company has orders pushed on it from customers periodically because 
salespeople are regularly measured, sometimes quarterly or annually, 
which causes end-of-quarter or end-of-year order surges.  Salespersons 
who need to fill orders may “borrow” ahead and sign orders prematurely.  
The U.S. Navy’s study on recruiter productivity found surges in the 
number of recruits by the recruiters on a periodic cycle that coincided with 
their evaluation cycle.  The “hockey stick” phenomenon is quite prevalent. 
(p.96)   
Another study on Navy recruiting done by the same author warns of the hockey-
stick effect due to the implementation of a new plan, which “measures monthly recruiter 
performance against a uniform standard.”(Lee, 1986, p.1385)  Lee states:  “any future 
analysis will encounter many of the problems inherent in the analysis of sales force 
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productivity in the private sector.” (Lee, 1986, p. 1386)  Based on its prevalence in 
civilian sales organizations and the author’s own experience, a possible “hockey-stick” 
effect on DEP attrition seemed worthy of investigation.   
But why, exactly, are enlistees signed during the last-week expected to exhibit a 
higher attrition rate than individuals enlisted during other times of the month?  Aside 
from just making sense and being supported by the existing literature, numerous 
scenarios can be described to explain this effect.   
Throughout the month, recruiters frequently interview individuals who have 
recently smoked marijuana.  These applicants are ineligible for enlistment for 
approximately 30 days, since they are administered a urinalysis on the day of enlistment.  
Although recruiters continue the interview, they place the applicant on a “next month” 
pending list if the individual is otherwise screened and sold on being a Marine.  But, as 
the last few days of the month draw near and the recruiter (substation, station, district, 
region, and nation) struggles to achieve the recruiting goal, pressure to enlist an applicant 
of this sort increases, depending upon risk.  If the individual were interviewed during the 
third week of the month and smoked marijuana within a few days of the interview, he 
would probably not be scheduled for enlistment during the current month because of his 
extremely high attrition risk.  But, if the individual were interviewed during the first week 
of the month, smoked marijuana within a few days of the interview, and is therefore 
approaching a 30-day required wait, it is easy to see why recruiters would take a chance.  
These types of individuals are frequently enlisted at the end of the month and then are 
promptly discharged again, when the results of the urinalysis are returned during the first 
few days of the next month. 
Pressure to achieve the monthly goal also causes other types of discharge.  
Applicants who screen well but are not completely sold on being a Marine are frequently 
pressured to enlist during the final days of the month.  These enlistees do not discharge 
immediately, but the longer they remain in the DEP, the more buyers’ remorse they are 
likely to experience.  Conversely, if this type of individual immediately ships to recruit 
training, the probability of subsequent attrition from active duty is extremely high.   
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It is relatively easy to imagine medical, moral, and education problems being 
undisclosed by enlistees or intentionally withheld by recruiters in their struggle to achieve 
a monthly goal.  This pattern of behavior is the basis for the hockey-stick effect, which is 
investigated in this thesis.      
 
2. Goal Setting 
If we can establish that recruitment behavior at the end of the month causes a 
marked increase in the discharge probability of enlistees, we must further find some 
strategy for resolving the issue. Even if a major cause of DEP attrition is recruiter 
performance and the overarching desire to make a quota, what sort of incentives or goals 
can be assigned to change this behavior?   
As the existence of deadline-oriented goals lead to hockey-stick behavior, an 
initial place to look for improving the situation is the goal-setting literature itself.  
According to goal-setting theory, “people with specific hard goals (often called stretch 
goals) perform better than those with vague goals such as ‘do your best’ or specific easy 
goals.” (Latham, 2004, p. 126)  Additionally, “the psychological outcomes of setting and 
attaining high goals include enhanced task interest, pride in performance, a heightened 
sense of personal effectiveness and, in most cases, many practical life benefits such as 
better jobs and higher pay”. (Latham, 2004, p. 126)  With the investigation of end-of-
month recruiter performance and the discovery that the attrition rate of enlistees increases 
during this period, a possible solution would be to assign a more difficult goal.     
But, recruiting goals are already so challenging and concrete that a stretch mission 
would probably not produce the desired result.  As an example, a recruiter who writes 
two or three contracts each month (a normal mission) is considered successful, whereas a 
recruiter who writes four or more contracts consistently is considered almost heroic.  
Therefore, adhering to current goal-setting philosophy, and assigning a “stretch” goal of, 
say, five contracts each month to every recruiter, would really not be feasible.  With the 
assignment of such a ridiculous goal, recruiters would simply give up and not really 
strive to achieve it in the first place.  A goal of four would be treated in a similar fashion 
and a goal of three would not really be a stretch goal at all. 
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With the realization that higher goals would probably not improve performance, 
and due to the lack of meaningful incentives because of the nature of recruiting, it was 
decided to focus on the increased attrition probability of applicants who were enlisted at 
the end of the month.  In exploring this avenue, it became apparent that the discharge 
probability of an enlistee was an unquantifiable characteristic and, therefore, no feasible 
method could be developed to verify that recruiters had indeed enlisted applicants who 
would eventually ship to recruit training.   
In recognizing the requirement to somehow quantify discharge probability in a 
concrete fashion, and through the exploration of a goal-setting solution, the research 
shifted its focus to an inductive process of identifying the most problematic categories of 
recruits.  If quantifiable and concrete characteristics could be identified that have a strong 
correlation with the attrition rate of enlistees, a straightforward policy could be proposed 
to reduce DEP discharges by limiting or further qualifying the recruitment of candidates 
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III. DATA COLLECTION, ACCURACY, AND METHODS 
A. DATA COLLECTION  
As stated earlier, two separate data sets were obtained from the Marine Corps 
TFDW.  The initial data set consisted of all enlistments from 1 October 1999 through 30 
September 2001 from five of the six Marine Corps Districts (MCDs).  The second sample 
consisted of all enlistments from 20 May 2002 through 20 May 2004 from the same five 
commands.  Its purpose was to function as a “holdout” sample to test the validity of the 
model.    
One district (8MCD) was omitted because of the limits in an Excel spreadsheet.  
Two years of enlistments from six Marine Corps Districts would have exceeded the 
65,536 Excel cell limit for a single spreadsheet.  To download the data from all six 
districts would have required two separate spreadsheets.  Since both samples consisted of 
ample data to represent a typical Marine Corps enlistee, the author did not believe it 
necessary to create two spreadsheets. 
While the dates of the first sample encompassed two full fiscal years, the second 
sample did not.  The date difference between the first and the second sample was due to 
the desire to use the most recent two years of Marine Corps recruiting data for the 
holdout sample.  If the dates for the second sample had been from 1 October 2002 
through 30 September 2004 (the actual fiscal years), the enlistees from 20 May 2004 
through 30 September 2004 would not have had an opportunity to ship or to discharge.  
Because of the collection date (20 May 2005), only applicants who had enlisted before 20 
May 2004 would have had their true disposition reflected in the Marine Corps enlistment 
system.  It is for this reason that the holdout sample consisted of enlistments from 20 
May 2002 through 20 May 2004.  
Figure 2 graphically depicts the timing of enlistments in the two samples.  Sample 
1 is the original sample.  Since the date of data collection was 20 May 2005 and the last 
enlistment date of this sample was on 30 September 2001, these enlistees would all have 
had the opportunity to either ship or discharge.  But, had the dates for the second, most 
recent, sample mirrored these dates, enlistees would not have had sufficient time to either 
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ship or discharge.  Individuals who enlisted from 20 May 2004 through 30 September 
2004 would have had 365 days to either ship or discharge, which would have placed 
these individuals past the data collection date (20 May 2005).  To circumvent this 
difficulty and still use the most recent data available, the second sample consisted of 











Figure 2.   Sample Selection 
 
Finally, the Marine Recruiting Services migrated from the Automated Recruit 
Management System (ARMS) to the Marine Corps Recruiting Information Support 




After collection, the data were evaluated to ensure accuracy.  Missing or 
obviously incorrect entries were deleted and numerous variables were created to 
accurately describe the characteristics of enlistees in the Marine Corps DEP.  The 
following discussion summarizes the treatment of data and the difficulties encountered in 
the process of creating the samples used in the subsequent analysis. 
 
20 May 2002 20 May 2004 
(Sample 2)  
Sample 2 = Enlistees 
have until 20 May 2005 
to either ship or 
discharge 
1 Oct 1999 30 Sept 2001 
30 Sept 2004 
Not included because 
enlistees have from 20 
May 2005 to 30 Sept 





1. Component Code Changes 
Component code changes (individuals who changed their component from regular 
to reserve or the opposite) were not coded as discharges since these enlistees merely 
decided to switch from one component to the other and did not really discharge.  
Although it is a common belief that enlistees who change from a regular to reserve 
component have a higher attrition risk, there was no way to verify this information.  The 
variable (COMP_CHANGE_FLAG) that TFDW provides to highlight this statistic is 
inaccurate. 
If an individual changes from a regular to a reserve component or the opposite, he 
receives a “ZKC” for his discharge code.  This identifies the enlistee as a Component 
Code Change.  At this time, the enlistee also receives a “Y” under the variable 
COMP_CHANGE_FLAG.  If at some later time this same enlistee discharges from the 
DEP, he would receive a different discharge code, deleting the old “ZKC” in the process.  
With the COMP_CHANGE_FLAG variable, an observer would know that the discharged 
enlistee had changed from one component to the other.   
Although this system sounds satisfactory, the author noticed that there were 603 
records in the original FY00/01 data set that had no discharge code whatsoever but were 
labeled “Y” under COMP_CHANGE_FLAG.  When the TFDW staff was questioned 
about this anomaly, they verified that if a record had a “Y” coded under 
COMP_CHANGE_FLAG, this entry should either have had a “ZKC” or another code 
listed under its discharge code.  The explanation provided by TFDW was that the 
discharge code for the 603 records probably had some values at one time.  Users later 
found out that they may have discharged the wrong person, so they called the MCRISS 
helpdesk and requested the record to be corrected.  The MCRISS helpdesk then blanked 
out the discharge code but did not blank out the value entered under 
COMP_CHANGE_FLAG.  Because of this explanation, the author ignored the variable 
COMP_CHANGE_FLAG              
Finally, even if the variable COMP_CHANGE_FLAG had provided accurate 
information, it still would not have been appropriate for use in this thesis.  While an 
enlistee changing from a reserve to regular component would probably not be considered 
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a sign of decreasing motivation to be a Marine, the reverse change would potentially 
indicate this phenomenon.  The variable COMP_CHANGE _FLAG only indicated a 
component code change and not the direction of the change.  To most accurately identify 
the effect of a component code change, the variable needs to accurately indicate a change 
from reserve to regular or a change from regular to reserve. 
 
2. Prior Service, Non-Graduates, and Recontracts 
Prior service contracts were deleted from the data set.  Enlistees who have been in 
the military at a previous time spend almost no time in the DEP and therefore exhibit a 
very low overall attrition rate.  Prior Service entrants do not represent a typical 
enlistment.  Non-graduates were deleted from the data set because they represent a small 
and unique segment of the recruiting market and were thus uninteresting to this study.  
No separate variable was created for applicants who had recontracted.  These individuals 
had been previously enlisted into the DEP but had failed to ship to recruit training.  Since 
the same amount of recruiter work had to be done to re-enlist an applicant who had 
previously discharged, these individuals were treated as separate enlistments.  It should 
be noted that for this study, recontracted applicants who failed to ship to recruit training a 
second time would be counted as discharges twice.          
 
3. Waivers 
a. Duplicate Entries 
The inclusion of waiver information produced an additional record for 
each person with a waiver, causing many duplicate entries.  To correct this problem, the 
data were rearranged to list all waivers by type and level, by Social Security Number 
(SSN).  The data were then coded in such a fashion that only one waiver of each type was 
retained.  So, as an example, if an enlistee received a District level and a Region level 
dependency waiver, he or she was counted as having received only one dependency 
waiver.  Variables were created to reflect receipt of different types of waivers.  




waiver.  After making the correction, the individual had only one record and variables 
representing each type of waiver.  Table 1 shows the original and corrected records for a 
hypothetical enlistee. 
 







b. Waiver Level and Type 
Waiver information is categorized by both waiver level and type.  From 
examining the data and the author’s own experience, the seven main waiver types 
include:  drug, moral, BUMED (Bureau of Medicine), weight, age, administrative, and 
dependency.  Also, from examining the data and the author’s experience, waivers can be 
reviewed at four different levels of command:  Marine Corps Recruiting Command 
(MCRC), Region, District, or RS. 
As observed in the literature review, waivers are important to this analysis 
not because of their possible use to isolate a “good” contract from one that is prone to 
discharge but due to their potential for preventing discharges.  While at first glance it 
would seem that an enlistment waiver should increase the probability of discharge, 
exactly the opposite is usually true.  Rather than allowing a substandard individual to 
enlist, most waivers force the recruiter to truly evaluate a potential applicant and decide if 
he or she is worthy of additional effort.  In this study, waiver information is important 
because of the time it takes a recruiter to submit the paperwork for the waiver and not 
really because of the “type” of waiver itself. 
The issue was how best to code waiver information to accurately 
differentiate waivers that absorb recruiter time from waivers that did not.  Should waivers 
  
NAME SSN DIST WVR.LVL.1 WVR.DESC.1 WVR.LVL.2 WVR.DESC.2
JOHNSON 555996684 12MCD REGION DEPENDENT
JOHNSON 555996684 12MCD DISTRICT DEPENDENT
ORIGINAL DATA ENTRY
NAME SSN DIST DEPENDENT WAIVER
JOHNSON 555996684 12MCD YES
CORRECTED DATA ENTRY
22
be classified only by type, (seven different variables), by level (four different variables), 
or by both waiver level and type (28 different variables)?  Or, should waivers be coded in 
some other manner?  To resolve the problem and to accurately demonstrate the effect of 
enlistment waivers, the author used his knowledge of key points about the data to develop 
a classification scheme for waivers.   
Moral and drug waivers increase in severity as reviewing levels become 
higher.  The significance of this information is that an RS-level moral or drug waiver 
takes virtually no time while a MCRC-level waiver of this type is extremely tedious.  To 
accurately describe the effects of these two types of waivers, eight separate variables 
would have had to be created.  These eight variables would have described the effect of 
this type of waiver at all levels of review (MCRC, Region, District and RS level for both 
moral and drug waivers). 
Unlike moral and drug waivers, other waiver types are more alike in the 
time required for preparation of paperwork, regardless of level.  BUMED waivers are 
granted only at the MCRC level and are time-consuming to prepare.  Age and 
dependency waivers take the same amount of time no matter what their level and are 
reviewed mainly at the District and Region levels.  Administrative waivers consist of 
education and criteria waivers, which are both usually reviewed only at the MCRC level.  
Education waivers review a questionable enlistee’s education paperwork, while criteria 
waivers are submitted when an enlistee falls short of certain minimum test scores needed 
for some Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs).  Finally, although weight waivers 
are typically reviewed only at one or two levels, and therefore require the same amount of 
time to prepare, they constitute a special case and are discussed in detail below.   
Because of the above distinction, it was decided not to include moral and 
drug waivers in this analysis.  While previous studies (Ogren, 1999) have shown that 
moral waivers decrease attrition risk, creating eight additional variables to accurately 





c. Weight Waivers 
During the course of the thesis and upon running countless models, it was 
discovered that weight waivers dramatically decrease attrition risk more than any other 
waiver.  While other waivers decrease discharge probability by a significant 3 to 7 
percentage points, weight waivers decrease attrition risk by more than triple this amount.  
At first, it was believed that the incredibly low attrition risk of these enlistees resulted 
from recruiters having a more quantifiable goal to attain (get these individuals to lose 
weight by their ship date).  However, upon closer examination it was discovered that 
many weight waivers are granted to individuals directly before they ship.  They are in 
essence shipping weight waivers and not contracting ones.  Consequently, these waivers 
would exhibit a strong negative correlation with discharge probability.  Enlistees who 
receive these waivers do so on the day they actually ship to recruit training.  Since a 
weight waiver has very little to do with DEP attrition (because it is granted on ship day), 
a variable to represent these waivers was not included in this study.   
The four waiver types that were included as dummy variables in this thesis 
(BUMED, age, dependency, and administrative) are more uniform than moral and drug 
waivers in the time it takes to prepare them.  Additionally, these waivers are granted upon 
enlistment and not on ship day.  For these reasons, these variables are believed to 
accurately demonstrate the effects of recruiter prescreening on attrition risk.    
 
4. Education Code 
Because of the widely differing characteristics of high school graduates and 
seniors, two sub-samples were created for these groups.  This produced a total of four 
different samples (FY00/01 graduates and seniors and FY03/04 graduates and seniors).  It 
was at this time that a data error was discovered, because senior enlistment percentages 
were only 30 percent for one sample and 20 percent for the other.  After a discussion with 
Marine Corps Recruiting Command, it was confirmed that the education code of some 
applicants who had enlisted as seniors had been incorrectly changed to “graduate” based 
on the education level on their ship date.  This problem was most pronounced in the 
FY03/04 sample, but affected the FY00/01 sample as well. 
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To resolve this difficulty, the education status of enlistments was recoded.  First, 
it was assumed that the education codes of the existing seniors were correct.  The ages of 
these enlistees (17 and 18 years old) tended to confirm this assumption.  Additionally, 
average discharge probabilities for these enlistments were much higher than for the 
“graduate” data set, again indicating that the existing education codes for the originally 
coded “seniors” were, indeed, correct.   
Graduate data sets were then analyzed on the basis of enlistment, ship, and 
discharge date, as well as DEP time.  Individuals who enlisted in June, and shipped or 
discharged in June, and spent 335 to 365 days in the DEP were separated and assumed to 
be seniors.  For July, both June and July shippers and discharges were included, based on 
a 305 to 365 day DEP time.  Each month of the year was analyzed in this fashion, and the 
seniors were identified.  Finally, the new data sets of “graduate-coded” seniors were 
analyzed on the basis of age.  All “graduate coded” seniors with an age greater than 19 
were returned to the graduate data set.  
The final FY00/01 and FY03/04 data sets consisted of approximately 50 to 60 
percent graduate contracts and 40 to 50 percent senior contracts.  These percentages 
corresponded to commonly known graduate and senior recruiting practices.   Ages of 
seniors were largely 17, 18, and 19, while the ages of graduates were mostly 18 and 
older.  The final testament to the accuracy of the redefined data concerned the discharge 
probabilities of the seniors and graduates.  Average discharge probabilities for the new 
seniors were approximately 22 percent while graduates exhibited an 11 percent discharge 
rate.  Although not totally accurate, the newly created graduate and senior samples are 
believed to be a good representation of the true graduates and seniors enlisted by the 
Marine Corps during this time. 
 
5. Missing Data 
As mentioned previously, enlistment data migrated from ARMS to MCRISS 
during FY02.  Although the actual transition period was avoided, it was still believed that 
the FY00/01 data were inaccurate, aside from the senior/graduate issue discussed above.  
The relative scarcity of contract data from the 4th District, as well as the low overall 
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accessions from all districts, lead the author to believe that enlistment data had somehow 
been lost.  Enlistments from the 1st, 6th, 9th and 12th MCD ranged from 2,500 to 3,500 per 
year (each approximately 2,500 to 3,000 short), whereas enlistments from the 4th 
amounted to only 800.   
Although enlistments from one district were extremely low and accessions from 
the other commands seemed to be missing as well, some key points must be mentioned.  
First, all prior-service and non-graduate observations were deleted from the sample, 
thereby accounting for some of the missing information.  Second, when inaccurate data 
entries were encountered for a given variable, the entire enlistment record was deleted.  
Because of these decisions, enlistment samples were understandably lower than expected.    
But the fact remains that enlistments for the FY00/01 sample were low for the 4th 
MCD as well as the other commands and therefore it must be assumed that some records 
were lost.  Deletions of observations are believed to have been entirely random due to the 
computer error during the migration from ARMS to MCRISS.    With over 26,000 data 
entries remaining in the FY00/01 sample, there is ample variation in the variables 
contained in the data set.  Additionally, as seen in Chapter VI of this thesis, the signs and 
effects of key variables from the FY00/01 data set validated with those from the FY03/04 
sample. 
In contrast to the FY00/01 data, the holdout sample did accurately represent true 
enlistments from each Marine Corps District.   Accessions for all districts in this data set 
ranged from 4,000 to 5,000 each year, which, when prior service, non-graduate, and 
inaccurate data deletions are taken into account, reflect normal enlistment levels.  
Because of the positive validation results between the two data sets (see Chapter VI 
below) the author is confident that the conclusions presented in this thesis are well 
supported.       
 
C. METHODS 
Once the data were correctly coded and the increase in discharge probability of 
end of the month contracts was established, a method was needed to differentiate 
enlistees based on attrition risk.  As discussed previously, if the attrition risk of 
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individuals remained a mystery, then recruiters would inevitably continue to enlist 
questionable applicants in their struggle to achieve their monthly goals.  The following is 
a discussion of the methods used to identify categories of enlistee that exhibited different 
probabilities of discharge.  An even more detailed account of this process is provided in 
Chapter VI.  While it is necessary to summarize the entire method at this point, important 
data from base regressions are first discussed in Chapters IV and V.  Without the 
background provided by these two chapters, the detailed discussion of the methods used 
to identify high-risk enlistees would be difficult to follow.      
 
1. Methods to Identify Suitable Variables 
To distinguish enlistees based on their attrition risk, only variables that were 
“concrete” (accurate beyond any question) could be used.  As an example, although 
probably a differentiating characteristic, drug use was unsuitable for the purpose of this 
analysis.  Not only could applicants potentially remain quiet about actual drug use but 
recruiters could also fail to properly screen.  Conversely, the time between when an 
individual took the ASVAB and when he actually enlisted, (ASVABTIME) was a 
variable that affected discharge probability, but could not be changed, hidden, or remain 
undisclosed.  The date an individual takes the ASVAB is recorded by a testing officer and 
the subsequent enlistment date is recorded by several official agencies.  This time period 
is therefore accurate.  Variables such as ASVABTIME were considered “concrete” and 
therefore also appropriate in identifying individuals with a high attrition risk, while 
variables that reflected any type of questionable data were not. 
Accuracy was, however, not the only criterion necessary for variable selection.  It 
was preferable that the characteristics chosen to identify high-risk individuals also 
applied to a sufficiently large group of enlistments to actually make a difference.  If a 
variable could be found that identified enlistees that exhibited a high probability of 
discharge, but the Marine Corps only enlisted 10 of these individuals during a two year 
time period, then it would make little sense to propose a policy to qualify the enlistment 
of these substandard accessions.   
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Variables that were used to identify high attrition risk enlistees had to meet two 
additional requirements.  When examined in isolation or in conjunction with something 
else, variables had to be statistically significant and also exhibit sufficient variation.  If 
for instance, the attrition risk of individuals of all ages was virtually the same, then the 
age variable might not be able to be used to differentiate enlistees based upon their 
probability of discharge.  If, however, the opposite was true and enlistees with different 
ages exhibited different discharge probabilities, then this variable could be used.  Also, if 
a variable proved to be statistically insignificant, then this variable might not be able to 
be used to differentiate enlistees, based on their probability of discharge.  As in the above 
discussion of variation, if this variable did prove to be statistically significant, then of 
course it could be used. 
But while variation and statistical significance in individual variables were 
necessary features, more analysis could possibly yield different information.  It is, for 
instance, conceivable that a variable like AFQT has no statistical significance when 
examined in isolation.  It is also conceivable that individuals of all ages exhibit the same 
discharge probability.  However, it is possible that the effect of age differs by AFQT.  So, 
for example, a variable that combines individuals who are 23 and older and who score 
below 49 on the ASVAB could prove to be statistically significant and have a much 
higher attrition risk than a group of enlistees who are younger than 23 and who score 
higher than 50 on the ASBVAB.  And this could be true even though AFQT score is not 
significant and the attrition risk of all ages is the same.  So, if variables exhibited no 
variation or statistical significance when examined independently and when combined 
with other variables, then these variables could not be used for further analysis.   
Finally, in addition to the above criteria, the variables chosen could not be too 
complicated or politically impractical.  The author did not believe that the Marine Corps 
would be willing to adopt any policy based upon race or on criteria that were too 
confusing.  For example, qualifying the enlistment of all 17-year-old minorities who took 
the ASVAB exactly 22 days from enlistment during only the month of September, in the 
4th Marine Corps District, would be a difficult as well as a questionable policy to 
implement.   
 
28
2. Variables   
Race variables were not suitable for the purpose of identifying enlistees with 
differing discharge probabilities because a policy that qualified enlistment based on race 
runs counter to policy.  Gender variables were inappropriate for further use because of 
the exceedingly small percentage of women in the Marine Corps.  Time spent in the DEP 
was not suitable because of the necessity to identify applicants with a high attrition risk 
before they enlisted.  The time of year (spring, summer, fall, winter) an applicant enlisted 
was also not suitable because of the difficulty implementing a policy that used this 
characteristic.   
In this search for variables suitable for further analysis, six concrete 
characteristics finally emerged for both high school graduates and seniors.  These were: 
the time between when an individual took the ASVAB and when he actually enlisted 
(ASVABTIME); age; component (either regular or reserve); AFQT score; and, of course, 
variables representing the first three weeks, as well as the last-week, of the month 
(WEEK_123, WEEK_45).   
 
3. Interactions 
Although each independent variable affected the discharge probability of an 
enlistee, combinations of these characteristics might better predict applicants with an 
unusually high-risk of attrition.  For example, the older an applicant, the higher his 
attrition risk.  Additionally, if an applicant took the ASVAB within a few days of 
enlistment, his discharge probability also increased.  But ages of applicants varied greatly 
and so did the days between when an applicant took the ASVAB and when he actually 
enlisted.  Thus, the analytical question was: which combination of these characteristics 
best isolated the applicant with a high probability for discharge?  Was an age of 21 and 
an “ASVABTIME” of 15 days the magic combination, or was it an age of 22 and an 
“ASVABTIME” of 20?  Because ages varied from 17 to 33 and ASVABTIMES from 0 
to 365 days, the possibilities for different combinations of even two variables of this sort 
were immense.  
To complicate matters even more, ages of graduate and senior contracts differed 
considerably.  Seniors were largely 17 - 19 years old, whereas graduates were largely 19 - 
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23 years old.  Did a senior who was 17 and who took the ASVAB within five days of 
enlistment behave the same as a graduate who was 19 and who took the ASVAB within 
five days of enlistment?  Again, the discussions above involve only two variables, while 
the actual analysis dealt with six. 
 
4. Groups 
After testing hundreds of different interactions, graduate and senior data sets were 
classified into different groups based on combinations of the above six variables.  
Enlistments in each group were separated by enlistment time (WEEK_123 and 
WEEK_45) and the discharge probability of each group during the different enlistment 
times was determined.  Exactly how different ASVABTIMES, ages, and AFQT scores 
were chosen to form these groupings is explained in Chapter VI.   
Finally, the discharge probability of each group, during the first three weeks and 
during the last-week of the month from the FY00/01 data set, was compared and 
validated against the exact same group in the FY03/04 data set.  Through this process, it 
became evident that not all enlistees exhibited a higher probability of discharge during 
the last-week of the month.  The variables of each graduate and senior data set could, 
however, be consolidated into three main categories: a category of enlistments that 
exhibited a low probability of discharge at all times; a category that exhibited a high 
probability of discharge no matter when they were enlisted; and a category that exhibited 
a high probability of discharge during only the last-week of the month. 
Figure 3 depicts the final step in the above process.  Once again, this Figure is 
merely a representation of the process and includes no actual discharge probabilities or 
other statistics.  The number of groups solidified in the actual study greatly exceeded the 
ones depicted in Figure 3.  The actual groups and data are presented in Chapter VI. 
Groups 1 through 10 represent different combinations of the variables, AGE, 
ASVABTIME, COMPONENT and AFQT.  The discharge probability of each group was 
determined during the first three weeks of the month as well as during the last.  These 
discharge probabilities from the FY00/FY01 sample were then compared to the discharge 
probabilities of the same groups analyzed in an identical fashion in the FY03/FY04 
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sample.  Only groups that exhibited the same discharge characteristics in both data sets 
were consolidated into three final categories:  those enlistees that exhibited a low 
probability of discharge at all times of the month (Groups 1, 4, 6, 7, 8); those enlistees 
who exhibited a low attrition risk during the first three weeks of the month and a high 
discharge probability during the last-week of the month (Groups 2, 3, 9); and those 
enlistees who exhibited a high probability of discharge no matter when they were enlisted 
(Groups 5, 10).   
Based on the validation results, the FY00/01 and FY03/04 data sets were each 
separated into the final three categories shown at the bottom of the Figure.  The discharge 
probabilities of these three categories were then also tested during the first three weeks of 
the month and during the last.  The two data sets were again compared to ensure 
validation.   The three final categories identified in this process form the basis for the 














































7% 12% 10% 4% 23% 6% 5% 3% 13% 21%
FY00 / FY01




























































Last Week Last Week Last Week
3% 15% 28%















































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
33
IV. TESTING FOR THE HOCKEY-STICK PHENOMENON 
A. THEORETICAL MODEL 
To test the probability of discharge of applicants enlisted at the end of the month, 
a binary discharge variable was regressed on enlistment time variables representing the 
first three weeks of the month, the last four days preceding the last day of the month, as 
well as the actual last day of each month. 
 
1. Specification 
A probit model was chosen for this analysis.  In addition to mirroring the 
approach of previous studies, this type of model is not affected by heteroskadasticity 
(Wooldridge, 555).  Additionally, this type of model overcomes the limitations of a 
Linear Probability Model (LPM): “the fitted probabilities can be less than zero or greater 
than one and the partial effect of any explanatory variable (appearing in level form) is 
constant”. (Wooldridge, 554)   For this hypothesis test, a binary discharge variable 
(DISCHARGE) was regressed on dummy variables representing different periods during 
the month.  It was decided not to include any other variables that could affect DEP 
attrition in this model.  These additional variables were added to the models used Chapter 
V.  The specification for the model to test the effect of the end of the month goal on 
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where all variables are defined in Table 1 
, 




A description of the variables used in the model is displayed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Descriptions of Model Variables 
 
2. Explanation of Variables 
a. Enlistment Time 
Although seemingly a simple task, deciding how to separate each month in 
order to most accurately analyze the end of the month “hockey-stick” effect proved to be 
a difficult task.  Should activity be compared by day, by week, or in some other 
unorthodox manner?   
Comparing recruiting activity by enlistment day proved to be an 
inaccurate approach.  Because months differed with respect to the number of recruiting 
days, varying from as low as eighteen to as many as twenty-four, accurate day-by-day 
comparisons could not be made for the end of the month.  Although a desirable method to 
test the increase in attrition risk with the approach of the end of the month deadline, 
comparing activity by day was not a feasible solution.   
After much evaluation, it was decided to create variables that would 
compare recruiter performance during the first three weeks of each month (WEEK_123), 





= 1 if discharged from DEP 










 = 1 if enlistee was contracted in week 4 minus the last day, 
 = 0 if otherwise 
 = 1 if enlistee was contracted on the last day of the month, 
 = 0 if otherwise 
 = 1 if enlistee was contracted in the last week of the month, 
 = 0 if otherwise 
    Enlistee was contracted in weeks one, two or three is 
    omitted category 
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final variable for the actual last day of each month (WEEK_45).  This breakdown of the 
recruiting month seemed to be an accurate way to reflect changes in recruiter 
performance. 
 
3. Hypothesized Relationship   
The hypothesized relationship of enlistment time variables is that at some point as 
enlistment time approaches the end of the month, the probability for discharge will begin 
to increase, culminating on the last day of the month.  When the next goal period begins, 
this process will repeat itself.  While there should be no significant difference in the 
character of enlistees during “normal” recruiting operations, this should change during 
the final few days of the month when recruiters are pressed to achieve their goals.  Given 
this hypothesis, it would seem that there should be some increase in the attrition risk of 
applicants enlisted during the final four days of the month (excluding the last day), and an 
even greater increase on the final day of each month. 
 
C. RESULTS 
1. Base Case 
The characteristics for a base case enlistee are provided in Table 3. 
Table 3. Descriptions of the Base-Case Individual 
 
2. Probit Models 
• Regression to compare the statistical significance and probability of 
discharge of WEEK_123 enlistments to WEEK_4 and LDAY enlistments 
in the FY00/01 sample. 
• Regression to compare the statistical significance and probability of 
discharge of WEEK_123 enlistments to WEEK_4 and LDAY enlistments 




WEEK_123 Enlistee was contracted in weeks one, two or three 
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The regression results are provided in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Probit model results for FY00/01 and FY03/04 data  
 
Results of additional multivariate models are provided in Appendix A. 
• Regression to compare the statistical significance and probability of 
discharge of WEEK_123 enlistments to WEEK_45 enlistments in the 
FY00/01 sample. 
• Regression to compare the statistical significance and probability of 
discharge of WEEK_123 enlistments to WEEK_45 enlistments in the 
FY00/01 sample 
 
3. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the variables in this model as well as additional variables 
used in the remainder of this thesis are provided in Chapter V.   
 
D. EVALUATION OF BASIC REGRESSIONS 
1. Variables 
All variables are statistically significant to all known levels for both models.  In 
the FY00/01 model, the probability of discharge of the average individual enlisted during 
weeks one, two or three, is 17.3 percent.  A fourth week enlistee is 2.2 percentage points 
more likely to attrite than the average individual enlisted during weeks one, two and three 
and exhibits an actual probability of discharge of 19.5 percent. As expected, a last day 
enlistee has a significantly higher attrition risk than beginning of the month enlistments.  
This individual is 4.0 percentage points more likely to attrite than the average individual 





WEEK_4 0.0217 0.0234 
 (0.0060)*** (0.0051)*** 
LDAY 0.0403 0.0338 
 (0.0087)*** (0.0077)*** 
Observations 26640 41347 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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The results from the FY03/04 sample validate the findings of the FY00/01 data 
set.  In the FY03/04 regression, the actual probability of discharge of the average 
individual enlisted during weeks one, two or three, is 19.2 percent.  A fourth week 
enlistee is 2.4 percentage points more likely to attrite than the average enlistee during 
weeks one, two, and three and exhibits an actual attrition risk of 21.6 percent.  A last day 
enlistee is 3.4 percentage points more likely to attrite than the average individual enlisted 
during weeks one two and three and exhibits an actual attrition risk of 22.6 percent.   
 
2. Preliminary Conclusions                    
Results of probit analysis strongly support the hypothesized hockey-stick 
relationship of increasing attrition rates for recruits enlisted as the end-of-the-month 
deadline nears.  This basic result was cross-validated by separate regressions including a 
number of control variables (essentially the same list of control variables reported in the 
next chapter), and the results were identical.  Last-week enlistees can be expected to have 
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V. HIGH ATTRITION RISK ENLISTEES – THE BASE MODEL 
A. THEORETICAL MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
To discover which enlistees demonstrated the highest end-of-month attrition risk, 
a binary discharge variable was regressed on all other factors that were deemed likely to 
affect attrition in a combined data set of high school graduates and seniors.  The chosen 
model was different from those found in the literature review because of the greater 
availability of data in TFDW and also because of some critical assumptions made based 
upon previous experience, detailed below.  All other regressions were built upon this 
model.  
After determining the statistical significance and effect of all variables and 
analyzing their suitability for use in further study, data sets were separated into graduate 
and senior categories.  Following the identification of the above groups, comparing the 
FY00/01 results with a holdout sample, validated these findings.  Only groups that 
displayed similar attrition risks in both samples were combined to form the basis for the 
recommended policy.  These models as well as the validation process are discussed in 
detail in Chapter VI. 
 
B. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Although this study required the use of numerous different models, the base form 
and underlying specification for each remained the same.  As in the previous section, a 
probit model was chosen for this analysis.  For the base model, a binary discharge 
variable (DISCHARGE) was regressed on year (FY00) and the Marine Corps District 
(MCD) that enlisted the contract.  Seasonal variables (SUMMER, FALL, and WINTER) 
were followed by the total days spent in the DEP (DEPTIME).  After this, the model 
included a variable for whether or not an enlistee received an extension in the DEP 
(DEP_EXT) as well as variables for gender (MALE) and education code (GRAD).  
Variables representing age (AGE), AFQT (A1, A2), component (COMPONENT), and 
the number of days between when an applicant took the ASVAB and when he actually 
enlisted (ASVABTIME1), were essential to the model.  Race variables (WHITE, 
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OTHER, DECLINE), a variable reflecting pool moves (PLMOVES1), the enlistee’s 
source of enlistment (RCTRGEN, REFERRAL), and whether or not he received any type 
of enlistment bonus (BONUS) were also important considerations.  A variable 
representing the last four recruiting days of the month minus the last day (WEEK_4) as 
well as the last recruiting day of the month (LDAY) followed waiver variables (AGE_W, 
BUMED_W, ADMIN_W, DEP_W).  All of the above except DEPTIME and AGE were 




1. Definitions   
A description of the variables used in the base model is displayed in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Descriptions of Base Model Variables 
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= 1 if entered DEP in Fiscal Year 2000, = 0 if otherwise  








 = 1 if enlisted by MCD1, = 0 if otherwise 
 = 1 if enlisted by MCD6, = 0 if otherwise 
 = 1 if enlisted by MCD9, = 0 if otherwise 
 = 1 if enlisted by MCD12, = 0 if otherwise 
    Omitted command MCD4 
 









 = 1 if enlisted during June, Jul or Aug, = 0 if otherwise 
 = 1 if enlisted during Sept or Oct, = 0 if otherwise 
 = 1 if enlisted during Nov or Dec, = 0 if otherwise 
    Omitted season SPRING (Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr, May) 
Time in DEP 
DEPTIME 
 
    Days spent in DEP before ship or discharge 






















 = 1 if score 50 - 70, = 0 if otherwise 
 = 1 if score > 70, = 0 if otherwise 





 = 1 if enlistee was Regular component, = 0 if otherwise 






 = 1 if enlistee took ASVAB > 25 days from enlistment, = 0 
     if otherwise 
     Enlistee took ASVAB <= 25 days from enlistment is 








 = 1 if enlistee was Caucasian, = 0 if otherwise 
 = 1 if enlistee was Asian, American Indian or Pacific 
     Islander, = 0 if otherwise  
 = 1 if enlistee declined to respond, = 0 if otherwise 





 = 1 if enlistee pool moved <=5 times, = 0 if otherwise 








 = 1 if contract was generated only through recruiter effort,  
 = 0 if otherwise 
 = 1 if contract was generated through some type of referral,  
 = 0 if otherwise 
    Contract generated through a recruiting program is 





2. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the base model are provided in 
Table 6. 





 = 1 if enlistee received any enlistment bonus; =0 if 








 = 1 if enlistee received an Age Waiver, = 0 if otherwise  
 = 1 if enlistee received a BUMED Waiver, = 0 if otherwise 
 = 1 if enlistee received an Administrative Waiver, = 0 if  
    otherwise 
 = 1 if enlistee received an Dependency Waiver, = 0 if  
    otherwise 
    Enlistee did not receive one of these waivers is omitted 
    category 









 = 1 if enlistee was contracted in week 4 minus the last day, 
 = 0 if otherwise 
 = 1 if enlistee was contracted on the last day of the month, 
 = 0 if otherwise 
 = 1 if enlistee was contracted in the last week of the month,  
 = 0 if otherwise 
    Enlistee was contracted in weeks one, two or three is 
    comitted category 
 
VARIABLE OBS MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
FY00 26616 .3844304 .4864695 0 1 
MCD1 26616 .2436129 .4292698 0 1 
MCD6 26616 .1954088 .3965225 0 1 
MCD9 26616 .2679216 .4428848 0 1 
MCD12 26616 .2340322 .4234003 0 1 
SUMMER 26616 .3268711 .4690785 0 1 
FALL 26616 .1798918 .3841045 0 1 
WINTER 26616 .1379621 .3448667 0 1 
DEPTIME 26616 160.459 120.1023 0 485 
DEP_EXT 26616 .019199 .1372264 0 1 




3. Explanation of Variables and Hypothesized Relationships 
Variables were all selected from TFDW or created by the author, because of their 
hypothesized correlation with DEP attrition.  Although there are countless factors that 
affect this phenomenon, the selected characteristics are the most complete compilation of 
variables describing an enlistee in the Marine Corps DEP available.   
 
a. Year 
Thirty eight percent of the data entries were FY00 contracts while the rest 
were from FY01.  The missing data has been discussed previously and this would 
account for most of the difference in years.  Data deletions and non-graduate and prior 
service data removal would account for the remainder of the difference. 
 
b. Command 
With the exception of the 4th Marine Corps District, enlistments from the 
sample were evenly spread among the commands.  Enlistments from the 6th MCD 
AGE 26616 19.30673 2.337821 17 35 
A1 26616 .3666592 .4819014 0 1 
A2 26616 .2654418 .4415765 0 1 
REG 26616 .8341599 .371944 0 1 
ASVABTIME1 26616 .2986549 .4576768 0 1 
WHITE 26616 .7604448 .42682 0 1 
OTHER_R 26616 .0326871 .1778197 0 1 
DECLINE 26616 .0865645 .2812011 0 1 
PLMVES1 26616 .9770439 .1497664 0 1 
RCTRGEN 26616 .3787196 .4850772 0 1 
REFFERAL 26616 .2665314 .4421536 0 1 
GRAD 26616 .6451383 .4784804 0 1 
BONUS1 26616 .0624812 .242032 0 1 
BUMED_W 26616 .0222798 .1475949 0 1 
AGE_W 26616 .0038323 .0617878 0 1 
DEP_W 26616 .0309964 .1733111 0 1 
ADMIN_W 26616 .0801773 .2715726 0 1 
WEEK_4 26616 .214758 .4106621 0 1 
LDAY 26616 .0967087 .2955663 0 1 
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amounted to 20 percent of the data entries, while other districts enlisted between 23 and 
26 percent of the total contracts in the sample.   
       
c. Season 
The FALL and WINTER periods consisted of two months each while the 
SUMMER period was made up of three months.  This accounts for the contracting 
difference between these periods. 
Although January is unique to other months in its recruiting 
characteristics, enlistments from January were so few in relation to the other seasonal 
variables that individuals accessed during this month were included with enlistments 
from February through May.  The February through May time period has always been 
thought to be more difficult for recruiting.  The “new” senior market has dwindled and 
become “old” while “easy” contracts have by this time been enlisted by one of the four 
services.  A college has accepted soon-to-graduate seniors.  Rising seniors (juniors who 
will be seniors in June) cannot be enlisted.   
Even though recruiting is more difficult during this period, enlistments 
during SPRING are expected to be less likely to attrite than individuals enlisted during 
other times of the year.  Because of the time of year, recruiting pools have become small 
and recruiters enlist a majority of “Direct Ship” applicants (individuals who enlist and 
ship immediately to recruit training).  These enlistees probably spend the least amount of 
time in the DEP, and this characteristic also greatly reduces their attrition risk.   
June, July, and August, (SUMMER) are normally rich recruiting months.  
Recruiters enlist a large number of “new” seniors and I-IIIA contracting percentages are 
normally high.  Many applicants enlisted during this time have had previous aspirations 
to join the military and, consequently, their probability for discharge is expected to be 
relatively low.  Unfortunately, the new seniors enlisted during this time, can only ship the 
following year.  Therefore, these enlistees must remain in the DEP for 275 to 365 days.  
Because of the conflicting forces affecting these enlistees, the overall expected attrition 
risk of SUMMER accessions is unknown.  
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September and October are unique recruiting months and comprise the 
FALL variable.  During this period “old” seniors, who do not attend college are left 
behind while their former classmates and friends who pursue higher education are now 
beginning what for most will be a new life.  Both months have very few holiday 
distractions.  While applicants enlisted during this period probably differ in motivation 
from those enlisted during the summer, the harsh reality of being left behind impacts their 
decision to enlist.   
Although November and December seem similar to the previous two 
months, their unique characteristics caused them to be grouped under the WINTER 
variable.  Not only do both months have significant holiday distractions, reducing the 
number of productive recruiting days, but also few people desire to enlist right before 
Thanksgiving and Christmas.  Additionally, recruiters and commands usually try to 
achieve their missions rapidly (before the holidays) because recruiters desire to spend 
time with their families. 
Both FALL and WINTER enlistees are expected to attrite at the highest 
rates of the year.  Not only do these individuals usually spend relatively long times in the 
DEP, but they also represent a lower quality of accession than those individuals enlisted 
during the summer months.   
 
d. Time Spent in the DEP 
The average time in the DEP for the sample was 160- days.  This number 
is expected to differ drastically between the graduate and senior categories.  The more 
time spent in the DEP the greater is an individual’s expected probability of discharge.  
“Buyer’s remorse”, parents, friends, and countless other factors all influence individuals 
awaiting shipment to recruit training.  The positive correlation between DEPTIME and 
attrition risk has already been discussed in the previous literature review. 
While more time in DEP is expected to increase attrition risk, the 
relationship between DEP_EXT and DISCHARGE is not as evident.  In some cases, a 
DEP extension (when an enlistee is granted an extension to his ship date which forces 
him to exceed the 365 day limit) may serve a legitimate purpose.  Other times this 
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“waiver” only prolongs the DEP time of an enlistee who should have been discharged 
long before.  Although the effect of DEP_EXT on DISCHARGE is largely unknown, this 
variable is included in the model because the characteristics of “extended” DEP time may 
well be different from regular DEP time.  Individuals who received a DEP_EXT only 
constituted 2 percent of the sample.   
   
e. Gender, Education Code, and Age 
Ninety two percent of the sample consisted of Male applicants, while 64 
percent of the enlistments consisted of high school graduates.  The average age of an 
enlistee was 19.  Both male and graduate enlistees are expected to exhibit a lower 
attrition risk than females and high school seniors.  The relationship between gender and 
discharge probability has been discussed in previous literature.  Education code has also 
been shown to increase attrition risk in previous studies.   
 
f. AFQT Score and Component 
Thirty six percent of all enlistments scored between 50 and 70 on the 
ASVAB, while another 26 percent scored in excess of 70.  The remainder of enlistees (38 
percent) scored below 50.  Although the military strives to enlist intelligent individuals, 
the relationship between AFQT and DISCHARGE is expected to be positive.  Lower 
scoring accessions have more to gain through enlistment, while higher scoring enlistees 
probably have more options in the civilian sector.   
Eight three percent of the sample consisted of regular component enlistees 
while the remainder consisted of reserves.  Regular enlistees are expected to exhibit a 
higher attrition risk than reserves.  While reserve enlistees must also attend recruit 
training, their commitment to the Corps can be expected to be less than for their regular 
enlistee counterparts.   
 
g. Enlistment Date in Relation to ASVAB Date  
Prior to enlistment, applicants must take and pass the ASVAB.  This test 
can be administered on the day of enlistment, the night before, or really at any other time 
convenient for the applicant.  The majority of enlistees take the ASVAB the day prior to 
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their enlistment or at some other time, as part of an official high school testing program.  
Enlistees are administered the test at the Military Entrance and Processing Station 
(MEPS), at a Military Entrance Test (MET) site, or at a High School.   
Although data for where an enlistee took the ASVAB were not available, a 
testing officer does record the date when the test was administered.  Subtracting the 
enlistment date from the date when the test was administered provided the number of 
days between when an enlistee took the ASVAB and when enlistment actually occurred 
(ASVABTIME).  The more time between when an individual takes the ASVAB and 
actual enlistment, the more chances the applicant will have to think about his decision 
and be more firm in his convictions about military service, before he enlists.  This 
variable is expected to decrease attrition risk.  For this sample, 30 percent of all enlistees 
took the ASVAB more than 25 days from enlistment.   
 
h. Race Variables   
Seventy-six percent of the sample consisted of white enlistees.  Three 
percent consisted of other races while 9 percent declined to respond.  The remaining 12 
percent of the data set consisted of African Americans.  Based on previous studies, all 
race variables other than WHITE are expected to reduce the probability of discharge. 
 
i. Pool Moves 
Upon enlistment, each individual is assigned a ship date when he is 
scheduled to depart for recruit training.  This date is recorded and tracked by all levels of 
command.  Although the original ship date is hopefully correct, it may be moved for a 
variety of reasons.  Each movement of an enlistee’s original ship date is recorded as a 
pool move.  Excessive pool moves may indicate increased attrition risk.  Because 
PLMVES1 describes those enlistees who have been moved in the pool only a few times 
(see variable descriptions), its effect is expected to be negative.  In this sample, 98 
percent of all enlistees shipped or discharged with less than 5 pool moves.    
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j. Enlistment Source 
Recruiters have various means at their disposal to contact potential 
applicants.  They can do so through telephone calls or also through canvassing certain 
areas such as shopping malls and grocery stores.  Enlistments, which happen this way, 
are called recruiter-generated contracts.  In this sample, 38 percent of all enlistees were 
contracted through this source.    
Recruiters can also receive referrals from various sources that identify 
applicants who have an increased interest in the Marine Corps.  Referrals can happen by 
chance but more often than not they are the result of a recruiter’s diligence in gaining 
exposure in his community and winning the trust and confidence of parents, teachers, and 
employers.  These contracts are known simply as referrals.  26 percent of all enlistments 
in the sample were generated in this manner. 
Finally, there are numerous command-sponsored programs that assist the 
recruiting force in its search for enlistees.  These programs include advertising, 
involvement of the Marine Corps Reserves, and the utilization of recently graduated 
Marines as a positive proof source for future enlistees.  Accessions that occur through 
command-sponsored programs are known as program-generated contracts.  The 
remaining 36 percent of all enlistments in the sample were generated from this source.  
The expected effect of source variables is mixed.  Of the three variables, 
only REFERRAL is expected to decrease discharge probability.  The expected effect of 
the other two variables is unknown.   
 
k. Enlistment Incentives 
Individuals who received any type of enlistment bonus made up 6 percent 
of the sample.  Any type of enlistment bonus is expected to reduce attrition risk because 





l. Waiver Variables 
All waiver variables included in the model are alike in that they all require 
the recruiter to perform a considerable amount of additional work.  These waivers are 
reviewed primarily at higher levels.  For this reason, the waivers included in this study 
(AGE_W, BUMED_W, DEP_W, ADMIN_W) are expected to decrease attrition risk.  2 
percent of all enlistees received a BUMED waiver.  Age waivers are very few (.04 
percent) while dependent waivers comprise 3 percent of all enlistments.  8 percent of the 
sample received some type of administrative waiver. 
 
m. Enlistment Time 
Enlistment time variables are identical to those identified in Chapter IV.  
Last day enlistment constitute 10 percent of the entire sample while the four days 
preceding the last day comprise 21 percent of the sample. 
 
4. Omitted Variables 
a. Recruiter Characteristics 
Individual recruiter characteristics and effort undoubtedly affect discharge 
potential, as do the policies and esprit of each individual Recruiting Substation.  
Although interesting, quantifying these variables would have been difficult. 
 
b. Time Spent with Enlistees 
While the time each recruiter spends with poolees following their 
enlistment would undoubtedly decrease discharge probability, accurate data does not 
exist.  It might have been interesting to include each recruiter’s Military Occupational 
Specialty as a variable in the regression.  While not a substitute for the time each recruiter 
spends with his enlistees, MOS could indicate recruiter effort and ability.  Infantry 
Marines could affect poolee discharge potential differently than mechanics or 





c. Component Code Changes 
As discussed previously, applicants who decide to change from one 
component to the other are termed component code changes.  Although not available for 
this study, variables that indicated whether or not an enlistee changed from a regular to a 
reserve component and the opposite, would have added explanatory power to the 
regression model.    
 
d. Enlistee Characteristics 
Numerous enlistee characteristics were unavailable for this thesis.  
Variables such as Initial Strength Test (IST) scores, school activities, and ASVAB score 
breakdowns could quite possibly have provided further ways to differentiate good and 
bad contracts.   
Although IST_SCORE was listed as a variable in TFDW, no data were 
available.  Additionally, even if it had been entered, its accuracy would have been 
questionable since the recruiter himself enters this data.  Further ASVAB score 
breakdowns would indicate certain types of skills of each enlistee.  Having a record of 
these other scores could have provided additional insight for this thesis.   
 
e. ASVABL Location 
Finally, although the author was able to track the days between when an 
individual took the ASVAB and when he actually enlisted, there was no record of where 
the applicant actually took this test.  While the number of days between test and 
enlistment do indicate where the test was taken, the actual data would have been better.  
Having this information could have provided superior clarity of a variable that affects 
discharge probability.  
 
D. CONTROL AND TREATMENT GROUPS 
After running the base model, it was determined that graduate and senior enlistees 
exhibited widely different attrition rates.  Because of this, regressions were run on data 
sets separated on the basis of education code.  Therefore, the control group for one 
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additional model consists of two years of senior enlistments for five Marine Corps 
Districts.  The control group for the second additional model consists of two years of 
graduate enlistments for five Marine Corps Districts.   
 
E. RESULTS FOR COMBINED FY00/01 MODEL 
The regression results for the Combined FY00/01 model are provided in Table 7    
 
Table 7. Probit Model Results For Combined FY00/01 Data  














































Results of additional multivariate models are provided in Appendix B. 
• Regression to determine the discharge probability of all variables that 
could affect senior DEP attrition in the FY00/01 sample. 
• Regression to determine the discharge probability of all variables that 
could affect graduate DEP attrition in the FY00/01 sample. 
 
F. EVALUATION OF COMBINED FY00/FY01 MODEL 
1. Goodness-of-Fit 
Since this model involves probit regression, the pseudo R2 statistic is inaccurate.  
Measuring the goodness-of-fit, percent correctly predicted (PCP), non-attrites is 81.9 
percent and for attrites is 94.1 percent.  Overall, the percent correctly predicted method 
shows that the model predicts correctly 81.9 percent of the time.   
More relevant to the goodness of fit of the model than PCP are the statistical 
significance of the variables.  Of the 29 variables tested, only four were not individually 
significant:  MCD12, A2, REG and REFERRAL.  Performing the Likelihood Ratio (LR) 
test to evaluate joint significance, three of these four were jointly significant.  MCD12 






















Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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source variables, RCTRGEN and REFERRAL were also jointly significant, though less 
so than the previous case (Prob > χ2 = 0.0191).  As in the Ogren study, AFQT is 
individually not significant when tested on a scale of 0 to 100.  But, as can be seen in this 
model, when the AFQT variables are broken into specific categories, some of these are 
statistically significant.  Finally, the variable for component (REG) was found to be 
statistically insignificant for a two-tailed test.  This variable is significant below the 10 
percent level for a one tailed t-test. 
 
2. Base Case 
The characteristics for a base case enlistee are provided in Table 8. 
 





FY01 Was enlisted during FY01  
MCD4 Was enlisted by the 4th MCD 
SPRING Was enlisted from Jan through May  
DEPTIME Had an average DEPTIME of 160 days  
DEP_EXT Did not receive a DEP extension  
FEMALE Was a female enlistee 
AGE Was an average age of 19 years of age  
IIIB Scored below 50 on the AFQT  
RESERVE Enlisted for a reserve component 
ASVABTIME2 Enlisted within 25 days of taking the ASVAB  
BLACK Was an African American enlistee 
PROGRAM  Was a contract generated through a USMC program 
SENIOR Enlisted as a High School senior 
BONUS2 Did not receive any type of enlistment bonus 
WAIVER Did not receive a BUMED, age, or dependency waiver 
WEEK_123 Enlisted during the 1st three weeks of the month 
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3. Interpretation of the Variables   
a. Year 
The year variables indicate an expected 4.7 percentage point marginal 
increase in discharge probability from FY00 to FY01.  Specifically, an average individual 
who enlists during FY01 is predicted to have a 15.8 percent probability of discharge 
while an individual who enlisted in FY00 is only expected to have an 11.1 percent 
attrition risk.    
 
b. Command  
Command variables are interesting in this model because they indicate a 
significant difference in the attrition risk of individuals based upon socioeconomic 
conditions and command climate.  Enlistees from the 4th MCD are predicted to have a 
10.7 percent probability of discharge, the lowest of all five commands.  Enlistees from 
the 6th and 12th MCD have predicted probabilities of discharge 2.3 and 1.1 percentage 
points higher than those of the 4th.  The actual predicted probability of discharge of 
enlistees from these commands is 13.0 and 11.2 percent, respectively.  The 4th MCD 
attrition rates may be low because of the missing data issue previously discussed in 
Chapter III.  Enlistees from the 1st and 9th MCD both have predicted discharge 
probabilities, which are 7.5 and 4.3 percentage points higher than an enlistee from the 4th 
MCD.  The actual predicted probabilities of discharge from these commands are 18.2 and 
15.0 percent respectively.  Although interesting and worthy of investigation by the 
Marine Corps, locally targeted interventions are beyond the scope of this study.   
 
c. Season 
Not surprisingly, spring enlistees have a low, 11.5 percent predicted 
attrition risk.  Enlistments from the WINTER variable have a predicted attrition risk that 
is 1.5 percentage points higher than enlistees during the spring.  The actual predicted 
discharge probability of WINTER enlistees is 12.9 percent.  SUMMER and FALL 
enlistees have expected discharge probabilities that are 4.5 and 5.1 percentage points 
higher than enlistees from SPRING.  The actual predicted attrition risk of these enlistees 
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was 15.8 percent and 16.2 percent, respectively.  Although statistically and practically 
significant, locally targeted interventions are beyond the scope of this study.    
 
d. Time Spent in the DEP  
Ever controlling for the effects of seasonality, an increase of one day spent 
in the DEP of the average of 160 days, is expected to increase attrition risk by .03 
percentage points.  To evaluate time spent in the DEP, an average individual who spends 
30 days in DEP is compared to an average individual who spends 160 days in DEP.  
Finally, the expected discharge probability of an average individual who spends 300 days 
in DEP is also calculated.   
Enlistees who spend 30 days in the DEP exhibit the lowest predicted 
attrition risk (10.1 percent).  Conversely, individuals who spend 300 days in DEP have a 
predicted attrition risk of 18.9 percent.  Enlistees who spend 160 days in DEP exhibit a 
13.8 percent predicted discharge probability.  
As mentioned in Chapter I, while discharge probability does increase with 
time, the argument could be made that it would be better to discharge enlistees from the 
DEP than during their first term of enlistment.  While this may be true, it is irrelevant to 
the search for variables that identify enlistees with a high attrition risk because the 
DEPTIME variable affects discharge probability after enlistment.  No practically 
significant intervention could be designed to account for this factor.  
Even after accounting for the effects of time in DEP, enlistees who 
received a DEP extension exhibit a 3.5 percentage point higher predicted attrition risk 
than individuals who do not extend their time in this program.  The actual predicted 
attrition risk of individuals who receive a DEP extension is 17.3 percent while those 
enlistees who ship within 365 days have a 13.8 percent probability of discharge.  
Regardless of its effect, DEP extensions are granted to so few individuals that no 





e. Gender  
As expected, males are predicted to have a 9.6 percentage point lower 
attrition risk than females.  The actual predicted attrition risk of a male enlistee is 13.2 
percent in comparison to a 22.8 percent predicted discharge probability for females.  As 
discussed previously, no practically significant intervention could be designed to account 
for this factor.  
 
f. Age, AFQT, Component, and Enlistment Time in Relation to 
ASVAB   
The predicted discharge probability of enlistees increases dramatically 
with age.  An increase of one year above the average age of 19 is expected to increase 
discharge probability by 1.3 percentage points.  17-year-old enlistees exhibit an 11.1 
percent predicted attrition risk, while the predicted discharge probability of 22 year olds 
is 17.7 percent.   
Individuals who score between 50 and 70 on the ASVAB have a predicted 
discharge probability that is .9-percentage point greater than those who score below 50.  
Interestingly, individuals who score above 70 exhibit the lowest attrition rate of all (.07 
percentage points below enlistees who score below 50).     
Individuals who take the ASVAB more than 25 days from enlistment have 
a 3.4 percentage point lower attrition risk than individuals who do not.  The actual 
predicted attrition risk of individuals who take the ASVAB more than 25 days from 
enlistment is 11.6 percent while the actual predicted discharge probability of individuals 
who do not is 14.9 percent.  While AFQT score only seems to have a small impact on 
attrition risk when examined in isolation, interactions between this variable and others 
proved to be useful. 
For the base model, the component variable was statistically insignificant.  
While component seems to have no impact on attrition risk when examined for both high 
school graduates and seniors combined, this changes when the samples are separated 
based upon education code.  Additionally, interactions between this variable and others 
proved to be useful. 
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Although only AGE and ASVABTIME variables seem to have a 
significant impact on attrition risk, all of the above four characteristics do meet the 
criteria for suitability for further analysis.  All statistics pertaining to these variables are 
input by a separate party and not the recruiter.  They can all be verified through 
documentation.  Finally, they describe an individual before he or she enlists.   
 
g. Race 
Contrary to what was found in the literature review (Ogren 1999), only 
black enlistees have a high predicted attrition risk (16.9 percent), while white and other 
races and those who declined to respond exhibit a respective 3.0, 2.6, and 5.1 percentage 
point lower predicted discharge probability than African Americans.  White and other 
races have predicted discharge probabilities of 13.9 percent and 14.3 percent, 
respectively.  Enlistees, who declined to respond, exhibit a low predicted attrition risk 
(11.1 percent).  As discussed previously, no practically significant intervention could be 
designed to account for this factor.  
 
h. Pool Moves 
As hypothesized, excessive pool moves dramatically increase attrition 
risk.  In fact, enlistees who have five or fewer moves of their ship date exhibit a 5.0 
percentage point lower attrition risk than individuals who are moved more frequently. 
Individuals who are moved less than five times exhibit an actual 13.8 percent predicted 
probability of discharge, while those enlistees who are moved more than this amount, 
demonstrate a 18.8 percent predicted probability of discharge.  Pool move variables 
cannot be used for further analysis because of their occurrence after enlistment,    
 
i. Source Variables 
The predicted probabilities of discharge of source variables are 13.4 




and again, 13.4 percent for referrals.  Source variables could possibly be used in further 
study, however, because recruiters record this information themselves, the author 
refrained from doing so.  
 
j. Education Code 
As highlighted in other studies the attrition risk of high school seniors is 
more than double that of high school graduates.  Seniors exhibit a predicted 14.1 
percentage point higher attrition risk than graduates.  The actual predicted discharge 
probability of seniors is 23.9 percent, while graduate predicted discharge probabilities are 
9.8 percent.  Senior and graduate enlistments clearly have to be studied in separate data 
sets.     
 
k. Enlistment Bonus 
Enlistees who receive an enlistment bonus exhibit a similar discharge 
probability than graduates.  Individuals who receive a bonus have a predicted 17.6 
percentage point lower attrition risk than enlistees who do not.  The actual predicted 
attrition risk of individuals who receive a bonus is virtually 0 percent while those 
enlistees who do not receive any type of bonus, demonstrate a 17.6 percent predicted 
attrition risk.  While the BONUS variable is unsuitable for use in further study since it is 
assigned after enlistment and therefore does not identify individuals who exhibit a high 
attrition risk, it might be useful for a policy recommendation. 
 
l. Waivers       
As expected, forcing the recruiter to submit paperwork dramatically 
affects discharge probability.  Predicted attrition risks for enlistees requiring an 
enlistment waiver range from 6.9 to 11.2 percent, all well below the average attrition risk 
for the sample.  Conversely, individuals who do not receive any type of waiver exhibit a 




m. Enlistment Time 
Individuals enlisted during the first three weeks of the month exhibit a 
below average predicted discharge probability of 13.2 percent.  Individuals who enlist 
during the last four days of the month (prior to the last day) are expected to have a 1.5 
percentage point higher attrition risk than their counterparts, making their actual 
predicted attrition risk 14.7 percent.  Finally, enlistees who are contracted on the last day 
of the month have a predicted attrition risk that is 3.6 percentage points higher than first 
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VI. HIGH ATTRITION RISK ENLISTEES – FURTHER RESULTS 
USING INTERACTIONS 
A. CONCEPTS USED TO CREATE INTERACTIONS   
Based upon the original regression, there were only six variables that were 
deemed likely to form the basis for any type of policy.  Identified in the previous section, 
these variables were:  AGE, COMPONENT, ASVABTIME, AFQT, WEEK_123, and 
WEEK_45.  As noted above, graduate enlistees were categorized separately from seniors.  
Recruits who have already graduated tend to behave and attrite differently from recruits 
who are still in high school.  The following is a detailed discussion of how the interaction 
variables were created.  
Various threshold levels of the six variables (e.g., AGE > 20 or AGE > 21, etc.) 
were examined in order to form interesting interactions.  During this process, the 
statistical significance and effect of intermediate interactions was not recorded simply 
because of the number of variables that resulted from the different combinations.  
Therefore, all of the results will not be reported.  While this inductive process would be 
questionable without some means of independently supporting the resulting model, cross-
validation from our holdout sample serves this purpose.  After a final model was derived 
an LR test was performed to determine the joint significance of the new interactions.  As 
expected, the combinations of the six suitable variables were jointly significant (Prob > 
χ2 = 0.0000).  
 
B. BACKGROUND FOR THIS CHAPTER 
As discussed previously, the main reason for creating interactions between 
variables was because no groups that were of suitable size to form the basis for any type 
of policy could be identified in the original data.  As an example, all enlistees exhibited a 
higher attrition risk at the end of the month.  While the Marine Corps could not possibly 
place all last-week enlistees on a high-risk list, perhaps a small group of these entrants 
exhibited such a high attrition risk during only the last five days of each month, that a 
policy could be proposed to lower their attrition risk   The author must emphasize that if a  
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group suitable for policy change could have been identified immediately, the tedious 
process of interacting the six variables identified in this thesis would not have been 
necessary.   
Unfortunately this was not the case, and interactions were needed to identify 
categories suitable for policy change.  While the resulting differentiation did produce 
many sub groups of enlistee that validated exactly from one data set to the next, there 
were small groupings that were more difficult to place for a variety of reasons discussed 
below.  Although more accurate categorization of these questionable sub groupings might 
be able to be made through further analysis using larger samples, the final categories 
identified in this thesis all exhibited unique attrition characteristics and validated from 
one data set to the next.  While the final categories are suitable for policy 
recommendation, there are sub groupings within these categories that would require 
further analysis for more definitive placement.         
          
C. CREATION OF GRADUATE VARIABLES 
1. Treatment of AGE and ASVABTIME  
The age variable was initially separated into young and old enlistees.  Although it 
would seem that the attrition risk of graduates of differing ages should have been the only 
determining factor for this division, the size of the resulting groups was an important 
consideration as well.  As an example, graduate enlistees older than 23 exhibited a much 
higher attrition risk than younger enlistees and the highest attrition risk of any group 
tested.  However, 23 and older accessions were not chosen to represent the “old” category 
because only 1,600 individuals (out of 15,506) fit into this grouping.  Although these 
entrants exhibited an extremely high attrition risk, there were too few for this stage of the 
analysis.  It must be remembered that the two new AGE variables that resulted from this 
process were then divided again, based on the other five variables identified in this study 
(ASVABTIME, COMPONENT, AFQT, WEEK_123 and WEEK_45).  Had a small 
group, like graduate enlistees older than 23 been chosen as an initial step, subsequent cell 
sizes would have been too small.      
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A1OLD A1YNG A2OLD A2YNG
ASVAB1 OLD ASVAB2 YOUNG
ASVAB1: >25 days 
ASVAB2: <26 days 
OLD: >20 
YNG < 21  
Of the 15,506 graduate enlistees in the FY00/01 data set, 10,330 were younger 
than 21.  These enlistees exhibited an attrition risk of 11.1 percent.  Based on this low 
probability of discharge these enlistees were consolidated under the YNG (young) 
variable.  The remaining 5,176 enlistees exhibited an attrition risk of 14.9 percent and 
were formed into the OLD variable. 
The method used to create interactions with ASVABTIME was similar to the one 
used for AGE.  The author tested the discharge probability of different ASVABTIME 
periods and based on trial and error, settled on 25 days as a suitable cut off.  The 4,495 
enlistees who took the ASVAB more than 25 days from enlistment exhibited an attrition 
risk of 9.6 percent and were grouped under the variable A1.  The remaining 11,011 
enlistees who took the ASVAB within 25 days of enlistment exhibited an attrition risk of 
13.1 percent and were grouped under the variable A2.   
Once this interaction had been accomplished the variables YNG and OLD and A1 
and A2 were interacted with one another.  Figure 4 depicts how the two variables for 







Figure 4.   Intersecting ASVABTIME and AGE 
 
2. Adding AFQT 
AFQT scores were initially divided to conform to current quality guidelines.  
Although these AFQT groups did not provide the biggest differences in the attrition rate, 
conforming to current USMC quality standards was considered to be a more important 
consideration, to facilitate implementation of any recommendation.  The 5,384 enlistees 
scoring 49 and below exhibited an attrition risk of 11.8 percent and were grouped as 
variable B, while 10,122 enlistees scoring 50 and above exhibited an attrition risk of 12.1 
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percent and were grouped as variable A.  Although there was not a large difference in the 
attrition risk of the two categories when examined in isolation, differences emerged when 
these variables were interacted with other factors.  The newly created AFQT variables 
were interacted with the four existing ASVABTIME and AGE variables in the manner 





Figure 5.   Interacting ASVABTIME/AGE with AFQT 
 
3. Adding Component and Time of Month Variables 
A similar method as that outlined in Figures 4 and 5 was used to interact the 
component (REG and RES) and recruited week (WEEK_123 and WEEK_45) variables 
with the above eight new combinations.  This produced 32 different interactions and a 
regression (with the controls described in the previous chapter) involving 54 variables in 
all. 
The discharge probability associated with each new variable was tested during the 
first three weeks of the month (WEEK123) and compared to its discharge probability 
during the last five recruiting days of each month (WEEK45).  Table 9 illustrates the 
different interaction variables created from the base variables: AGE, ASVABTIME, 
COMPONENT, and AFQT.  The discharge rate during the first three weeks of the month 
and during the last five days of each month (WEEK_123 and WEEK_45) is provided for 
















Following the partition of the sample into the above groups, it was quickly 
realized that some of the new combinations (VAR3, VAR11, VAR12, and VAR15) were 
still too large because any intervention based on those categories would involve too many 
recruits.  Therefore, further separation was necessary.  Although VAR16 was not as large 
as the other interactions mentioned above, the attrition risk of all the enlistees in this 
group was so high and the group was sufficiently big to warrant its separation into 
smaller categories as well.   
 
4. Reevaluating YNG, OLD, AFQT 
YNG and OLD variables were divided into two additional categories each, while 
AFQT was separated into four.  17 and 18 year old enlistees became YNG1 while 19 and 
20-year-old contracts were labeled YNG2.  Entrants who were 21 and 22 were labeled 
OLD1 while enlistees who were 23 and older were labeled OLD2.  Enlistees who scored 
50 to 69 on the ASVAB were labeled IIIA_1 and those who scored 70 and above were 
labeled IIIA_2.  Finally, enlistees who scored below 40 were labeled B1 and those who 
scored from 40 to 49 were labeled B2. 
 
D. CROSS-VALIDATING GRADUATE INTERACTION ATTRITION 
RATES THROUGH THE USE OF A HOLDOUT SAMPLE 
After this final separation of groups, another regression was run for the FY00/01 
graduate data set incorporating all the newly formed combinations.  At this point, there 
were 62 new interactions and 84 variables in the regression in all.  Only one variable 
VAR1 VAR2 VAR3 VAR4 VAR5 VAR6 VAR7 VAR8 VAR9 VAR10 VAR11 VAR12 VAR13 VAR14 VAR15 VAR16
ASVABTIME A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2
AGE Yng Yng Yng Yng Old Old Old Old Yng Yng Yng Yng Old Old Old Old
AFQT I-IIIA IIIB I-IIIA IIIB I-IIIA IIIB I-IIIA IIIB I-IIIA IIIB I-IIIA IIIB I-IIIA IIIB I-IIIA IIIB
COMPONENT Res Res Reg Reg Res Res Reg Reg Res Res Reg Reg Res Res Reg Reg
DISCH RATE 
WEEK123 5% 9% 8% 8% 10% 18% 11% 13% 9% 10% 9% 13% 11% 17% 13% 16%
DISCH RATE 
WEEK45 13% 11% 11% 8% 4% 23% 13% 6% 10% 12% 11% 9% 17% 12% 16% 17%
N 415 234 1558 999 206 94 637 352 1006 346 3602 2170 664 213 2034 976
% of sample 3% 2% 10% 6% 1% 1% 4% 2% 6% 2% 23% 14% 4% 1% 13% 6%
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from the base model was not included in this graduate regression.  Including the 
BONUS1 variable in the more selective graduate regression predicted failure perfectly. 
Very few enlistees who received any type of enlistment bonus, discharged, and no 
graduate enlistees who received an enlistment bonus, discharged.          
With this final model, discharge probabilities for each group for an average 
enlistee were determined and the resulting data were recorded in the manner presented in 
Table 9.  Once the discharge probabilities during different times of the month were 
recorded, it quickly became apparent that not all enlistments increased in attrition risk 
with the approach of the monthly deadline.   
The groups that exhibited a low attrition risk no matter when their enlistment, 
were combined to form a large category of enlistee (CAT1).  Those groups that exhibited 
a high attrition risk no matter when their enlistment, were combined to form a separate 
and smaller category of enlistee (CAT2).  Finally, groups that exhibited a low attrition 
risk during the first three weeks of the month but a disproportionately high discharge 
probability during only the last five recruiting days of the month were combined to form 
the final category of enlistee (CAT3).   
Cross-validation, using the identical groups established in the previous description 
was performed using the FY03/04 sample.  These results were tabulated below the 
FY00/01 results.   
Table 10 illustrates the results of this categorization process.  The top portion of 
the table (labeled FY00/01) provides the final graduate interactions of AGE, 
ASVABTIME, COMPONENT, and AFQT in FY00/01 (identified as V1 through V31).  
Additionally, it provides the attrition rates of each of these interactions during the first 
three weeks of the month as well as during the final five days of the month.  The bottom 
portion of the table (labeled FY03/04 Holdout Sample) provides the final graduate 
interactions of AGE, ASVABTIME, COMPONENT, and AFQT in FY03/04 (also 
labeled V1 through V31).  Additionally, it provides the attrition rates of each of these 
interactions during the first three weeks of the month as well as during the final five days 
of the month.  Consolidating the 31 interactions into the three final categories (CAT1, 
CAT2, and CAT3) is described below.  Interactions that are highlighted in white became 
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the CAT1 category of enlistee.  Interactions that are highlighted in red became the CAT2 
category of enlistee.  Interactions that are highlighted in yellow became the CAT3 
category of enlistee.  The following discussion references Table 10. 
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Table 10. High School Graduate Group Consolidation 
 
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 V20 V21 V22 V23 V24 V25 V26 V27 V28 V29 V30 V31
ASVABTIME A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2
AGE Y Y Y1 Y1 Y2 Y2 Y Old Old Old Old Y Y Y1 Y1 Y2 Y2 Y1 Y1 Y2 Y2 Old Old Old1 Old1 Old2 Old2 Old1 Old1 Old2 Old2
AFQT A B A1 A2 A1 A2 B A B A B A B A1 A2 A1 A2 B1 B2 B1 B2 A B A1 A2 A1 A2 B1 B2 B1 B2
COMPONENT K K R R R R R K K R R K K R R R R R R R R K K R R R R R R R R
DISCH RATE 
WEEK123 5% 9% 6% 9% 9% 10% 8% 10% 18% 11% 13% 9% 10% 7% 11% 16% 12% 9% 9% 11% 15% 11% 17% 17% 15% 21% 18% 17% 14% 14% 17%
DISCH RATE 
WEEK45 13% 11% 13% 10% 16% 8% 8% 4% 23% 13% 6% 10% 12% 13% 12% 16% 13% 4% 10% 15% 17% 17% 17% 12% 17% 22% 13% 17% 24% 14% 14%
N 415 234 381 223 571 383 999 206 94 637 352 1006 346 672 426 1384 1120 330 356 802 682 664 213 616 543 450 425 320 268 193 195
% of sample 3% 2% 2% 1% 4% 2% 6% 1% 1% 4% 2% 6% 2% 4% 3% 9% 7% 2% 2% 5% 4% 4% 1% 4% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 1% 1%
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 V20 V21 V22 V23 V24 V25 V26 V27 V28 V29 V30 V31
ASVABTIME A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2
AGE Y Y Y1 Y1 Y2 Y2 Y Old Old Old Old Y Y Y1 Y1 Y2 Y2 Y1 Y1 Y2 Y2 Old Old Old1 Old1 Old2 Old2 Old1 Old1 Old2 Old2
AFQT A B A1 A2 A1 A2 B A B A B A B A1 A2 A1 A2 B1 B2 B1 B2 A B A1 A2 A1 A2 B1 B2 B1 B2
COMPONENT K K R R R R R K K R R K K R R R R R R R R K K R R R R R R R R
DISCH RATE 
WEEK123 8% 4% 8% 7% 8% 5% 9% 8% 22% 11% 13% 11% 8% 13% 10% 13% 13% 13% 13% 15% 14% 12% 17% 15% 13% 16% 14% 20% 18% 15% 22%
DISCH RATE 
WEEK45 8% 9% 4% 5% 12% 8% 9% 17% 8% 12% 13% 9% 10% 16% 11% 18% 15% 17% 15% 11% 21% 15% 17% 20% 21% 17% 19% 18% 21% 18% 26%
N 623 274 562 394 950 656 1424 342 127 1369 598 1179 375 890 600 1917 1631 400 458 995 953 1041 263 999 1160 725 986 462 423 321 319




1.  Cross-Validation Inconsistencies and Solutions    
As discussed above, some sub groups failed to perfectly validate from one data set 
to the next.  Rather than placing them in a questionable fourth category, the author chose 
to include these groups in the CAT1, CAT2, or CAT3 category for the reasons discussed 
below.   
V10 consisted of enlistees who took the ASVAB more than 25 days from 
enlistment, were 21 or older, scored 50 or higher on the ASVAB, and enlisted for a 
regular component – highlighted in white in Table 10.  V13 consisted of enlistees who 
took the ASVAB less than 25 days from enlistment, were 20 or younger, scored below 50 
on the ASVAB, and enlisted for a reserve component – also highlighted in white in Table 
10.  Both variables exhibited a 2- percentage point increase in attrition risk during 
FY00/01.  During FY03/04, V10 only exhibited a 1-percentage point jump in attrition 
while V13 exhibited the same 2-percentage point increase.  While these variables 
increased in attrition risk from one period to the next, even the last-week attrition risk of 
these enlistees was relatively low when compared to other groupings.  These two 
variables were therefore included in the CAT1 category.   
V26 consisted of enlistees who took the ASVAB less than 25 days from 
enlistment, were 23 or older, scored between 50 and 70 on the ASVAB, and enlisted for a 
regular component – highlighted in yellow in Table 10.  This variable exhibited a 1- 
percentage point increase in attrition risk during FY00/01 and also in FY03/04.  While 
this variable did validate from one sample to the next, its increase in attrition risk from 
one period to the next in both samples was relatively minor.  Because of V26’s small 
increase in attrition rate throughout the month and also its high overall attrition rate, it 
could have been placed in the CAT2 category.  Due to this group’s similarity to variable 
V25 and because of its attrition jump validation from one sample to the next, the author 
chose to place it in the CAT3 category.  Even though the attrition risk of V26 does 
increase throughout the month in both samples, however, definitive placement of these 
subgroups can only be made through further analysis.   
V2 consisted of enlistees who took the ASVAB more than 25 days from 
enlistment, were younger than 21, scored below 50 on the ASVAB, and enlisted for a 
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reserve component – highlighted in white in Table 10.  In FY00/01, V2 exhibited a 2-
percentage point increase in attrition during the last-week of the month.  In FY03/04, this 
variable exhibited a 5-percentagte point increase in attrition.  While the FY03/04 results 
did constitute a significant increase in attrition risk at the end of the month, even the final 
week attrition rate of V2 in FY03/04 (9 percent) was well below the attrition rates of 
other groupings.  For this reason, this variable was placed in the CAT1 category.   
V1 consisted of enlistees who took the ASVAB more than 25 days from 
enlistment, were younger than 21, scored 50 or higher on the ASVAB, and enlisted for a 
reserve component – highlighted in white in Table 10.  V3 consisted of enlistees who 
took the ASVAB more than 25 days from enlistment, were 17 or 18 years old, scored 
between 50 and 70 on the ASVAB, and enlisted for a regular component – highlighted in 
white in Table 10.  V20 consisted of enlistees who took the ASVAB less than 25 days 
from enlistment, were 19 or 20 years old, scored below 40 on the ASVAB, and enlisted 
for a regular component – also highlighted in white in Table 10.  V1, V3, and V20 all 
exhibited significant increases in attrition during FY00/01 but no increase in discharge 
probability during FY03/04.  The author cannot definitively explain the reasons for why 
these sub groupings did not validate from one data set to the next.  Because these groups 
did increase significantly in attrition risk in FY00/01 throughout the month and their end 
of month discharge risk was high, definitive placement of these subgroups can only be 
made through further analysis.  The author chose to place these variables in the CAT1 
category because the overall monthly discharge probability of these enlistees is low for 
both data sets. 
V18 consisted of enlistees who took the ASVAB less than 25 days from 
enlistment, were 17 or 18 years old, scored below 40 on the ASVAB, and enlisted for a 
regular component – highlighted in white in Table 10.  In contrast to the above three 
variables, V18 did not exhibit any jump in attrition during FY00/01 but did exhibit a 
large increase in attrition risk during FY03/04.  As with the above variables, the author is 
unable to explain the reason for this difference in discharge probability.  Because this 
group did increase significantly in attrition risk throughout the month in FY03/04 and 
because its end of month discharge risk was high in this sample, definitive placement can 
only be made through further analysis.  The author chose to place this variable in the 
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CAT1 category because of the group’s small size combined with its relatively low overall 
monthly discharge probability both data sets. 
V16 consisted of enlistees who took the ASVAB less than 25 days from 
enlistment, were 19 or 20 years old, scored between 50 and 70 on the ASVAB, and 
enlisted for a regular component – highlighted in red in Table 10.  V24 consisted of 
enlistees who took the ASVAB less than 25 days from enlistment, were 23 or older, 
scored between 50 and 70 on the ASVAB, and enlisted for a regular component – also 
highlighted in red in Table 10.  V27 consisted of enlistees who took the ASVAB less than 
25 days from enlistment, were 23 or older, scored higher than 70 on the ASVAB, and 
enlisted for a regular component – also highlighted in red in Table 10.  Variables V16, 
V24, and V27 exhibited a high attrition risk at all times of the month during FY00/01.  In 
FY03/04, these groupings exhibited a high attrition risk during the first three weeks of the 
month and an even higher attrition risk during the last-week of the month.  Because of the 
overall high monthly attrition risk in FY03/04, these variables were placed in the CAT2 
category.   
V8 consisted of enlistees who took the ASVAB more than 25 days from 
enlistment, were older than 20, scored between higher than 50 on the ASVAB, and 
enlisted for a reserve component – highlighted in yellow in Table 10.  V9 consisted of 
enlistees who took the ASVAB more than 25 days from enlistment, were older than 20, 
scored between below 50 on the ASVAB, and enlisted for a reserve component – 
highlighted in red in Table 10.    Variables V8 and V9 were the final two groupings that 
failed to validate from one data set to the next.  V9 exhibited a high attrition risk at all 
times during FY00/01 but only displayed a high discharge probability during the first 
three weeks in the FY03/04 data.  The author cannot definitively explain the reasons for 
why this sub grouping did not validate from one data set to the next.  Because this group 
exhibited such an unusual attrition pattern in FY03/04, definitive placement can only be 
made through further analysis.  The author chose to place this variable in the CAT2 
category because even though the discharge probability of these entrants is only 8 percent 
during the final week of the month, the overall monthly attrition risk of the entire group is 
still well above other groupings.   
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V8 was the only variable in the FY00/01 sample that did not increase in attrition 
during the fourth week of the month but was still included in the CAT3 category.  While 
it did not increase in attrition risk during FY00/01, it did increase in discharge probability 
in the FY03/04 data.  The author cannot definitively explain the reasons for why this sub 
grouping did not validate from one data set to the next.  Because this group decreased in 
discharge probability during FY00/01 and increased during FY03/04, definitive 
placement can only be made through further analysis.   The author chose to place these 
enlistees in the CAT3 category.  The very small size of V8 could account for the 
inconsistent discharge probabilities in the last-week of the FY00/01 sample.  
Additionally, older I-IIIA reservists who took the ASVAB less than 25 days from 
enlistment (V22) exhibited a significant jump in attrition in both data sets while old I-
IIIA reservists that took the ASVAB more than 25 days from enlistment (V8) exhibited a 
large jump in attrition risk during FY03/04 but no jump in attrition risk during FY00/01.  
The similarity of these variables (V22 and V8) was another reason for the categorization 
of V8 as CAT3.  
Table 11 summarizes those groups that cross-validated completely, those that 
cross-validated weakly, and those groups that did not cross-validate. 
 







2. Categorizing Interaction Variables  
Groups represented by variables V1, V2, V3, V4, V6, V7, V10, V11, V12, V13, 
V15, V17, V18, V19, and V20 (highlighted in white) were combined to form the CAT1 
category.  All have been discussed previously or exhibit an overall low attrition risk in 
Groups
Cross-validation ALL OTHERS
Weak            
cross-validation
V1, V3, V18, 
V20, V26, 
No              







both FY00/01 and FY03/04.  The groups represented by the variables V9, V16, V23, 
V24, V27, V28, V30, and V31 (highlighted in red) were combined to form the CAT2 
category.  Although many of these groups increased in attrition risk from the first three 
weeks to the last-week of the month, the jump was either negligible or the overall 
attrition risk of the group was much higher than the average of the sample.  The overall 
high attrition risk of these variables caused them to be labeled CAT2.  The groups 
represented by variables V5, V8, V14, V21, V22, V25, V26, and V29 (highlighted in 
yellow) were combined to form the CAT3 category.  All have been discussed previously 
or were selected based upon their attrition risk jump from the first three weeks to the last 
five recruiting days of the month in both the FY00/01 and the FY03/04 sample.  Table 12 
shows the attrition risks of the consolidated groupings discussed above during the first 
three weeks of the month and during the last five recruiting days of each month.   
 





   
 
E. FINAL GRADUATE REGRESSIONS 
1. Discussion 
While the percent of total enlistments shown in Table 12 for each of the three 
categories are accurate, it should be noted, that the 26 and 28 percent figures for FY00/01 
and FY03/04 CAT3 enlistees, do not reflect the number of these individuals who actually 
exhibit a high discharge probability.  These numbers reflect the entire population of the 
CAT3 category enlisted during the entire month.  The accurate percentages for enlistees 
who exhibit a high probability of discharge during only the last-week of the month are 
seven percent of total graduate enlistments, for both data sets.  
CAT1 CAT2 CAT3 CAT1 CAT2 CAT3
DISCH RATE WEEK123 9.6% 16.7% 12.5% DISCH RATE WEEK123 10.7% 15.1% 12.8%
DISCH RATE WEEK45 10.8% 15.2% 16.4% DISCH RATE WEEK45 10.8% 18.8% 17.4%
N 8010 3440 4056 N 11538 5394 6484
DISCH JUMP W_123 to W_45 1.2% -1.5% 3.9% DISCH JUMP W_123 to W_45 0.1% 3.7% 4.5%
% OF TOTAL ENLISTMENTS 52% 22% 26% % OF TOTAL ENLISTMENTS 49% 23% 28%
FY00/01 Graduate Sample FY03/04 Graduate Sample















Table 13 shows that last-week CAT3 enlistments for both samples constitute 
seven percent of all graduate enlistments for both FY00/01 and FY03/04.   
 









The final graduate regressions resemble the base model with the exception of the 
inclusion of the above-described interactions and the exclusion of BONUS1.     The 
models are listed below: 
• A regression to determine the discharge probability of graduate CAT1, 
CAT2, and CAT3 enlistees during the first three weeks and the last-week 
of the month in the FY00/01 sample. 
• A regression to determine the discharge probability of graduate CAT1, 
CAT2, and CAT3 enlistees during the first three weeks and the last-week 
of the month in the FY03/04 sample. 
The results of the FY00/01 and FY03/04 regressions are provided in Table 14. 















Table 14. Regression Results For FY00/01 and FY03/04 Models 
 
 
Note:  These Models also included the following variables:  FY00, SUMMER, 
FALL, WINTER, MCD1, MCD6, MCD9, MCD12, DEPTIME, DEP_EXT, MALE, 
BLACK, OTHER, DECLINE, PLMOVES1, RECTRGEN, REFERRAL, BUMED_W, 
DEP_W, ADMIN_W, AGE_W.  These variables are all described above in Chapter V.      
 
3. Variable Interpretations 
a. CAT1 Graduate Enlistees 
All of the interactions in both samples are significant to the 1 percent level 
aside from the last-week CAT1 variable.  In the FY00/01 model this variable is 
significant only at the 10 percent level, while in the holdout sample this variable is not 
significant at all.  Although all interactions are jointly significant (Prob > χ2 = 0.0000), 
another explanation for this effect could be the complete randomness of the discharge 
probability of CAT1 enlistees.  The author maintains that some discharges occur because 
of unexplainable chance.  Medical and moral complications do arise and enlistees, who 
initially wanted to be Marines, do change their minds.  These types of discharges are 
captured in the CAT1 category.  Because these types of discharges have little to do with 
the six characteristics that make up the interactions of the “category” variables, the low 
significance of CAT1 variables is understandable.  Conversely, other types of discharges 
do correlate with AGE, ASVABTIME, COMPONENT, AFQT, and time of month 





CAT1_WEEK45 0.0143 0.0015 
 (0.0087)* (0.0073) 
CAT2_WEEK123 0.0782 0.0478 
 (0.0101)*** (0.0076)*** 
CAT2_WEEK45 0.0637 0.0884 
 (0.0136)*** (0.0120)*** 
CAT3_WEEK123 0.0328 0.0240 
 (0.0087)*** (0.0068)*** 
CAT3_WEEK45 0.0770 0.0728 
 (0.0129)*** (0.0107)*** 
Observations 15506 23416 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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who discharge with more certainty due in part to the characteristics identified in this 
study.  CAT1 entrants discharge more by chance.      
Enlistments that exhibit a low probability of discharge (CAT1) comprise 
the largest segment of both data sets.  This category was consolidated from 15 separate 
groups that exhibited a low probability of discharge at all times of the month in both the 
FY00/01 and the FY03/04 samples.  While attempts could be made to explain why each 
of the 15 groups exhibits a low attrition risk, the sheer number of groups in this category 
would make this a tedious process.  Rather than discussing each CAT1 subgroup’s 
attrition risk, detailed explanations for CAT2 and CAT3 subgroups are provided.  In the 
FY00/01 sample CAT1 enlistees exhibit a 9.6 percent overall probability of discharge 
during the first three weeks of the month and a 10.8 percent overall probability of 
discharge during the last-week of the month.  In the FY03/04 sample CAT1 enlistees 
exhibit a 10.7 percent overall probability of discharge during the first three weeks of the 
month and a 10.8 percent overall probability of discharge during the last five recruiting 
days of the month.     
 
b. CAT2 Graduate Enlistees 
Groups that exhibit a high probability of discharge at all times of the 
month (CAT2) consist of five types of enlistee.  The individuals who comprise this 
category are discussed below and are outlined in Table 15.  All discussions will reference 
the variable definitions in Table 10. 
 









1.) CAT2_a:  21+; Reserve; AFQT 49-  The group of CAT2_a 
individuals is comprised of two smaller categories of enlistee differentiated only by when 
they took the ASVAB.  Group V23 exhibits a high attrition risk at all times of the month 
LABEL ASVABTIME AGE COMPONENT AFQT
CAT2_a ALL 21 AND UP RES 49 -
CAT2_b 19,20,21,22 REG 50 - 70
CAT2_c 23 + REG IIIB
CAT2_d 21 & 22 REG 40 -
CAT2_e 23+ REG 70+
<25 DAYS
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in both samples.  Group V9 exhibits a high attrition risk during all four weeks in FY00/01 
and during three of the four weeks in FY03/04.  Although a definitive placement of V9 
cannot be made without further analysis, reasons why V9 was included in the CAT2 
category were provided above.     
In the FY00/01 sample, 21-year-olds who enlist for a reserve 
component and score 49 and below on the ASVAB, exhibit a 7.9-percentage point higher 
discharge probability than an average CAT1 individual enlisted during the first three 
weeks of the month.  The overall attrition risk of these enlistees is 17.5 percent.  In the 
FY03/FY04 sample, these same individuals exhibit a 6.4-percentage point higher 
discharge probability than an average CAT1 individual enlisted during the first three 
weeks of the month.  The overall attrition risk of these enlistees is 17.1 percent.       
Intuitively, the high attrition risk of these entrants makes sense.  
Individuals who enlist for a reserve component usually do so in order to be a Marine but 
also to attend college.  These enlistees are typically highly intelligent and are between the 
ages of 17 and 20.  As an example, in the FY00/01 data set, of the 3,178 reserve 
enlistments, 2,001 (63 percent) were younger than 21.  Of these 2,001 enlistees, 1,421 (71 
percent) scored above 50 on the ASVAB.   
One reason a reserve enlistee remains in the DEP is because of his 
desire to be a Marine, but also because of his additional incentive to earn money for 
college.  It would make sense that an older individual scoring low on the ASVAB and 
enlisting for a reserve component would exhibit an unusually high attrition risk.  While 
the motivation of college would be true for the intelligent younger reservist, this would 
probably not be the case for enlistees with the opposite characteristics.  As ship dates 
drew nearer, without the additional incentive of money for college, older low-scoring 
reservists would be more likely to change their mind.     
 
2.) CAT2_b:  ASVABTIME <25 days; 19 to 22; Regular; 
AFQT 50 -70.  The group of CAT2_b individuals is comprised of variables V16 and 
V24.  The reasons for their inclusion in this category have been discussed previously.   
In the FY00/FY01 sample, 19 to 22-year-old, individuals who 
enlist for a regular component, score from 50 to 70 on the ASVAB, and take this test 
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within 25 days of enlistment (the characteristics of both variables combined), exhibit a 
6.6-percentage point higher discharge probability than an average CAT1 individual 
enlisted during the first three weeks of the month.  The overall attrition risk of these 
enlistees is 16.1 percent.  In the FY03/FY04 sample, these same entrants exhibit a 4.4-
percentage point higher discharge probability than an average CAT1 individual enlisted 
during the first three weeks of the month.  The overall attrition risk of these enlistees is 
15.1 percent.       
Although a short ASVABTIME does indicate a quick decision to 
enlist, no other characteristic of this group can be used to explain its high attrition risk.  
19 and 20 year old, regular component individuals who take the ASVAB and then 
quickly enlist, and score between 50 and 70 on this test, exhibit a high overall monthly 
attrition risk in both samples.   
 
3.) CAT2_c:  ASVABTIME<25; 23 and up; Regular; IIIB.  
The group CAT2_c consists of groups V30 and V31.  Although some of these groups 
also vary in attrition risk from the first three weeks of the month to the last, all discharge 
probabilities exceed average CAT1 enlistee attrition rates.  All  groups validate from one 
year to the next.   
In the FY00/FY01 sample, individuals who are 23 and older, enlist 
for a regular component, score below 50 on the ASVAB and take this test shortly before 
their enlistment, exhibit a high attrition risk.  This type of enlistee has a 5.7-percentage 
point higher discharge probability than an average CAT1 individual enlisted during the 
first three weeks of the month.  The overall attrition risk of these individuals is 15.3 
percent.  In the FY03/FY04 sample, these same individuals exhibit an 8.9-percentage 
point higher discharge probability than an average CAT1 individual enlisted during the 
first three weeks of the month.  The overall attrition risk of these enlistees is 19.5 percent.     
Intuitively, the high attrition risk of these accessions would make 
sense for a variety of reasons.  Older, regular component enlistees who score poorly on 
the ASVAB and take this test shortly before they enlist may have had some involvement 
with the law.  Additionally, that these individuals take the ASVAB immediately before 
they enlist indicates a hasty decision to join or perhaps a last minute and incomplete sales 
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presentation.  As the actual ship date draws near, individuals with these characteristics 
may begin to seriously consider the ramifications of their concealed police involvement 
and or hasty decision to enlist, and they decide to attrite.   
While the above description is plausible, other scenarios for this 
category exist as well.  Whether or not the high attrition risk of this category of enlistee is 
a result of recruiter misconduct, an unrealistic job preview, or the naiveté of the 
applicant, the quick ASVAB/enlist, low AFQT, and old regular component combination, 
constitute a high attrition risk flag that should signal a clear warning to any recruiting 
command.        
4.) CAT2_d:  ASVABTIME<25; 21 & 22; Regular; AFQT 40-  
The group CAT2_d consists of group V28.  V28 validates from one year to the next.   
Regular component enlistees between 21 and 22 years old who 
have a low AFQT and enlist within 25 days of taking the ASVAB, also exhibit a high 
discharge probability.  In the FY00/FY01 sample, these individuals have a 7.3-percentage 
point higher discharge probability than an average CAT1 individual enlisted during the 
first three weeks of the month.  The overall attrition risk of these enlistees is 16.9 percent.  
In the FY03/FY04 sample, these individuals have an 8.5-percentage point higher 
discharge probability than an average CAT1 individual enlisted during the first three 
weeks of the month.  The overall attrition risk of these enlistees is 19.2 percent. 
The attrition risk of these accessions also makes sense for the same 
reasons described for low AFQT, 23 and older enlistees (CAT2_c).  21 and older, low 
AFQT individuals, who enlist for a regular component quickly after taking the ASVAB, 
exhibit a high discharge risk in both samples.     
 
5.) CAT2_e:  ASVABTIME<25; 23; Regular; AFQT 70+  The 
group CAT2_e consists of group V27.  V27 validates from one year to the next.   
23 and older old, regular component enlistees who have a high 
AFQT and enlist within 25 days of taking the ASVAB, also exhibit a high discharge 
probability.  In the FY00/FY01 sample, these individuals have a 6.5-percentage point 
higher discharge probability than an average CAT1 individual enlisted during the first 
three weeks of the month.  The overall attrition risk of these enlistees is 16.1 percent.  In 
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the FY03/FY04 sample, these individuals have a 4.6-percentage point higher discharge 
probability than an average CAT1 individual enlisted during the first three weeks of the 
month.  The overall attrition risk of these enlistees is 15.3 percent. 
Intuitively, the high attrition risk of these accessions would make 
sense for a variety of reasons.  Older and highly intelligent individuals probably have 
other options aside from the Marine Corps.  While enlistment initially does sound good 
following a motivating sales presentation by a Marine in his dress blues, it is easy to see 
why these entrants might change their mind as their ship date draws nearer.  
Table 16 summarizes the comparisons between the attrition risks 
of each group of CAT2 enlistees and individuals who fall into the CAT1 category for 
both the FY00/01 and FY03/04 samples.  In each case, CAT2 enlistees exhibit a higher 
discharge probability than CAT1 contracts. The deltas at the bottom of the table represent 
differences in overall CAT2 attrition rates and first three-week CAT1 attrition rates.  
Regardless for when the discharge rates are compared, the differences are significant.  All 
subgroups of the CAT2 interactions are statistically significant (Appendix C).    
 












c. CAT3 Graduate Enlistees 
Individuals, who exhibit a low probability of discharge during the first 
three weeks of the month but a disproportionately high attrition risk as the end of the 
month approaches, make up the third category of enlistee.  Although at first glance, 
CAT3 last-week enlistees may seem similar to CAT2 enlistees, the author maintains that 
this is not the case.  Individuals enlisted during the last-week of the month are affected by 
CAT1 CAT2_a CAT2_b CAT2_c CAT2_d CAT2_e
WEEK_123 9.6%
WEEK_45 10.8%
7.9% 6.5% 5.7% 7.3% 6.5%
CAT1 CAT2_a CAT2_b CAT2_c CAT2_d CAT2_e
WEEK_123 10.7%
WEEK_45 10.8%









17.1% 15.1% 19.5% 19.2%
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the hockey-stick phenomenon caused by the approach of a concrete deadline.  To 
illustrate the effects of this “target” date, discharge rates of these enlistees were analyzed 
and reported during the last-week (minus the last day) as well as on the actual last day of 
the month.  In most cases, the attrition rate of CAT3 enlistees continued to increase 
throughout the last-week, culminating on the last day of the month.  This result supports 
the author’s assumption that these individuals are different from CAT2 entrants and 
demonstrate a high discharge rate because of reasons that are closely linked to recruiter 
behavior. 
Generalizations have been made in Chapter II about why certain type of 
individuals might be perfectly fine to enlist from during the first three weeks of the 
month but (because of recruiter behavior) exhibit a high attrition risk when enlisted 
during the last-week.  These explanations include individuals who have recently used 
drugs, individuals who have concealed past police and medical complications in order to 
enlist, and individuals who are unsure about being a Marine and have received an 
unrealistic job preview from a recruiter.  In all cases the recruiter or the applicant takes a 
chance.  Also in all cases, the high attrition risk of the enlistee may be caused by the 
recruiter’s requirement to meet a specific goal by a certain deadline – he or she may be 
willing to accept the higher risk. 
In the case of applicants who have used drugs, the recruiter hopes the 
individual will pass the urinalysis.  Without the monthly deadline, the recruiter would 
simply have waited the required 30 days.  Because of the pressure to make mission, this 
type of individual is enlisted a bit too early.  In this case, if the gamble fails, discharge is 
immediate. 
With medical or moral problems, either the recruiter knows of these 
deficiencies and conceals the information, or the individual simply fails to disclose these 
problems.  Again, because of the monthly deadline, the recruiter deals with applicants he 
would normally not accept.  It is relatively easy to imagine these individuals becoming 
unsure of their decision to enlist as their ship date draws nearer. 
Finally, those enlistees who are unsure about being a Marine in the first 
place but receive a good sales presentation may also exhibit a high attrition risk at the end 
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of the month.  In this case, the recruiter definitely realizes his gamble but due to the 
pressure to make mission, enlists the applicant anyway.  During the first three weeks of 
the month, while the recruiter still interviews this type of individual, he provides a better 
sales presentation and a realistic job preview and consequently this type of individual 
does not enlist.  Conversely, with the better sales presentation and a good follow-up, the 
recruiter accurately probes the applicant’s needs and successfully convinces him to 
become a Marine.  In this case, the individual enlists and also ships.  At the end of the 
month, however, because of pressure and time constraints, the recruiter does not take the 
time to determine the applicant’s true propensity.  Consequently this type of individual 
changes his mind at some point while he is in the DEP and decides not to ship.   
While these explanations clarify why an individual might exhibit a high 
attrition risk only at the end of the month, it is difficult to explain why CAT3 enlistees 
identified in this study demonstrate this type of behavior.  Although the reasons for the 
high end of month attrition risk for these subgroups remains obscure, the attrition 
behavior of this category of enlistee is validated in the holdout sample for all variables 
aside from V8 (previously discussed).  The groups that comprise this category of enlistee 
are described below and outlined in Table 17.  All discussions will again reference 
variable codes identified in Table 10. 
 






1.) CAT3_a:  21 +; Reserve; AFQT 50+  Individuals who 
comprise the CAT3_a group are formed from variables V8 and V22.  As discussed 
previously, of these, the only variable that does not demonstrate an increase in attrition 
risk from the first three weeks to the last-week, is variable V8 from the FY00/01 sample.  
LABEL ASVABTIME AGE COMPONENT AFQT
CAT3_a ALL 21 AND UP RES I-IIIA
CAT3_b >25 DAYS 19 & 20 REG 50-70
CAT3_c 17 & 18 REG 50-70
CAT3_d 19,20,21,22 REG 40-50
CAT3_e 21 & 22 REG 70+
CAT3_f 23+ REG 50-70
<25 DAYS
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Although definitive categorization of this variable cannot be accomplished without 
further analysis, the reason for its inclusion in the CAT2 category was discussed above. 
Reserve component enlistees older than 21 exhibit a high discharge 
probability when they are enlisted during the last-week of the month.  In the FY00/01 
sample, when enlisted during the last four days of the month (excluding the last day), 
these entrants have a 1.8 percentage point greater attrition risk than CAT1 individuals 
enlisted during the same monthly time frame.  On the actual last day of the month, the 
attrition risk difference between last day CAT1 and last day CAT3 enlistees is 3.0 
percentage points.  In FY00/01 these entrants exhibit an overall 3.5 percentage point 
greater attrition risk when they are enlisted during the last five recruiting days of the 
month.  The actual attrition risk of these enlistees is 12.6 percent during the last-week of 
the month minus the last day, and 13.9 percent on the last day.  In the FY03/04 sample, 
these entrants have a 3.5 percentage point greater attrition risk than CAT1 individuals 
enlisted during the same monthly time frame.  Their attrition risk on the last day is 5.7 
percentage points greater than comparable last day CAT1 enlistees.  In FY03/04 these 
entrants exhibit an overall 4.1 percentage point greater attrition risk when they are 
enlisted during the last five recruiting days of the month.  The actual attrition risk of these 
enlistees is 14.8 percent during the last-week of the month excluding the last day, and 
17.0 percent on the last day of the month.      
      
2.) CAT3_b:  ASVABTIME>25; 19 and 20; Regular; AFQT 
50-70  The only variable that makes up this group is V5.  The jump in the attrition risk 
from the first three weeks to the last-week validates from one sample to the next.  
Regular component graduate enlistees between the ages of 19 and 20, who score from 50 
to 70 on the ASVAB, and take this test more than 25 days from enlistment increase in 
discharge probability with the approach of the monthly deadline as well.  In the FY00/01 
sample, these individuals exhibit a 9.0 percent attrition risk when enlisted during the first 
three weeks of the month.  Their discharge probability is 16.1 percent when enlisted 
during the four days preceding mission day and 9.8 percent on the last day of the month.  
In FY00/01 these entrants exhibit an overall 7.3 percentage point greater attrition risk 
when they are enlisted during the last five recruiting days of the month.  Compared to 
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CAT1 enlistees by week, the difference is just as telling.  When enlisted during the first 
three weeks of the month, these CAT3 enlistees exhibit a 0.5-percentage point lower 
attrition risk than CAT1 enlistees assessed during this same monthly time frame.  During 
the last five recruiting days of the month, these CAT3 enlistees exhibit a 5.5 percentage 
point high attrition rate than do comparable CAT1 individuals.   
In the FY03/04 sample, the results mirror those reported above.  
These CAT3 individuals exhibit an 8.5 percent overall attrition risk when enlisted during 
the first three weeks of the month but their discharge probability jumps to 10.7 percent 
when enlisted during the last four days of the month and then to 14.9 percent on the last 
day.  In FY03/04 these entrants exhibit an overall 3.2 percentage point greater attrition 
risk when they are enlisted during the last five recruiting days of the month.     
 
3.) CAT3_c:  ASVABTIME<25; 17 & 18; Regular; AFQT 50 
– 70.  The only variable that makes up this group is V14.  The attrition risk jump from the 
first three weeks to the last-week validates from one sample to the next.  Regular 
component graduate enlistees between the ages of 17 and 18, score from 50 to 70 on the 
ASVAB, and take this test within 25 days of enlistment increase in discharge probability 
with the approach of the monthly deadline.  In the FY00/01 sample, these individuals 
only exhibit a 7.5 percent attrition risk when enlisted during the first three weeks.  Their 
discharge probability is 9.5 percent when enlisted during the four days preceding mission 
day but jumps to 21.6 percent on the last day of the month.  Compared to CAT1 enlistees 
by week, these CAT3 entrants exhibit a lower attrition risk than comparable CAT1 
enlistees on all but the last day of the month.  On mission day, these individuals exhibit a 
10.0-percentage point higher discharge probability than CAT1 individuals enlisted at this 
time.      
In the FY03/04 sample, these CAT3 individuals exhibit a 13.2 
percent overall attrition risk when enlisted during the first three weeks of the month but 
their discharge probability jumps to 17.0 percent when enlisted during the last four days 
of the month.  On the last day, their attrition risk is 14.8 percent.  Compared to CAT1 
enlistees when enlisted during the first three weeks of the month, this group of CAT3 
enlistee exhibits only a 2.6-percentage point higher attrition risk.  During the last four 
85
days the difference is 6.4 percentage points.  On the last day of the month CAT3_c 
entrants display a 3.6 percentage point higher attrition risk than CAT1 enlistees enlisted 
on this same day.  
 
4.) CAT3_d:  ASVABTIME<25; 19, 20, 21, 22; Regular; 
AFQT 40 – 50.  Individuals who comprise the CAT3_d group are formed from variables 
V21 and V29.  All enlistees identified by these variables exhibit an increase in attrition 
risk from the first three weeks to the last-week of the month in both samples.   
Regular component graduate enlistees between the ages of 19 and 
22, who score from 40 to 50 on the ASVAB, and take this test within 25 days of 
enlistment, increase in their discharge probability at the end of the month.  In the 
FY00/01 sample, these individuals exhibit a 14.9 percent attrition risk when enlisted 
during the first three weeks of the month, but a discharge probability of 19.1 percent 
when enlisted during the four days preceding mission day and 16.5 percent probability on 
the last day of the month.  Compared to CAT1 enlistees by week, the difference is also 
interesting.  When enlisted during the first three weeks of the month, these CAT3 
enlistees exhibit a 5.4-percentage point higher attrition risk than CAT1 enlistees assessed 
during this same monthly time frame.  During the last four days preceding the final day 
of the month, this difference jumps to 8.7 percentage points.  On the last day of the 
month, these individuals exhibit a 5.0-percentage point higher discharge probability than 
CAT1 individuals enlisted at this time.      
In the FY03/04 sample, the results support those reported above.  
These CAT3 individuals exhibit a 15.3 percent overall attrition risk when enlisted during 
the first three weeks of the month but their discharge probability jumps to 19.4 percent 
when enlisted during the last four days of the month and then to 23.8 percent on the last 
day.  Compared to CAT1 enlistees by week, the difference is again revealing.  When 
enlisted during the first three weeks of the month, this group of CAT3 enlistees exhibits 
4.6-percentage point higher attrition risk than CAT1 enlistees contracted during this same 
monthly time frame.  During the last four days the difference is 8.8 percentage points.  
On the last day of the month CAT3 entrants display a 12.5 percentage point higher 
attrition risk than CAT1 enlistees enlisted on this same day.  
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5.) CAT3_e:  ASVABTIME>25; 21 and 22; Regular, AFQT 
70+ .  The only variable that makes up this group is V25.  The attrition risk jump from 
the first three weeks to the last-week validates from one sample to the next.  Regular 
component graduate enlistees between the ages of 21 and 22, who score above 70 on the 
ASVAB, and take this test within 25 days of enlistment, also increase in discharge 
probability with the approach of the monthly deadline.  In the FY00/01 sample, these 
individuals exhibit a 14.7 percent attrition risk when enlisted during the first three weeks.  
Their discharge probability is 18.4 percent when enlisted during the four days preceding 
mission day and is 14.0 percent on the last day of the month.  When enlisted during the 
first three weeks of the month, these CAT3 enlistees exhibit a 5.0-percentage point higher 
attrition risk than CAT1 enlistees enlisted during this same monthly time frame.  During 
the last four days preceding the final day of the month, the difference between CAT1 and 
CAT3 enlistees is 8.0 percentage points.  On the last day of the month these individuals 
exhibit a 2.5-percentage point higher discharge probability than CAT1 individuals 
enlisted at this time.      
In the FY03/04 sample, the results validate those reported above.  
These CAT3 individuals only exhibit a 13.0 percent overall attrition risk when enlisted 
during the first three weeks of the month but their discharge probability jumps to 20.7 
percent when enlisted during the last four days of the month and then to 23.0 percent on 
the last day.  Compared to CAT1 enlistees by week, the difference is significant.  When 
enlisted during the first three weeks of the month, this group of CAT3 enlistee exhibits 
only a 2.3-percentage point higher attrition risk than CAT1 enlistees assessed during this 
same monthly time frame.  During the last four days the difference is 10.1 percentage 
points.  On the last day of the month CAT3 entrants display an 11.8 percentage point 
higher attrition risk than CAT1 enlistees enlisted on this same day.  
 
6.) CAT3_f:  ASVABTIME>25; 23 and older; Regular, AFQT 
50 – 70.  The only variable that makes up this group is V26.  The attrition risk jump from 
the first three weeks to the last-week validates from one sample to the next.  Regular 
component graduate enlistees older than 23, who score between 50 and 70 on the 
ASVAB, and take this test within 25 days of enlistment, also increase in discharge 
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probability with the approach of the monthly deadline.  In the FY00/01 sample, these 
individuals exhibit a 21.4 percent attrition risk when enlisted during the first three weeks 
and increase slightly in attrition risk during the last-week of the month.  
In the FY03/04 sample, the results support placing this group in 
CAT3 vice CAT2.  Not only do the groups validate from one sample to the next, but the 
jump in attrition risk during FY03/04 is significant.  During the first three weeks of the 
month, the attrition risk of these entrants is only 15.8 percent.  It remains roughly the 
same during the last four days preceding mission day.  On mission day, however, the 
attrition risk of these enlistees increases to 21.9 percent  
Appendix D provides the regression results for CAT3 groupings.  
All CAT3 groupings are jointly significant in both samples (Prob > χ2 = 0.0000); 
however only the last-week CAT3_d grouping is individually significant down to all 
known levels for both data sets.  The last-week CAT3_a grouping is individually 
significant at the 5 percent level in FY00/01 and at the 1 percent level in FY03/04.  The 
last-week CAT3_b grouping is individually significant at the 5 percent level in FY00/01 
but not in FY03/04.  The last-week CAT3_c grouping is not individually significant in 
FY00/01 but is individually significant at the 5 percent level in FY03/04.  The last-week 
CAT3_e grouping is individually significant at the 5 percent level in FY00/01 and at the 
1 percent level in FY03/04.  The last-week CAT3_f grouping is individually significant at 
the 1 percent level in FY00/01 and at the 5 percent level in FY03/04.       
The results of the above discussion are again perhaps best 
summarized in Table 18.  This table shows the attrition risk of each sub group of the 
CAT3 category during the first three weeks, the last four days preceding mission day, and 
on the actual last day of the month for both FY00/01 and FY03/04.  It also shows the 
overall last 5-day attrition risk of each subgroup.  Finally, the table provides the 
difference in attrition risk between the last 5 days of the month and the first three weeks 
of the month for each subgroup.  Although some CAT3 first three-week groups exhibit a 
somewhat higher discharge probability than comparable first three-week CAT1 enlistees, 
the telling statistic continues to be the jump in attrition risk of these enlistees during the 
last five days of the month.  Additionally, in all cases, there is a significant difference 
between discharge probabilities of fourth week CAT3 and fourth week CAT1 entrants.  
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Finally, the CAT3 group is based on the hypothesis that the recruiter successfully screens 
these enlistees during the first three weeks of the month but because of difficulties in 
making mission, enlists these same entrants during the final week of the month.  Because 
it is believed that difficult recruiting causes the high discharge rate of CAT3 enlistees, it 
would make sense that FY03/04 results would be stronger than FY00/01.  This is in fact 
the case.  Table 17 shows that the jump in attrition rate between the first three weeks and 
the last, in FY03/04 is higher in four of the six subgroups.  In all, the attrition rates of 
these subgroups indicate markedly different (hockey-stick) recruiter behavior when 
enlisting CAT3 individuals.  The labels for each CAT3 grouping correspond to the labels 
introduced in Table 17. 
 










F. CREATION OF SENIOR VARIABLES  
Senior variables and methods used to create interactions, mirror those used for 
graduate samples with two slight differences.  As in graduate samples, age variables were 
initially divided into two categories: YNG and OLD.  YNG enlistees consisted of those 
individuals who were 18 and younger.  They exhibited a predicted discharge probability 
of 23.0 percent.  OLD enlistees (19 and older) exhibited a predicted attrition risk that was 
approximately 2.6 percentage points higher than an average YNG enlistee.   
CAT1 CAT3_a CAT3_b CAT3_c CAT3_d CAT3_e CAT3_f
WEEK_123 9.5% 10.9% 9.0% 7.5% 14.9% 14.7% 21.4%
WEEK_4 10.4% 12.6% 16.1% 9.5% 19.1% 18.4% 22.2%
LDAY 11.5% 13.9% 9.8% 21.6% 16.5% 14.0% 8.6%
WEEK_45 10.7% 14.3% 16.3% 12.7% 18.3% 17.1% 21.7%
WEEK123/WEEK45 DIFFERENCES 1.2% 3.5% 7.3% 5.2% 3.4% 2.4% 0.3%
CAT1 CAT3_a CAT3_b CAT3_c CAT3_d CAT3_e CAT3_f
WEEK_123 10.7% 11.3% 8.5% 13.2% 15.3% 13.0% 15.8%
WEEK_4 10.6% 14.8% 10.7% 17.0% 19.4% 20.7% 14.5%
LDAY 11.3% 17.0% 14.9% 14.8% 23.8% 23.0% 21.9%
WEEK_45 10.8% 15.4% 11.8% 16.5% 20.7% 21.4% 16.8%




Because some of the initial groups were again too large, the YNG variable was 
further subdivided into 17-year-old enlistees (YNG1) and 18-year-olds (YNG2).  While 
YNG2 seniors exhibited only a slightly higher attrition risk than YNG1 accessions, the 
discharge probability of these variables proved to be significant when interacted with 
other key factors.  Although the actual ages of these senior variables were different than 
the various ages represented in the age variables created for the graduate sample, the 
principal is the same. 
After the first senior groupings had been isolated, it was again determined that 
three categories were still too large.  Original senior grouping separations are presented in 
Table 19. 




   
 
 
Again, three of the original senior groups (highlighted in yellow) were still too 
large to form the bases for a practical intervention, and they were further separated on the 
basis of age and AFQT.  The search method used to further differentiate AGE has already 
been discussed.  The method used to further differentiate AFQT score remained the same 
as for the graduate sample.  To reiterate again, AFQT was divided into four categories.  
Enlistees who scored 50 to 69 on the ASVAB were labeled IIIA_1 and those who scored 
70 and above were labeled IIIA_2.  Enlistees who scored below 40 were labeled B1 and 
those who scored from 40 to 49 were labeled B2. 
 
G. CROSS-VALIDATING SENIOR INTERACTION ATTRITION RATES 
THROUGH THE USE OF A HOLDOUT SAMPLE 
After this final separation of groups, a regression was run for the FY00/01 senior 
data set, incorporating all the newly formed interactions.  At this point, there were 50 new 
VAR1 VAR2 VAR3 VAR4 VAR5 VAR6 VAR7 VAR8 VAR9 VAR10 VAR11 VAR12 VAR13 VAR14 VAR15 VAR16
ASVABTIME A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2
AGE Yng Yng Yng Yng Old Old Old Old Yng Yng Yng Yng Old Old Old Old
AFQT I-IIIA IIIB I-IIIA IIIB I-IIIA IIIB I-IIIA IIIB I-IIIA IIIB I-IIIA IIIB I-IIIA IIIB I-IIIA IIIB
COMPONENT Res Res Reg Reg Res Res Reg Reg Res Res Reg Reg Res Res Reg Reg
DISCH RATE 
WEEK123 14% 12% 20% 7% 18% 20% 28% 25% 26% 17% 32% 22% 26%
DISCH RATE 
WEEK45 21% 42% 24% 6% 17% 18% 32% 31% 33% 18% 46% 32% 32%
N 248 101 1574 776 82 53 360 264 457 153 3657 2058 93 50 642 566
% of sample 2% 1% 14% 7% 1% 0% 3% 2% 4% 1% 33% 18% 1% 0% 6% 5%
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interactions and 71 variables in the regression in all.  The only base variable from the 
graduate regression that was not included in the senior model was AGE_W.  It is self-
explanatory why a high school senior would not require an age waiver. 
With this final model, individual discharge probabilities for each group for an 
average enlistee were determined and the resulting data were recorded in the manner 
presented in Table 19.  It again became apparent that not all senior enlistments increased 
in attrition risk with the approach of the monthly deadline.   
The groups that exhibited a low attrition risk no matter when their enlistment, 
were combined to form the largest category of enlistments (CAT1).  Those senior groups 
that exhibited a high attrition risk no matter when their enlistment, were combined to 
form a separate category of enlistee (CAT2).  Finally, those groups that exhibited a low 
attrition risk during the first three weeks of the month and a disproportionately high 
discharge probability during only the last-week of the month were combined to form the 
final category of enlistee (CAT3).   
Cross-validation, using the identical groups established in the previous description 
was performed using the FY03/04 sample.  These results were tabulated below the 
FY00/01 results.   
Table 20 illustrates the results of this categorization process.  The top portion of 
the table (labeled FY00/01) provides the final senior interactions of AGE, ASVABTIME, 
COMPONENT, and AFQT in FY00/01 (identified as V1 through V25).  Additionally, it 
provides the attrition rates of each of these interactions during the first three weeks of the 
month as well as during the final five days of the month.  The bottom portion of the table 
(labeled FY03/04 Holdout Sample) provides the final senior interactions of AGE, 
ASVABTIME, COMPONENT, and AFQT in FY03/04 (also labeled V1 through V25).  
Additionally, it provides the attrition rates of each of these interactions during the first 
three weeks of the month as well as during the final five days of the month.  
Consolidating the 25 interactions into the three final categories (CAT1, CAT2, and 
CAT3) is described below.  Interactions that are highlighted in white became the CAT1 
category of enlistee.  Interactions that are highlighted in red became the CAT2 category 
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of enlistee.  Interactions that are highlighted in yellow became the CAT3 category of 






Table 20. High School Senior Group Consolidation 
 
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 V20 V21 V22 V23 V24 V25
ASVABTIME A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2
AGE Yng Yng Yng1 Yng1 Yng2 Yng2 Yng Old Old Old Old Yng Yng Yng1 Yng1 Yng2 Yng2 Yng1 Yng1 Yng2 Yng2 Old Old Old Old
AFQT A B A1 A2 A1 A2 B A B A1 B A B A1 A2 A1 A2 B1 B2 B1 B2 A B A B
COMPONENT K K R R R R R K K R R K K R R R R R R R R K K R R
DISCH RATE 
WEEK123 17% 16% 21% 18% 17% 22% 10% 21% 21% 22% 30% 26% 30% 19% 20% 24% 20% 29% 24% 26% 24% 18% 35% 23% 27%
DISCH RATE 
WEEK45 22% 46% 24% 24% 23% 25% 11% 23% 20% 20% 32% 32% 37% 24% 24% 28% 22% 28% 25% 22% 28% 22% 54% 33% 31%
N 248 101 389 241 592 352 776 82 53 360 264 457 153 1015 643 1213 786 362 446 618 632 93 50 642 566
% of sample 2% 1% 3% 2% 5% 3% 7% 1% 0% 3% 2% 4% 1% 9% 6% 11% 7% 3% 4% 6% 6% 1% 0% 6% 5%
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 V20 V21 V22 V23 V24 V25
ASVABTIME A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2 A2
AGE Yng Yng Yng1 Yng1 Yng2 Yng2 Yng Old Old Old Old Yng Yng Yng1 Yng1 Yng2 Yng2 Yng1 Yng1 Yng2 Yng2 Old Old Old Old
AFQT A B A1 A2 A1 A2 B A B A1 B A B A1 A2 A1 A2 B1 B2 B1 B2 A B A B
COMPONENT K K R R R R R K K R R K K R R R R R R R R K K R R
DISCH RATE 
WEEK123 25% 29% 21% 16% 26% 23% 27% 32% 37% 28% 32% 27% 40% 22% 19% 25% 26% 25% 22% 31% 31% 28% 38% 33% 34%
DISCH RATE 
WEEK45 29% 32% 18% 14% 31% 23% 31% 41% 60% 30% 37% 28% 30% 24% 22% 34% 28% 28% 24% 35% 36% 42% 44% 36% 35%
N 271 71 535 381 805 554 1143 123 53 831 581 534 155 1338 900 1728 1154 463 640 759 862 269 100 1913 1180




1. Cross-validation Inconsistencies and Solutions 
Some sub groups of the senior samples also failed to perfectly validate from one 
data set to the next.  Rather than placing them in a questionable fourth category, the 
author chose to include these groups in the CAT1, CAT2, or CAT3 category for the 
reasons discussed below.   
In the FY00/01 data set, V4 and V15 all exhibited significant jumps in attrition 
from the first three weeks to the last-week of the month, but exhibited no or only a small 
increase in attrition in the FY03/04 sample.  Because of this lack of validation and 
because of these variables similarity to one another (they only differed by ASVABTIME) 
more definitive categorization of these variables could only be accomplished through 
further analysis.  The author chose to include these variables in the CAT1 category 
because of the low overall monthly attrition risk of these entrants. 
In the FY03/04 sample, variable V7 exhibited a high attrition rate that had not 
been observed in the base as well as an increase in attrition from the first three weeks to 
the last-week of the month.  Although its low attrition rate in FY00/01 was the 
justification used for its placement in the CAT1 category, definitive categorization of 
these enlistees can only be accomplished through further analysis.           
The only variables that did not increase in attrition during the fourth week of the 
month but were still included in the CAT3 category were V9 and V20.  V9 and V20 both 
closely resemble other groupings that increase significantly in attrition with the approach 
of the monthly deadline.  Group V9 is similar to group V1, V2, and V8.  These groups all 
dramatically increase in attrition from the first three weeks to the last-week of the month 
in both samples.  Group V20 is very similar to group V21.  Group V21 increases 
dramatically in attrition risk in both samples as well.  While definitive categorization 
cannot be accomplished without further study, the author included these groupings in the 
CAT3 category. 
Table 21 summarizes those groups that cross-validated completely, those that 












2. Categories  
Groups represented by variables V3, V4, V6, V7, V10, V15, V18, and V19 
(highlighted in white) were combined to form the CAT1 category.  Although some of 
these groups did increase in attrition risk from the first three weeks to the last-week of the 
month, the jump was either small or the group failed to validate from one sample to the 
next.  If the latter case occurred and the group’s overall attrition risk was still around the 
average of the sample, then this group was included in the CAT1 category.   Groups 
represented by variables V11, V13, V23, and V25 (highlighted in red) were combined to 
form the CAT2 category.  Although some of these groups also increased in attrition risk 
from the first three weeks to the last-week of the month, the overall attrition risk of these 
groupings was so high that they were labeled as CAT2 enlistees.  These groupings 
validated from one data set to the next.  The groups represented by variables V1, V2, V5, 
V8, V9, V12, V14, V16, V17, V20, V21, V22, and 24 (highlighted in yellow) were 
combined to form the CAT3 category.  These groups were selected based upon their 
attrition risk jump from the first three weeks to the last five recruiting days of the month 
in both the FY00/01 sample as well as the FY03/04 sample.  The only variables that did 
not increase in attrition during the fourth week of the month but were still included in the 
CAT3 category were V9 and V20.  Their tentative placement in this category has been 
discussed in the previous section.  Table 22 shows the attrition risks of the consolidate 
groupings discussed above during the first three weeks of the month and during the last 
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H. FINAL SENIOR REGRESSIONS 
1. Discussion 
As discussed for graduate data, CAT3 senior enlistment percentages displayed in 
Table 22 do not accurately reflect the individuals affected by this higher attrition rate.  
Table 23 shows that last-week CAT3 enlistments for both samples range from 16 to 18 
percent of all senior enlistments.   
 










The final senior regressions mirror the base model with the exception of the 
inclusion of the above-described interactions.  The models are listed below: 
• A regression to determine the discharge probability of senior CAT1, 
CAT2, and CAT3 enlistees during the first three weeks and the last-week 
of the month in the FY00/01 sample. 
• A regression to determine the discharge probability of senior CAT1, 
CAT2, and CAT3 enlistees during the first three weeks and the last-week 
of the month in the FY03/04 sample. 
CAT1 CAT2 CAT3 CAT1 CAT2 CAT3
DISCH RATE WEEK123 21.8% 28.4% 21.8% DISCH RATE WEEK123 24.0% 33.1% 27.6%
DISCH RATE WEEK45 24.5% 33.3% 26.1% DISCH RATE WEEK45 25.5% 34.2% 32.1%
N 3569 1033 6532 N 5447 2016 9880
DISCH JUMP W_123 to W_45 3% 5% 4% DISCH JUMP W_123 to W_45 2% 1% 5%
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Again, because these models resembled the base model in all respects, aside from 
the inclusion of the senior interactions, and the exclusion of BONUS1 and AGE_W 
variables, only the data from the interactions is included below.  The results of the 
FY00/01 and FY03/04 regressions are provided in Table 24. 
 
Table 24. Regression Results For FY00/01 and FY03/04 Senior Models 
 
Note:  These Models also included the following variables:  FY00/FY03, 
SUMMER, FALL, WINTER, MCD1, MCD6, MCD9, MCD12, DEPTIME, DEP_EXT, 
MALE, WHITE, OTHER, DECLINE, PLMOVES1, RECTRGEN, REFERRAL, 
BUMED_W, DEP_W, ADMIN_W.  These variables are described in above.     
 
All of the interactions in both samples are significant to the 1 percent level aside 
from the last-week CAT1 variable and the first three-week CAT3 variable.  In the 
FY00/01 model the CAT1 variable is significant only at the 10 percent level, while in the 
holdout sample this variable is not significant at all.  The CAT3 variable is not significant 
in the FY00/01 sample but it is significant in the holdout sample.  Although all 
interactions are jointly significant (Prob > χ2 = 0.0000), explanation for these effects are 
the same as for the graduate variables.  Although the groupings determined by this thesis 
are far from perfect, it makes sense that CAT1 variables are not significant and that the 
first three week CAT3 variable is not significant in the FY00/01 sample.  These variables 
represent discharges that are not correlated with the interaction variables identified by 







CAT1_WEEK45 0.0280 0.0166 
 (0.0159)* (0.0141) 
CAT2_WEEK123 0.0687 0.0953 
 (0.0220)*** (0.0160)*** 
CAT2_WEEK45 0.1186 0.1076 
 (0.0279)*** (0.0232)*** 
CAT3_WEEK123 -0.0002 0.0373 
 (0.0111) (0.0094)*** 
CAT3_WEEK45 0.0445 0.0852 
 (0.0139)*** (0.0124)*** 
Observations 11134 17343 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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3. Variable Interpretations 
a. CAT1 Senior Enlistees 
Senior enlistments that exhibit a low probability of discharge (CAT1) 
comprise a large segment of both data sets.  This category was consolidated from 8 
separate groups that exhibited a low probability of discharge at all times of the month in 
both the FY00/01 and the FY03/04 samples.  Alternatively, if groups failed to validate 
from 00/01 to 03/04 based on their discharge probabilities during different times of the 
month, and their attrition risk was low during the first three weeks of the month, they 
were placed in this category as well.  While attempts could be made to explain why each 
of the 8 groups exhibit a low attrition risk, the sheer number of groups in this category 
would make this a tedious process.  Rather than discussing each subgroup’s attrition risk, 
detailed explanations for CAT2 and CAT3 subgroups are provided.  CAT1 enlistees 
exhibit a 21.8 percent overall probability of discharge during the first three weeks of the 
month and a 24.8 percent overall probability of discharge during the last-week of the 
month in the FY00/01 sample.  In the FY03/04 sample this category of enlistee 
discharges at a similar rate.  During these years, CAT1 enlistees exhibit a 24.0 percent 
overall probability of discharge during the first three weeks of the month and a 25.5 
percent overall probability of discharge during the last-week of the month.     
 
b. CAT2 Senior Enlistees 
Seniors who exhibit a high probability of discharge at all times of the 
month (CAT2), consists of two types of senior enlistee.  The enlistees who comprise this 
category are discussed below and are outlined in Table 25.  All discussions will reference 
variable codes identified in Table 20. 
 










LABEL ASVABTIME AGE COMPONENT AFQT
CAT2_a ALL 19+ REG IIIB
CAT2_b <25 ALL RES IIIB
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1.) CAT2_a:  19+; Regular; AFQT 49-  The group CAT2_a 
consists of groups V11, and V25.  Although some of these groups vary slightly in 
attrition risk from the first three weeks of the month to the last, all discharge probabilities 
greatly exceed average CAT1 enlistee attrition rates.  Both groups validate from one year 
to the next.   
In the FY00/01 sample, all 19 and older seniors who enlist for a 
regular component, and score below 50 on the ASVAB, exhibit a high attrition risk.  This 
type of enlistee has a 7.8-percentage point higher discharge probability than an average 
CAT1 senior enlisted during the first three weeks of the month.  The overall attrition risk 
of these senior enlistees is 29.2 percent.  In the FY03/FY04 sample, these same 
individuals exhibit a 6.3-percentage point higher discharge probability than an average 
CAT1 individual enlisted during the first three weeks of the month.  The overall attrition 
risk of these enlistees is 32.9 percent.  Although these seniors exhibit similar behavior 
across both data sets concrete explanations for their attrition risk cannot be provided.   
 
2.) CAT2_b:  ASVABTIME<25; All Reserve, AFQT 49-  The 
group CAT2_b consists of groups V13, and V23.  Although some of these groups also 
vary in attrition risk from the first three weeks of the month to the last, all discharge 
probabilities greatly exceed average CAT1 enlistee attrition rates.  Both groups validate 
from one year to the next.   
In the FY00/01 sample, all seniors who enlist for a reserve 
component, score 49 and below on the ASVAB and take this test within 25 days of 
enlistment, exhibit a 13.4-percentage point higher discharge probability than an average 
CAT1 senior enlisted during the first three weeks of the month.  The overall attrition risk 
of these enlistees is 34.9 percent.  In the FY03/04 sample, these same accessions exhibit 
an 11.2-percentage point higher discharge probability than an average CAT1 senior 
enlisted during the first three weeks of the month.  The overall attrition risk of these 
enlistees is 37.8 percent.       
Intuitively, the high attrition risk of these senior enlistees makes 
sense.  Just as with high school graduates, most seniors who enlist for a reserve 
component do so because of the desire to be a Marine but also because of their need for 
money and also time to attend college.  Therefore, senior reserve enlistments typically 
score high on the ASVAB, indicating higher intelligence levels as well as the propensity 
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for these individuals to attend college at some later date.  As with graduate reserve 
enlistments, high scoring seniors who enlist for this component remain in the DEP 
because of their “need behind the need” of attending college.  Seniors who do not score 
well on the ASVAB and are sold on enlisting for this component would not have this 
ulterior motivation.  Or, conversely, if they did, these dreams would probably become 
less of a reality when college acceptance letters failed to arrive.  Therefore, it is entirely 
conceivable that these particular senior enlistees would begin to change their minds with 
the approach of their ship date.   
Table 26 summarizes the comparisons between the attrition risks 
of each group of CAT2 enlistees and individuals who fall into the CAT1 category for 
both the FY00/01 and FY03/04 samples.  In each case, CAT2 enlistees exhibit a higher 
discharge probability than CAT1 contracts. The deltas at the bottom of the table represent 
differences in overall CAT2 attrition rates and first three-week CAT1 attrition rates.  
Again, regardless for when the discharge rates are compared, the difference is significant.  
Both variables are significant down to all known levels (Appendix E).  
 








c. CAT3 Senior Enlistees 
Seniors who exhibit a low probability of discharge during the first three 
weeks of the month, but a disproportionately high attrition risk as the end of the month 
approaches make up the third category of enlistee.  As with graduates who display this 
type of behavior, only generalizations can be made for why last-week of the month senior 
enlistees behave in this fashion.  These explanations mirror those that have been provided 

















The groups that comprise this category of enlistee are described below and 
outlined in Table 27.  All discussions will reference variable codes identified in Table 20. 
 





1.) CAT3_a:  18; Regular; AFQT 50 – 70.  Individuals who 
comprise this group consist of variable V5 and V16 enlistees.  CAT3_a entrants validate 
completely from one data set to the next.      
Regular component senior enlistees, who are 18 and score between 
50 and 70 on the ASVAB, increase in discharge probability with the approach of the 
monthly deadline.  In the FY00/01 sample, these individuals exhibit a 16.2 percent 
overall attrition risk when enlisted during the first three weeks but their discharge 
probability jumps to 21.4 percent when enlisted during the last four days of the month 
(minus the last day).  On the actual last day of the month, these individual’s attrition risk 
more than doubles (34.4 percent).   Compared to CAT1 enlistees, these CAT3 seniors 
exhibit a 5.5 and 3.4-percentage point lower attrition risk than CAT1 enlistees assessed 
during the same monthly time frames (all days minus the last day).  On the last day of the 
month, these seniors exhibit a 14.1-percentage point higher discharge probability than 
comparable CAT1 seniors enlisted at this time.      
In the FY03/04 sample, the results validate and exceed those 
reported above.  These CAT3 seniors exhibit a 28.0 percent overall attrition risk when 
enlisted during the first three weeks of the month but their discharge probability jumps to 
35.2 percent when enlisted during the last-week of the month (minus the last day).  On 
the final day of the month, these enlistees exhibit a 37.6 percent overall attrition risk.  
Compared to CAT1 enlistees, the difference is again significant.  When enlisted during 
the first three weeks of the month, this group of CAT3 senior exhibits a 4.2-percentage 
point higher attrition risk than a CAT1 enlistee assessed during this same monthly time 
frame.  During the last four days of the month, excluding the last day, the difference 
between these CAT1 and CAT2 seniors jumps to 8.8 percentage points.  On the last day 
LABEL ASVABTIME AGE COMPONENT AFQT
CAT3_a 18 REG 50 - 70
CAT3_b ALL RES ALL
CAT3_c ALL RES IIIA
CAT3_d 18 REG IIIB
CAT3_e 17 REG 50-70




of the month, however, these individuals exhibit a 14.7-percentage point higher discharge 
probability than comparable CAT1 accessions enlisted at this time.   
 
2.) CAT3_b:  ASVABTIME>25, All; Reserve; All Individuals 
who comprise this group consist of a combination of V1, V2, V8, and V9 enlistees.  With 
the exception of FY00/01 V9 entrants, CAT3_a enlistees validate completely from one 
data set to the next.  Although definitive categorization of this variable cannot be 
accomplished without further analysis, the reason why V9 enlistees were included in this 
category is provided earlier in this chapter.          
Reserve component senior enlistees who take the ASVAB more 
than 25 days from enlistment, increase in discharge probability with the approach of the 
monthly deadline.  In the FY00/01 sample, these individuals exhibit a 16.2 percent 
overall attrition risk when enlisted during the first three weeks but their discharge 
probability jumps to 21.4 percent when enlisted during the last four days of the month 
(minus the last day).  On the actual last day of the month, these individual’s attrition risk 
is 34.7 percent.   Compared to CAT1 enlistees, when enlisted during the first three weeks 
of the month, these CAT3 seniors exhibit a 5.5-percentage point lower attrition risk.  
During the last four days of the month, CAT3_b entrants also exhibit a low attrition risk 
(3.5-percentage point lower than comparable CAT1 enlistees).  On the last day of the 
month, however, these seniors exhibit a 14.5-percentage point higher discharge 
probability than comparable CAT1 seniors enlisted at this time.      
In the FY03/04 sample, the results again validate and exceed those 
reported above.  These CAT3 seniors exhibit a 27.9 percent overall attrition risk when 
enlisted during the first three weeks of the month but their discharge probability jumps to 
35.1 percent when enlisted during the last-week of the month (minus the last day).  On 
the final day of the month, these enlistees exhibit a 37.5 percent overall attrition risk.  
Compared to CAT1 enlistees, the difference is also significant.  When enlisted during the 
first three weeks of the month, this group of CAT3 senior enlistees exhibits a 4.1-
percentage point higher attrition risk than CAT1 enlistees assessed during this same 
monthly time frame.  During the last four days of the month, excluding the last day, the 
difference between these CAT1 and CAT2 seniors jumps to 8.7-percentage points.  On 
the last day of the month, however, these individuals exhibit a 14.6-percentage point 
higher discharge probability than comparable CAT1 accessions enlisted at this time.   
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3.) CAT3_c:  ASVABTIME<25, All; Reserve; 50+.  
Individuals who comprise this group consist of variables V12 and V22 enlistees.  
CAT3_c entrants validate from one data set to the next.      
Reserve component senior enlistees who take the ASVAB less 
than 25 days from enlistment and score above 50 on this test increase in discharge 
probability with the approach of the monthly deadline.  In the FY00/01 sample, these 
individuals exhibit a 24.9 percent overall attrition risk when enlisted during the first three 
weeks but their discharge probability jumps to 28.3 percent when enlisted during the last 
four days of the month (minus the last day).  On the actual last day of the month, these 
individual’s attrition risk is 30.0 percent.   Compared to CAT1 enlistees, when contracted 
during the first three weeks of the month, these CAT3 seniors exhibit a 3.2-percentage 
point higher attrition risk.  During the last four days of the month, CAT3_c entrants 
exhibit a 3.4-percentage point higher attrition risk than comparable CAT1 enlistees.  On 
the last day of the month, these seniors exhibit a 9.7-percentage point higher discharge 
probability than comparable CAT1 seniors enlisted at this time.      
In the FY03/04 sample, the results validate those reported above.  
These CAT3 seniors exhibit a 27.4 percent overall attrition risk when enlisted during the 
first three weeks of the month but their discharge probability jumps to 30.2 percent when 
enlisted during the last-week of the month (minus the last day).  On the final day of the 
month, these enlistees exhibit a 38.2 percent overall attrition risk.  Compared to CAT1 
enlistees, the difference is significant.  When enlisted during the first three weeks of the 
month, this group of CAT3 senior enlistees exhibits a 3.5-percentage point higher 
attrition risk than CAT1 enlistees assessed during this same monthly time frame.  During 
the last four days of the month, excluding the last day, the difference between these 
CAT1 and CAT3 seniors jumps to 3.8-percentage points.  On the day of the month, 
however, these individuals exhibit a 15.3-percentage point higher discharge probability 
than comparable CAT1 enlistments of this time.   
 
4.) CAT3_d:  ASVABTIME<25, 18; Regular; 40 – 50.  
Individuals who comprise this group consist of variables V20 and V21 enlistees.  While 
CAT3_d entrants do validate from one data set to the next and their attrition risk does 
increase toward the end of the month, the attrition of these entrants even at the end of the 
month is not astoundingly high.  The author could therefore have placed these enlistees in 
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the CAT1 category.  Because of the authors recruiting knowledge as well as the 
validation from one data set to the next, the author chose to classify these enlistees as 
CAT3.  More analysis would be necessary for more definitive classification.        
Regular component 18-year old senior enlistees who take the 
ASVAB less than 25 days from enlistment and score below 50 on this test, increase in 
discharge probability with the approach of the monthly deadline.  In the FY00/01 sample, 
these individuals exhibit a 24.6 percent overall attrition risk when enlisted during the first 
three weeks of the month and their discharge probability is 23.7 percent when enlisted 
during the last four days of the month (minus the last day).  On the actual last day of the 
month, these individual’s attrition risk is 25.3 percent.   Compared to CAT1 enlistees, 
when enlisted during the first three weeks of the month, these CAT3 seniors exhibit a 
2.9-percentage point higher attrition risk.  During the last four days of the month, 
CAT3_d entrants exhibit a 1.2-percentage point lower attrition risk than comparable 
CAT1 enlistees.  On the last day of the month, however, these seniors exhibit a 5.0-
percentage point higher discharge probability than comparable CAT1 seniors enlisted at 
this time.      
In the FY03/04 sample, the results validate those reported above.  
These CAT3 seniors exhibit a 31.0 percent overall attrition risk when enlisted during the 
first three weeks of the month but their discharge probability jumps to 33.5 percent when 
enlisted during the last-week of the month (minus the last day).  On the final day of the 
month, these enlistees exhibit a 39.5 percent overall attrition risk.  Compared to CAT1 
enlistees, the difference is significant.  When enlisted during the first three weeks of the 
month, this group of CAT3 senior enlistees exhibits a 7.2-percentage point higher 
attrition risk than CAT1 enlistees assessed during this same monthly time frame.  During 
the last four days of the month, excluding the last day, the difference between these 
CAT1 and CAT2 seniors is 7.1-percentage points.  On the day of the month, however, 
these individuals exhibit a 16.6-percentage point higher discharge probability than 
comparable CAT1 accessions enlisted at this time.   
 
5.) CAT3_e:  ASVABTIME<25; 18; Regular; 50 – 70.  
Individuals who comprise this group consist of only variable V14 enlistees.  While 
CAT3_e entrants do validate from one data set to the next and their attrition risk does 
increase toward the end of the month, the attrition of these entrants even at the end of the 
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month is not astoundingly high.  The author could have placed these enlistees in the 
CAT1 category.  Because of the authors recruiting knowledge as well as the validation 
from one data set to the next, the author chose to classify these enlistees as CAT3.  More 
analysis would be necessary for more definitive classification.        
Regular component, 18 year old senior enlistees, who take the 
ASVAB less than 25 days from enlistment and score between 50 and 70 on this test 
increase in discharge probability with the approach of the monthly deadline.  In the 
FY00/01 sample, these individuals exhibit a 19.2 percent overall attrition risk when 
enlisted during the first three weeks and their discharge probability is 23.3 percent when 
enlisted during the last four days of the month (minus the last day).  On the actual last 
day of the month, these individual’s attrition risk is 22.7 percent.   Compared to CAT1 
enlistees, when enlisted during the first three weeks of the month, these CAT3 seniors 
exhibit a 2.5-percentage point lower attrition risk.  During the last four days of the month, 
CAT3_d entrants exhibit a 1.5-percentage point lower attrition risk than comparable 
CAT1 enlistees.  On the last day of the month, these seniors exhibit a 2.5-percentage 
point higher discharge probability than comparable CAT1 seniors enlisted at this time.      
In the FY03/04 sample, the results validate with those reported 
above.  These CAT3 seniors exhibit a 23.3 percent overall attrition risk when enlisted 
during the first three weeks of the month and their discharge probability is 24.2 percent 
when enlisted during the last-week of the month (minus the last day).  On the final day of 
the month, these enlistees exhibit a 26.3 percent overall attrition risk.  Compared to 
CAT1 enlistees, when enlisted during the first three weeks of the month, this group of 
CAT3 senior enlistees exhibits a 0.5-percentage point lower attrition risk than CAT1 
enlistees assessed during this same monthly time frame.  During the last four days of the 
month, excluding the last day, CAT2 seniors attrite at a 2.2-percentage point lower rate 
than comparable CAT1 enlistees.  On the last day of the month, these individuals exhibit 
a 3.4-percentage point higher discharge probability than comparable CAT1 accessions 
enlisted at this time. 
 
6.) CAT3_f:  ASVABTIME<25; 18+; Regular; 50+.  
Individuals who comprise this group consist of variables V17 and V24.  CAT3_e entrants 
validate completely from one data set to the next.      
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Regular component, 18 and older senior enlistees, who take the 
ASVAB less than 25 days from enlistment and score higher than 50 on this test increase 
in discharge probability with the approach of the monthly deadline.  In the FY00/01 
sample, these individuals exhibit a 22.7 percent overall attrition risk when enlisted during 
the first three weeks and their discharge probability is 25.0 percent when enlisted during 
the last four days of the month (minus the last day).  On the actual last day of the month, 
these individual’s attrition risk is 29.3 percent.   Compared to CAT1 enlistees, when 
enlisted during the first three weeks of the month, these CAT3 seniors exhibit a 1.0-
percentage point higher attrition risk.  During the last four days of the month, CAT3_d 
entrants exhibit the same attrition risk as comparable CAT1 enlistees.  On the last day of 
the month, these seniors exhibit a 9.1-percentage point higher discharge probability than 
comparable CAT1 seniors enlisted at this time.      
In the FY03/04 sample, the results validate those reported above.  
These CAT3 seniors exhibit a 27.9 percent overall attrition risk when enlisted during the 
first three weeks of the month but their discharge probability jumps to 32.7 percent when 
enlisted during the last-week of the month (minus the last day).  On the final day of the 
month, these enlistees exhibit a 34.3 percent overall attrition risk.  Compared to CAT1 
enlistees, the difference is significant.  When enlisted during the first three weeks of the 
month, this group of CAT3 senior enlistees exhibits a 4.3-percentage point higher 
attrition risk than CAT1 enlistees assessed during this same monthly time frame.  During 
the last four days of the month, excluding the last day, the difference between these 
CAT1 and CAT2 seniors is 6.3-percentage points.  On the last day of the month, 
however, these individuals exhibit an 11.4-percentage point higher discharge probability 
than comparable CAT1 accessions enlisted at this time. 
Appendix F provides the regression results for CAT3 groupings.  
All CAT3 groupings are jointly significant in both samples (Prob > χ2 = 0.0000), 
however only the last-week CAT3_f grouping is individually significant down to all 
known levels for both data sets.  The last-week CAT3_a grouping is not individually 
significant in FY00/01 but is individually significant at the 5 percent level in FY03/04.  
The last-week CAT3_b grouping is not individually significant in FY00/01 but is 
significant at the 1 percent level in FY03/04.  The last-week CAT3_c grouping is 
individually significant at the 5 percent level in FY00/01 and is individually significant at 
the 1 percent level in FY03/04.  The last-week CAT3_d grouping is not individually 
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significant in FY00/01 but is individually significant at the 1 percent level in FY03/04.  
The last-week CAT3_e grouping is individually not significant in FY00/01 or in 
FY03/04.         
The results of the above discussions are best presented in Table 28.  
This table shows the attrition risk of each sub group of the CAT3 category during the first 
three weeks, the last four days preceding mission day, and on the actual last day of the 
month for both FY00/01 and FY03/04.  It also shows the overall last 5-day attrition risk 
of each subgroup.  Finally, the table provides the difference in attrition risk between the 
last 5 days of the month and the first three weeks of the month for each subgroup. 
Although some CAT3 first three-week groups exhibit a somewhat higher discharge 
probability than comparable CAT1 enlistees, the telling statistic continues to be the jump 
in attrition risk of these enlistees during the last five days of the month.  Additionally, in 
all cases but one (CAT3_e), there is a significant difference between discharge 
probabilities of fourth week CAT3 and fourth week CAT1 entrants.  These facts indicate 
markedly different (hockey-stick) recruiter behavior when enlisting CAT3 individuals.  
The labels for each CAT3 grouping correspond to the labels originally introduced in 
Table 27.  
 






CAT1 CAT3_a CAT3_b CAT3_c CAT3_d CAT3_e CAT3_f
WEEK_123 21.7% 16.2% 16.2% 24.9% 24.6% 19.2% 22.7%
WEEK_4 24.8% 21.4% 21.4% 28.3% 23.7% 23.3% 25.0%
LDAY 20.3% 34.4% 34.7% 30.0% 25.3% 22.7% 29.3%
WEEK_45 24.4% 28.2% 25.2% 30.8% 24.8% 23.7% 27.5%
WEEK123/WEEK45 DIFFERENCES 2.7% 12.0% 9.0% 5.9% 0.2% 4.5% 4.8%
CAT1 CAT3_a CAT3_b CAT3_c CAT3_d CAT3_e CAT3_e
WEEK_123 23.8% 28.0% 27.9% 27.4% 31.0% 23.3% 27.9%
WEEK_4 26.4% 35.2% 35.1% 30.2% 33.5% 24.2% 32.7%
LDAY 22.9% 37.6% 37.5% 38.2% 39.5% 26.3% 34.3%
WEEK_45 25.4% 36.2% 35.9% 32.3% 35.2% 24.7% 33.2%




VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Prior to any discussion of options available to the Marine Corps, the key issues 
and results of this thesis should be addressed.  This chapter examines the cost of a 
discharge and discusses approaches in reducing attrition.  It concludes with several 
recommendations to apply the information presented in this thesis. 
 
A. SUMMARY 
Based on intuitive reasoning, and supported by the findings of this thesis, DEP 
discharges can be divided into three categories.   
 
1. The Price of Doing Business 
Marine recruiters perform their duties well.  They enlist individuals they believe 
would make good Marines and who decide to enlist.  These enlistees are the CAT1 and 
first three-week CAT3 entrants identified in Chapter VI.  While most of these individuals 
ship to recruit training, some do not.  Unforeseen medical or moral complications, change 
of plans, buyer’s remorse, and many other reasons describe why an individual of this 
category might decide to opt out.  Based on the data from the FY03/04 sample, this 
proportion is currently 10.7 percent for CAT1 high school graduates and 25.2 percent for 
CAT1 high school seniors.  First three week CAT3 graduates currently discharge at a rate 
of 12.5 percent while first three-week CAT3 seniors have an attrition rate of 28.3 percent.  
Normally, approximately 70 percent of Marine Corps enlistments fall into these 
acceptable categories.  To reduce the attrition risk of these enlistees, drastic measures 
would probably have to be taken.  Regardless of what procedures are used to reduce the 
discharge probability of these entrants, the solution to this problem is beyond the scope of 
this study.  The author maintains that the attrition risk of this group is the price of doing 
business. 
 
2. High-risk Enlistees             
Although recruiters normally perform their duties well, they sometimes enlist 
individuals who, quite simply, are poor risks.  These enlistees are the CAT2 entrants 
identified in Chapter VI.  While a certain percentage of this group does ship to recruit 
training, the discharge rate of these high-risk entrants is markedly higher than those who 
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discharge due to the normal price of doing business.  These high-risk enlistees are the 
reservists over the age of 21 who score low on the AFQT, as well the other groups 
described in detail in Chapter VI.  Intuitively again, it would just make sense that this 
group of enlistee consists of mostly high school graduates and not seniors.  Seniors are 
generally 17 or 18 years old; all have the option to go to college or enter the work force; 
and they are typically more homogenous than high school graduates.  It is much easier to 
imagine a high-risk graduate than it is a high-risk senior.   
This assumption is verified by the findings of this thesis.  Based upon the results 
of both samples, the Marine Corps normally enlists 22 to 23 percent high-risk graduate 
enlistees but only 9 to 12 percent high-risk seniors.  In FY00/01 sample, graduates in this 
category were discharged prematurely at an overall rate of 17.0 percent while seniors 
tended to attrite at an overall rate of 31.1 percent.  In FY03/04, graduates in this category 
were discharged at an overall rate of 16.1 percent, while seniors were discharged at an 
overall rate of 33.5 percent.  The total high-risk (CAT2) individuals enlisted by the 
Marine Corps constitute approximately 20 percent of all entrants.  Since the individuals 
who fall into this category can be identified, their attrition risk can be reduced.  While 
providing the actual statistics of measures to lower the attrition rate of these high-risk 
enlistees is beyond the scope of this study, possible courses of action are explored later in 
this chapter. 
 
3. Recruiter-caused Discharges 
Most recruiters normally perform their duties well, but a recruiter’s behavior 
sometimes changes with the approach of the monthly deadline.  This is reflected in the 
fact that a select group of recruits have a significantly high-risk of attrition if they sign 
their enlistment contract during the final week of the month.  These enlistees are the 
CAT3 entrants identified in Chapter VI.  As with CAT2 individuals, a certain percentage 
of CAT3 last-week enlistments do ship to recruit training.  The high numbers of recruits 
who do not ship are those who are discharged because of a positive urinalysis and the 
other cases described in detail in Chapter VI.  Based upon the results of both samples, the 
Marine Corps normally enlists 7 percent of all graduate enlistees who fall into this 
category and between 16 and 18 percent of all seniors who meet these characteristics.  
Based on the FY03/04 sample, last-week CAT3 graduates discharge at an overall rate of 
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17.4 percent, while last-week CAT3 seniors discharge at an overall rate of 34.1 percent.  
Normally, the total CAT3 last-week enlistees constitute approximately 10 percent of all 
entrants.  Since the individuals who fall into this category can easily be identified as well, 
their attrition risk can be reduced.  While providing the actual statistics of measures to 
lower the attrition rate of these CAT3 enlistees is beyond the scope of this study, courses 
of action will again be explored later in this chapter. 
 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
1. Cost 
To properly evaluate any proposed solution to reduce attrition, the full cost of a 
discharge must be established.  Although this remains a debatable figure, a detailed 
examination of the enlistment process allows for the determination of a conservative 
estimate. 
Because each discharge represents a shipper, the recruiter and therefore also his or 
her command, must find a replacement.  The most obvious and also first cost of a 
discharge, then, is the time it takes a recruiter to enlist a typical individual.  Although the 
time to enlist an average individual would seem a fairly concrete figure, even this may 
vary depending upon a recruiter’s location, ability, and effort.  Nevertheless, Marine 
Corps Recruiting Command does maintain averages for each segment of this process.  It 
should be noted that recruiter performance often differs from these standards, but the 
estimates still represent the average time it takes a recruiter to enlist one individual into 
the Marine Corps.  The national averages established by Marine Corps Recruiting 
Command were used in the following analysis.            
Enlistment begins with the recruiter contacting approximately 60 prospects to set 
twelve appointments.  These appointments typically result in three interviews.  It then 
takes about three interviews to declare one New Working Applicant (NWA)–an applicant 
who is mentally and morally screened “sold” on being a Marine and scheduled for 
processing at the MEPS.  Finally, it takes a little over one NWA to produce one new 
contract.  
Even though the above estimates may vary on a situational basis, it is clear that 
enlisting one contract involves significant time and effort.  Recruiters must spend hours 
upon hours on the phone to contact their market, they must screen potential 
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appointments, and they often drive long distances to meet with a candidate and conduct 
an interview.  The person-hours for an enlistment continue to escalate, since each 
interview takes time, and the interviews do not all turn into NWAs.  Each NWA must be 
processed, driven to and from the MEPS, and ultimately enlisted.  This also takes time.  It 
should be noted that each enlistment involves the time of not only the recruiter, but also 
the Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) of the station, MEPS Liaison, and 
perhaps also the Operations Officer or Operations Chief.  Although significant, these 
additional costs were not included in the estimate provided below.  Table 29 provides a 
conservative estimate of the person-hours required for one enlistment. 
 





(Marine Corps Recruiting Command, June 2005) 
A Marine Recruiting Station averages around 16 discharges each month, and 
these failed shippers represent 16 additional contracts the RS must write.  Additional 
contracts are, however, only the beginning of the difficulties caused by pool attrition.  
Because recruiters have spent so much time on each enlistment, they take great pains to 
save and resell individuals who are on the verge of discharge.  If the hours spent reselling 
shaky applicants are rewarded by the making of a new Marine, the efforts have been 
worth it; but for the average sixteen enlistees per RS who discharge each month, this is 
obviously not the case.  Discharges add insult to injury, since the recruiter often spends 
even more time trying to save enlistees who then fail to ship.  
Other problems are also caused by pool attrition.  Since all applicants are 
scheduled to ship on a certain date, the recruiter must now reschedule another enlistee to 
ship earlier, often on short notice.  This, too, can take significant time and effort and may 
even produce yet another discharge due to moving ship dates and pool turbulence.  A 
final hidden, yet significant, cost of pool attrition is the effect of a disgruntled employee 
back in the recruiter’s market.  It is doubtful that discharged enlistees praise the Marine 








Corps after their obligation has officially ended.  Although it is difficult to quantify, this 
must certainly work to tarnish the image of the Marine Corps in a local community.    
All told, a discharge can cost the recruiter a conservative 90 hours of work instead 
of the 40 hours required to enlist a good contract.  If a discharge is contracted, the 
recruiter must enlist and perform the work associated with a discharge, and he or she 
must also locate and enlist a replacement.  Table 30 compares the time it takes to enlist a 
recruit who ships with the time it takes to enlist a recruit who discharges. 
 





(Marine Corps Recruiting Command, June 2005) 
When tallied over a year for the entire Marine Corps, the costs are staggering.  An 
average of 190 discharges each year, per recruiting station, equals an additional 190 
contracts per RS that must also be written.  This equates to an estimated 9,120 discharges 
and, therefore, an additional 9,120 persons who must also be enlisted each year for the 
Marine Corps.  
Aside from being a waste of valuable time, these discharges are also quyite 
expensive.  The cost of 9,120 discharges, each requiring 90 hours of work, is calculated 
on the basis of approximately 820,800 hours.  If these 9,120 entrants who do not ship 
would report to recruit training, the cost to the Marine Corps would only be 364,800 
hours.  The bottom line, though, is that these 9,120 enlistees each cost the recruiter 90 
hours of work.  Therefore, if it were assumed that the average pay grade of a Marine 
recruiter is E6 and that this individual has served 6 years in the Marine Corps, his or her 
monthly pay would amount to $2,205.00.  Based on this monthly salary, this recruiter 
would earn approximately $13.78 per hour (working eight hours each day and five days 
each week).  At this hourly salary, 9,120 discharges conservatively cost the Marine Corps 
over $11 million annually. 
Normal Applicant Discharge Applicant Replacement
Enlist 40 40 40
Resell 0 6 0
Move in Shipper 0 4 0
Total 40 50 40
40 hrs 90 hrs
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Although this figure is substantial, it is perhaps a low estimate of the cost of 9,120 
discharges.  Official OSD data show that the cost of a recruit for the Marine Corps in 
2003 was $8,011.00.  If this is the case, then the cost of these discharges is actually $73 
million.  Regardless of which figure is correct, the monetary cost of DEP attrition is 
clearly significant and any step taken to reduce it will provide tremendous dividends. 
    
2. The Cost of High-risk Enlistees 
 Because high-risk enlistees can now easily be identified, the Marine Corps can 
focus its efforts on this group in reducing DEP attrition.  Formerly, the Marine Corps 
looked at all enlistees in relatively the same manner.  It can now continue to do business 
as usual with CAT1 recruits and concentrate on those enlistees who have been shown to 
have a disproportionately high attrition risk.  For the purpose of this discussion, the 
author assumes that the Marine Corps can successfully lower the attrition rate of CAT2 
and CAT3 entrants to the rates of CAT1 enlistees.  While this may certainly be the case if 
added effort is placed in these certain areas, the resulting attrition rates could actually be 
higher or even lower.     
Figure 6 illustrates the effects of a focus on only high-risk CAT2 and CAT3 
enlistees.  The top part of the diagram shows the current state of recruiting operations and 
uses an average of all graduate and senior discharge rates for the FY03/04 sample (19.0 
percent).  It calculates the total hours of work currently required to obtain 48,000 
contracts using the estimate of 40 hours of work for a recruit who ships and 90 hours for 
a recruit who is discharged. 
The lower portion of Figure 6 illustrates the effect of reducing the discharge rate 
of high-risk enlistees to the average discharge rate of a CAT1 enlistee.  The initial 
savings is approximately 1,165 discharges. 
But the benefit of a reduced attrition rate does not end here.  Fewer discharges 
also saves recruiters’ time.  Each of the saved discharges gains the Marine Corps 50 
hours of work.  The benefit to the Marine Corps amounts to an additional 58,000 hours of 
work that could be performed by Marine recruiters or an additional 1,450 contracts that 
could be written.  Of course, this savings could also be used to screen out poor contracts, 
take less discharges, and reap the further benefits of a lower attrition rate.  When all the 
quantifiable and unquantifiable costs of a discharge are added together, the uses of the 
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additional savings opens numerous options bridled only by the imagination of Marine 
Corps leaders.  The key point, however, is that proactively focusing efforts on high-risk 
enlistees can increase enlistments by a minimum of 1,165 contracts and could also greatly 
exceed this number.   
























(Author Calculations and Marine Corps Recruiting Command, June 2005) 
 
Figure 6.   Effect of Reducing USMC Discharge Rate Through Focus on CAT2 and Last- 
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3. Discharge-reducing Variables  
a. Waivers   
Although waivers cannot be used to identify enlistees with a high-risk of 
attrition, they might be used to provide a solution to the problem.  In all models, waivers 
dramatically decrease the attrition rate of an average enlistee.  These findings are 
reviewed below. 
 
1.) Graduate Waivers.  Of the four types of waivers included in 
the graduate model, all decreased the discharge probability of an enlistee and all were 
jointly statistically significant down to all known levels (Prob > c2 = 0.0000).  For the 
FY00/01 sample, administrative waivers decreased the attrition risk of an average 
graduate enlistee by 5.6 percentage points.  BUMED waivers decreased attrition risk by 
4.2 percentage points while dependent and age waivers decreased discharge probability 
by 2.2 and 1.3 percentage points, respectively.  Since all waivers included in the study 
resembled each other in their characteristics (i.e., they all required similar amounts of 
time to submit and they were all granted for enlistee technicalities vice moral or drug 
infractions), a variable was created to represent the above four waiver categories.  This 
waiver variable reduced the attrition risk of an average enlistee by 4.9 percentage points.  
Therefore, in the FY00/01 sample, a graduate enlistee who did not receive one of these 
four types of waiver exhibited an attrition risk of 12.9 percent while an enlistee who was 
a recipient of one of these waivers exhibited an actual attrition risk of only 8.0 percent. 
In the FY03/04 sample, waivers exhibited similar effects.  All 
waiver variables were again jointly significant down to all known levels (Prob > c2 = 
0.0000).  BUMED and age waivers reduced attrition risk by 4.2 and 3.8 percentage points 
respectively.  Dependency waivers decreased attrition risk by 1.6 percentage points while 
administrative waivers only decreased attrition risk by .09 percentage points.  When all 
like waivers were combined, the effect was again negative.  The combined waiver 
variable decreased the discharge probability of an average enlistee by 2.2 percentage 
points.  Therefore, an average enlistee who received a waiver only exhibited an attrition 
risk of 11.0 percent as compared to an individual who did not receive a waiver and who 
exhibited an attrition risk of 13.2 percent.   
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2.) Senior Waivers.  The effect of waivers on senior enlistees 
was even more revealing.  Of the three types of waivers included in the senior model 
(there were no age waivers for seniors), all decreased the discharge probability of an 
enlistee, and two were statistically significant down to all known levels (BUMED and 
administrative).  Dependency waivers were statistically significant below the 10 percent 
level.  As before, all waiver variables were jointly significant ((Prob > c2 = 0.0000).  For 
the FY00/01 sample, administrative waivers decreased enlistee discharge probability by 
11.0 percentage points.  BUMED waivers decreased attrition risk by 7.9 percentage 
points while dependent waivers decreased discharge probability by 7.3 percentage points.  
As in the graduate models, a combined waiver variable was created to represent the 
above three waiver categories.  This waiver variable reduced the attrition risk of an 
average enlistee by 11.2 percentage points.  Therefore, in the FY00/01 sample, a senior 
enlistee who received any type of waiver exhibited an actual attrition risk of only 13.6 
percent.   
In the FY03/04 sample, waivers again exhibited similar significant 
effects.  All waivers were individually significant.  BUMED and administrative waivers 
each reduced attrition risk by 6.9 and 4.7 percentage points, respectively.  Dependency 
waivers decreased attrition risk by 7.8 percentage points.  When all like waivers were 
combined, the effect was again strongly negative.  The combined waiver variable 
decreased the discharge probability of an average senior enlistee by 6.1 percentage 
points.  Therefore, an average enlistee who received a waiver only exhibited an attrition 
risk of 22.6 percent as compared with a senior who did not receive a waiver and who 
exhibited an attrition risk of 28.8 percent.  
 
b. Bonus 
Although the author recognizes that enlistment bonuses are sometimes 
assigned on ship day, this is not always the case.  In a discussion with CW04 Mayfield 
(MCRC), it was determined that, while some bonuses are assigned to enlistees on ship 
day, others are assigned as incentives to prevent discharge and the remainder are given to 
enlistees upon enlistment or at some other time while they are in the DEP.  The effect of 
enlistment bonuses as reported in this study is therefore considered to be relatively 
accurate.  In the FY00/01 overall sample, of the 1,663 enlistees who received an 
enlistment bonus, only one was discharged.  In the FY03/04 overall sample, of the 3,009 
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enlistees who received an enlistment bonus, again, only one was discharged.  In addition 
to this overwhelming evidence of the benefits of enlistment bonuses, the finding that 
these measures reduce attrition risk is supported by previous studies (Kearl and Nelson, 
1992).  Simply stated, enlistment bonuses can be used to lower DEP attrition.         
 
c. Time in DEP 
Time spent in the DEP increases the probability of one’s discharge.  This 
claim is substantiated by the results of this current research as well as previous studies 
(Kearl and Nelson, 1992).  While no time in the DEP would probably increase MCRD 
attrition and decrease DEP discharge rates, too much time in the DEP clearly increases 
attrition risk.  Would there be some amount of time in the DEP that would decrease the 
discharge probability of high-risk groups and leave the attrition probability of low-risk 
enlistees the same?  Furthermore, if the attrition probability of high-risk groups were 
decreased (and low-risk groups remained the same), would a policy of lowering the time 
in DEP for the high-risk groups increase MCRD attrition?  These are all questions that 
must be addressed before any changes can be made in the DEP time of the identified 
high-risk groups.       
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Options      
Now that cost and waivers have been discussed in detail, options to reduce 
attrition risk can be reviewed. 
 
a. Differences in High-risk Enlistees   
Although both CAT2 and last-week CAT3 enlistees exhibit similarly high 
attrition rates, the individuals who comprise these groups are fundamentally different.  
CAT2 enlistees have the same characteristics (AFQT, ASVABTIME, COMPONENT, 
and AGE) during all weeks of the month.  They exhibit relatively uniform high attrition 
risks during all times of the month as well.  This finding indicates that recruiters do not 
intentionally enlist these low-quality entrants.  Their attrition risk remains relatively 
constant even when recruiters are influenced by the approach of the monthly deadline.   
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Conversely, CAT3 enlistees have the same characteristics at all times, but 
these entrants exhibit much higher attrition risks only at the end of the month.  Therefore, 
the factor affecting CAT3 enlistees is likely the recruiter, and the factor affecting the 
recruiter, is likely the approach of the end-of-the-month deadline.  While recruiters 
contract low-attrition risk CAT3 enlistees during the first three weeks of the month and 
also screen out high-risk CAT3 entrants during this time, they clearly lower their 
standards during the last-week of the month.   
Through this reasoning, a policy that would lower the attrition risk of 
CAT2 enlistees would not necessarily affect the discharge rate of CAT3 entrants in any 
appreciable manner.  While the recruiter uses poor judgment to screen high-risk CAT2 
enlistees at all times of the month, this does not seem to be the case with individuals who 
fall into the last-week CAT3 category.  As evidenced by the data, recruiters can tell a 
good CAT3 enlistee from a bad one and clearly make this distinction during the first 
three weeks of the month.  During the final week of the month, the recruiter revisits these 
previously screened poor CAT3 enlistees and takes the chance.  
 
b. Option 1 
In the past, the Marine Corps solution to lower DEP attrition was for 
recruiters to spend more time with enlistees.  While this policy is certainly an effective 
deterrent to attrition, supported by other research (Quester and Murray, 1986), and makes 
intuitive sense, it is clearly not the most efficient way for the Marine Corps to employ its 
human capital.  Using the variables outlined in this thesis, the Marine Corps can focus its 
efforts on all high-risk individuals enlisted into the DEP.  These efforts begin with 
identification of the enlistee as high-risk immediately upon enlistment.  Entrants who fit 
these characteristics could be required to watch a video on enlistment day as well as 
receive an official command in-brief shortly after enlistment.   Following this, because 
the number of these enlistees is so much smaller than a recruiter’s entire pool, the 
recruiter could now pay special attention to these individuals to ensure they are still 
aware of the benefits and requirements of their enlistment.  Furthermore, when a 
command group member visited a substation, he or she could easily focus and investigate 
the status of high-risk enlistees.  Finally, a command group member (Commanding 
Officer, Operations Officer, Sergeant Major, or Executive Officer) could perform the 
119
required 30-day pre-ship screening of these individuals.  All these efforts would take no 
additional time, money, or recruiters and would undoubtedly lower the attrition risk of 
these entrants.  Whereas before, the recruiter was defending everything, and consequently 
nothing, now, the recruiter could focus time and effort on where they are needed most.   
Although similar to the methods the Marine Corps currently employs to 
reduce DEP attrition, the proposals outlined above are significantly different than current 
procedures.  While the Marine Corps presently does maintain a high-risk poolee list 
(identified primarily by the recruiter), these enlistees have largely already made the 
decision to discharge.  The current high-risk poolee list is therefore primarily intended to 
save enlistees who have developed second thoughts about being a Marine.  This is 
completely different than the proposed policy, using the information provided by this 
thesis.  With the new clarity concerning high-risk poolees, actions can be taken to prevent 
the second thoughts of this relatively small group of entrants before they begin.   
It is relatively easy to illustrate this difference using an example of a high-
risk enlistee.  Although the old IIIB reservist is not necessarily a bad contract, he does 
exhibit a much higher probability of discharge.  Previously, this enlistee would not have 
been identified as high-risk until after he had already made up his mind to discharge.  
Now, the Marine Corps could nurture and supervise this individual’s time in the DEP so 
that he would not lose his motivation and opt to be discharged. 
  
c. Option 2 
While added focus following enlistment would no doubt dramatically 
lower the attrition risk of CAT2 entrants and somewhat lower the attrition risk of last-
week CAT3 enlistees, decreasing the discharge probability of this latter group would 
most likely require more aggressive measures.  Since CAT3 enlistee attrition rates are 
likely caused largely by the recruiter’s incentive to make a certain goal (supported by the 
fact that these same enlistees exhibit a low-risk during the first three weeks of the month), 
simply spending more time, would not drastically decrease these individuals’ discharge 
probabilities.  Based upon the discussion of discharge-reducing variables, numerous 




1.) Barring enlistment during the last-week of the month.  This 
is the most severe, but perhaps also the most effective, measure to reduce the attrition risk 
of last-week CAT3 enlistees.  One week from mission day, most recruiters still have a list 
of possible applicants who might enlist during the next five days.  Many of these 
possibilities normally vanish throughout the next few days, leaving the recruiter 
scrambling to make his or her goal at the end of the month.  It is during this time that the 
recruiter remembers CAT3 enlistees who were interviewed and screened from enlistment 
earlier in the month.  Additionally, it is during this time that the recruiter interviews and 
enlists individuals who previously would not have been contracted.  The point is, that the 
recruiter does not think to resort to these desperate measures until a few days prior to 
mission day.  The existence of this behavior is again supported by analysis of CAT3 
enlistees, reported in Chapter VI.  
Although the attrition risk of CAT3 enlistees does not become 
severe until a few days before mission day, using the last five contracting days as a cut 
off would probably prevent the enlistment of these individuals.  Six contracting days 
from mission day, a recruiter normally has many prospects for attaining the goal.  During 
this time, the recruiter does not resort to frantic measures.  Additionally, CAT3 enlistees 
are successfully screened and do exhibit a low-risk during the first three weeks of the 
month.  The recruiter therefore knows what makes a good-and bad-risk enlistee with 
respect to these individuals.  Evidence suggests that a recruiter does not intentionally 
enlist a “bad-risk” CAT3 enlistee during the first three weeks of the month.  It can, 
therefore, be assumed that the recruiter really does not resort to enlisting these low 
quality entrants until all other avenues have been exhausted.  With a policy that prevented 
the enlistment of these individuals during the last five days of the month, the recruiter 
would not be able to enlist these low-quality entrants simply to achieve a goal at the 
expense of the risk. 
 
2.) Interview with the Commanding Officer.  A policy that 
barred the enlistment of all CAT3 individuals would probably solve their attrition 
problem but it would also reduce the Marine Corps market.  While many last-week CAT3 
enlistees discharge, numerous of these individuals do not.  Given this fact, completely 
preventing the enlistment of last-week CAT3 entrants, would probably give these 
contracts to one of the other services.  Because of this disadvantage, a separate option 
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would be to require special screening by the MEPS Liaison of all last-week CAT3 
enlistees.  Those CAT3 entrants, who were identified by the MEPS Liaison as being 
unacceptable, would then be required to receive further screening by the RS 
Commanding Officer before any final decision to prevent enlistment was made. 
Even though a policy of this type would probably still allow the 
enlistment of a small percentage of poor quality CAT3 enlistees, it is likely that a 
significant percentage of entrants who would eventually discharge would be successfully 
screened out.  Not only would the recruiter and Non Commissioned Officer in Charge 
(NCOIC) of the Recruiting Substation (RSS) be faced with increased scrutiny (and 
therefore screen better themselves), but also the additional test for this select group of 
individuals, would prevent some high-risk entrants from enlisting.  This type of policy 
would perhaps slightly increase the workload of command group members during the 
last-week of the month but it would probably also lower the attrition risk of this category.  
With an average mission of 80 new enlistments per RS, only 6 to perhaps 10 would fall 
into this last-week CAT3 category.  Requiring increased screening of even 10 high-risk 
enlistees during the final week of the month and screening out perhaps four, would be a 
small price to pay to save four discharges. 
 
3.) Waivers and enlistment bonuses.  Waivers and enlistment 
bonuses dramatically lower the attrition risk of an average enlistee but their effect on low 
quality last-week CAT3 entrants is unknown.  Recruiters are probably so desperate to 
attain their recruiting goals that an enlistment waiver for these individuals would do little 
more than increase a recruiter’s paperwork.  Bonuses would also probably do little to 
decrease the attrition risk of this category, because of the characteristics of these 
enlistees, as compared with those of CAT2 entrants, discussed previously in this section.  
Regardless of these intuitive explanations, a definitive answer to this question would not 
be possible without further analysis. 
 
4.) Decreasing DEP time.  Imposing restrictions with respect 
to DEP time on last-week CAT3 enlistees is certainly an option.  The potential problems 




This thesis has been an exhaustive study of enlistees and recruiter behavior, and 
every attempt was made to ensure accuracy, but additional data would provide the Marine 
Corps with even better results.  In a discussion with Marine Corps Recruiting Command, 
the author was informed that the MCRISS system was never intended for data analysis.  
This statement, combined with the numerous discrepancies and other problems that the 
author discovered in the data throughout the course of this study, suggests that proper 
attention at a command level is needed to ensure that data are complete and reliable.  A 
system of checks and balances must be installed in the current MCRISS system to ensure 
the integrity of the data.  The Marine Corps spent millions of dollars to field the MCRISS 
system and even more has been spent to create TFDW.  These systems could be an 
immeasurable tool to guide the Marine Corps in the most efficient employment of its 
human capital.  With inaccurate data, the maximum effectives of these systems cannot 
yet be exploited. 
 
3. Additional Research 
The findings of this thesis can provide the Marine Corps a gain in efficiency.  
Even with the knowledge of which enlistees exhibit a high attrition risk, much work 
remains to be done.  Do the groups identified in this study also exhibit a high attrition risk 
at recruit training and thereafter?  What measures, or combinations of measures would 
best lower the attrition risk of the groups identified in this thesis?  Are other measures 
available that would lower the attrition risk of even the good CAT1 enlistee?  Finally, 
there is no reason to believe that the other services could not benefit from a study of this 
type.  If high-risk enlistees are high-risk for the Marine Corps, they may exhibit similar 
behavior for the other services as well.  All of these questions and others remain to be 
examined. 
 
4. Final Remarks 
The information presented in this study can help to improve Marine Corps 
recruiting operations.  Whereas previously, the Marine Corps had no method to identify 
quality Tier I enlistees before enlistment (in terms of attrition risk) or to focus on high-
risk Tier I entrants while in the DEP, the findings of this study now make this possible.  
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Using the information presented in this thesis, the Marine Corps can target enlistees who 
consistently demonstrate a high risk of attrition from the DEP.  These efforts are 
completely different from current recruiting practices and may reduce DEP attrition and 
increase contracting.  Through continued research and focus of effort, the Marine Corps 




























Probit Models – Entire Last-week 







WEEK_45 0.0273 0.0262 
 (0.0052)*** (0.0045)***
Observations 26616 41347 
Standard errors in parentheses 

























fy00 -0.1046 0.0346 
 (0.0082)*** (0.0061)*** 
mcd1 0.1048 0.0096 
 (0.0219)*** (0.0065) 
mcd6 0.0329 0.0327 
 (0.0207) (0.0085)*** 
mcd9 0.0593 0.0301 
 (0.0206)*** (0.0102)*** 
mcd12 0.0107 0.0692 
 (0.0204) (0.0146)*** 
summer 0.1046 0.0250 
 (0.0133)*** (0.0140)* 
fall 0.1171 0.0442 
 (0.0154)*** (0.0138)*** 
winter 0.0483 0.0307 
 (0.0148)*** (0.0137)** 
deptime -0.0001 0.0007 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)*** 
dep_ext 0.2240 -0.0940 
 (0.0299)*** (0.0080)*** 
male -0.1025 -0.0697 
 (0.0175)*** (0.0118)*** 
age 0.0089 0.0093 
 (0.0061) (0.0011)*** 
afqt -0.0011 -0.0003 
 (0.0002)*** (0.0001)** 
reg -0.0217 0.0245 
 (0.0136) (0.0062)*** 
asvabtime1 -0.0298 -0.0368 
 (0.0087)*** (0.0056)*** 
white -0.0251 -0.0390 
 (0.0134)* (0.0090)*** 
other -0.0127 -0.0384 
 (0.0260) (0.0127)*** 
decline -0.0646 -0.0518 
 (0.0163)*** (0.0087)*** 
plmoves1 0.0109 0.0180 
 (0.0267) (0.0172) 
rctrgen 0.0301 0.0079 
 (0.0101)*** (0.0062) 
referral 0.0126 -0.0040 
 (0.0101) (0.0071) 
bumed_w -0.0733 -0.0421 
 (0.0260)*** (0.0145)*** 
dep_w -0.0735 -0.0302 
 (0.0372)** (0.0111)*** 
admin_w -0.1122 -0.0554 
 (0.0122)*** (0.0076)*** 
age_w  -0.0611 
  (0.0207)*** 
week_45 0.0269 0.0099 
 (0.0102)*** (0.0066) 
lday 0.0393 0.0105 
 (0.0163)** (0.0104) 
Observations 11134 15506 




































 (FY00/01) DISCHARGE (FY03/04) DISCHARGE 
fy00 0.0348 -0.0007 
 (0.0061)*** (0.0046) 
summer 0.0081 -0.0073 
 (0.0065) (0.0054) 
fall 0.0312 -0.0112 
 (0.0085)*** (0.0063)* 
winter 0.0288 0.0002 
 (0.0102)*** (0.0069) 
mcd1 0.0676 0.0270 
 (0.0146)*** (0.0072)*** 
mcd6 0.0237 -0.0049 
 (0.0139)* (0.0069) 
mcd9 0.0438 0.0086 
 (0.0138)*** (0.0075) 
mcd12 0.0303 -0.0043 
 (0.0137)** (0.0071) 
deptime 0.0007 0.0006 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
dep_ext -0.0956 -0.0379 
 (0.0078)*** (0.0107)*** 
male -0.0674 -0.0338 
 (0.0117)*** (0.0091)*** 
black 0.0456 0.0068 
 (0.0095)*** (0.0082) 
other -0.0051 -0.0460 
 (0.0144) (0.0429) 
decline -0.0210 -0.0125 
 (0.0089)** (0.0055)** 
plmves1 0.0204 0.0780 
 (0.0173) (0.0097)*** 
rctrgen 0.0098 -0.0033 
 (0.0062) (0.0053) 
referral -0.0039 -0.0045 
 (0.0071) (0.0061) 
bumed_w -0.0417 -0.0410 
 (0.0146)*** (0.0086)*** 
dep_w -0.0232 -0.0166 
 (0.0116)** (0.0095)* 
admin_w -0.0561 -0.0095 
 (0.0076)*** (0.0069) 
age_w -0.0161 -0.0375 


































CAT1_WEEK45 0.0143 0.0012 
 (0.0087)* (0.0073) 
CAT3 0.0365 0.0346 
 (0.0079)*** (0.0064)*** 
CAT2_a 0.0906 0.0712 
 (0.0258)*** (0.0223)*** 
CAT2_b 0.0731 0.0487 
 (0.0107)*** (0.0085)*** 
CAT2_c 0.0656 0.0975 
 (0.0221)*** (0.0181)*** 
CAT2_d 0.0838 0.0938 
 (0.0251)*** (0.02081)*** 
CAT2_e 0.0747 0.05144 
 (0.0215)*** (0.01340)*** 
Observations 15506 23416 
Standard errors in parentheses* sig at 10%; ** sig at 5%; *** sig at 1% 
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fy00 0.0352 -0.0007 
 (0.0061)*** (0.0046) 
summer 0.0095 -0.0065 
 (0.0065) (0.0054) 
fall 0.0323 -0.0108 
 (0.0085)*** (0.0063)* 
winter 0.0307 0.0004 
 (0.0102)*** (0.0069) 
mcd1 0.0664 0.0287 
 (0.0145)*** (0.0072)*** 
mcd6 0.0228 -0.0037 
 (0.0139)* (0.0069) 
mcd9 0.0432 0.0110 
 (0.0137)*** (0.0075) 
mcd12 0.0296 -0.0023 
 (0.0136)** (0.0071) 
deptime 0.0007 0.0006 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
dep_ext -0.0930 -0.0363 
 (0.0082)*** (0.0107)*** 
male -0.0678 -0.0314 
 (0.0117)*** (0.0090)*** 
black 0.0454 0.0071 
 (0.0095)*** (0.0082) 
other -0.0056 -0.0460 
 (0.0143) (0.0426) 
decline -0.0212 -0.0124 
 (0.0089)** (0.0054)** 
plmves1 0.0190 0.0784 
 (0.0172) (0.0097)*** 
rctrgen 0.0094 -0.0031 
 (0.0062) (0.0053) 
referral -0.0039 -0.0049 
 (0.0071) (0.0061) 
bumed_w -0.0414 -0.0392 
 (0.0145)*** (0.0087)*** 
dep_w -0.0221 -0.0151 
 (0.0116)* (0.0095) 
admin_w -0.0553 -0.0094 
 (0.0076)*** (0.0069) 
age_w -0.0097 -0.0336 
 (0.0314) (0.0250) 
CAT1_WEEK45 0.0144 0.0014 
 (0.0087)* (0.0073) 
CAT2 0.0723 0.0577 
 (0.0086)*** (0.0068)*** 
CAT3_a_WEEK123 0.0162 0.0070 
 (0.0158) (0.0123) 
CAT3_a_WEEK45 0.0559 0.0523 
 (0.0252)** (0.0201)*** 
CAT3_b_WEEK123 -0.0059 -0.0242 
 (0.0190) (0.0133)* 
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CAT3_b_WEEK45 0.0781 0.0128 
 (0.0328)** (0.0238) 
CAT3_c_WEEK123 -0.0240 0.0288 
 (0.0143)* (0.0149)* 
CAT3_c_WEEK45 0.0371 0.0644 
 (0.0261) (0.0264)** 
CAT3_d_WEEK123 0.0618 0.0513 
 (0.0168)*** (0.0133)*** 
CAT3_d_WEEK45 0.0999 0.1105 
 (0.0262)*** (0.0233)*** 
CAT3_e_WEEK123 0.0595 0.0260 
 (0.0220)*** (0.0134)* 
CAT3_e_WEEK45 0.0869 0.1174 
 (0.0345)** (0.0254)*** 
CAT3_f_WEEK123 0.1339 0.0574 
 (0.0283)*** (0.0188)*** 
CAT3_f_WEEK45 0.1383 0.0679 
 (0.0384)*** (0.0278)** 
Observations 15506 23416 
Standard errors in parentheses 



























fy00 -0.1035 -0.0395 
 (0.0082)*** (0.0071)*** 
mcd1 0.1047 -0.0147 
 (0.0218)*** (0.0106) 
mcd6 0.0307 0.0056 
 (0.0206) (0.0110) 
mcd9 0.0571 -0.0069 
 (0.0206)*** (0.0106) 
mcd12 0.0083 -0.0302 
 (0.0203) (0.0108)*** 
summer 0.1089 0.0334 
 (0.0128)*** (0.0107)*** 
fall 0.1224 0.0498 
 (0.0148)*** (0.0115)*** 
winter 0.0535 0.0543 
 (0.0142)*** (0.0109)*** 
deptime -0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)*** 
dep_ext 0.2219 0.0553 
 (0.0298)*** (0.0215)** 
male -0.1023 -0.1716 
 (0.0174)*** (0.0138)*** 
white -0.0288 -0.0197 
 (0.0134)** (0.0117)* 
other -0.0163 0.2213 
 (0.0258) (0.1043)** 
decline -0.0646 -0.0155 
 (0.0163)*** (0.0131) 
plmoves1 0.0116 0.2360 
 (0.0267) (0.0149)*** 
rctrgen 0.0311 0.0144 
 (0.0101)*** (0.0086)* 
referral 0.0136 -0.0108 
 (0.0101) (0.0087) 
dep_w -0.0726 -0.0777 
 (0.0373)* (0.0287)*** 
bumed_w -0.0765 -0.0678 
 (0.0256)*** (0.0159)*** 
admin_w -0.1113 -0.0467 
 (0.0123)*** (0.0115)*** 
CAT1_WEEK45 0.0239 0.0192 
 (0.0123)* (0.0111)* 
CAT3 0.0251 0.0526 
 (0.0100)** (0.0085)*** 
CAT2_a 0.0802 0.0847 
 (0.0195)*** (0.0142)*** 
CAT2_b 0.1387 0.1359 
 (0.0360)*** (0.0325)*** 
Observations 11134 17343 
Standard errors in parentheses 






























fy00 -0.1044 -0.0395 
 (0.0082)*** (0.0071)*** 
mcd1 0.1034 -0.0144 
 (0.0218)*** (0.0106) 
mcd6 0.0303 0.0059 
 (0.0206) (0.0111) 
mcd9 0.0585 -0.0052 
 (0.0206)*** (0.0106) 
mcd12 0.0092 -0.0285 
 (0.0203) (0.0109)*** 
summer 0.1173 0.0400 
 (0.0132)*** (0.0110)*** 
fall 0.1301 0.0573 
 (0.0152)*** (0.0118)*** 
winter 0.0593 0.0622 
 (0.0145)*** (0.0112)*** 
deptime -0.0001 0.0003 
 (0.0000)* (0.0000)*** 
dep_ext 0.2244 0.0574 
 (0.0299)*** (0.0216)*** 
male -0.1017 -0.1721 
 (0.0174)*** (0.0138)*** 
white -0.0305 -0.0211 
 (0.0134)** (0.0117)* 
other -0.0180 0.2275 
 (0.0257) (0.1044)** 
decline -0.0648 -0.0166 
 (0.0163)*** (0.0131) 
plmoves1 0.0121 0.2324 
 (0.0267) (0.0150)*** 
rctrgen 0.0304 0.0137 
 (0.0101)*** (0.0086) 
referral 0.0134 -0.0100 
 (0.0101) (0.0087) 
dep_w -0.0762 -0.0804 
 (0.0368)** (0.0285)*** 
bumed_w -0.0756 -0.0662 
 (0.0257)*** (0.0160)*** 
admin_w -0.1093 -0.0479 
 (0.0124)*** (0.0115)*** 
CAT1_WEEK45 0.0278 0.0166 
 (0.0159)* (0.0141) 
CAT2 0.0897 0.1032 
 (0.0190)*** (0.0145)*** 
CAT3_a_WEEK123 -0.0354 0.0261 
 (0.0226) (0.0211) 
CAT3_a_WEEK45 0.0259 0.0703 
 (0.0336) (0.0356)** 
CAT3_b_WEEK123 -0.0581 0.0440 
 (0.0224)*** (0.0272) 
CAT3_b_WEEK45 0.0362 0.1275 
 (0.0433) (0.0407)*** 
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CAT3_c_WEEK123 0.0335 0.0379 
 (0.0251) (0.0221)* 
CAT3_c_WEEK45 0.0943 0.0905 
 (0.0382)** (0.0324)*** 
CAT3_d_WEEK123 0.0302 0.0764 
 (0.0181)* (0.0166)*** 
CAT3_d_WEEK45 0.0320 0.1201 
 (0.0248) (0.0244)*** 
CAT3_e_WEEK123 -0.0259 -0.0058 
 (0.0177) (0.0164) 
CAT3_e_WEEK45 0.0206 0.0095 
 (0.0262) (0.0248) 
CAT3_f_WEEK123 0.0102 0.0430 
 (0.0140) (0.0115)*** 
CAT3_f_WEEK45 0.0598 0.0987 
 (0.0197)*** (0.0167)*** 
Observations 11134 17343 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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